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ABSTRACT
The rally around the flag effect describes the president’s to increase in job approval
during and immediately after an international crisis. This project has been built as an attempt
to explain why that effect occurs. The literature on the presidency and public opinion point at
two determinants for the rally effect: the acceptance of the President as the symbolic leader
of the nation and the center of action in the government, and opinion leadership, especially
that given by the independent mass media. By examining the development of the rally effect,
I tested the relative importance of these two factors.
To test these factors, I used a mixed methods approach to analyze the existence of
rally effects in each of three cases. The quantitative portion included development of a proxy
measure for public approval through the content analysis of newspapers before, during and
after potential rally events. Applying a bivariate analysis to this measure, I could show when
there were changes in the patterns of mentions of and attitudes towards the President, the
Congress, and public opinion. I added to this analysis a qualitative narrative, adding depth to
the analysis and showing where the determinants were and why the numbers were telling the
story that they did.
vi

I selected three potential historical cases of rallies. The first, focused on the Thornton
Affair and the Mexican-American War, was designed to be a least-likely case, with neither
factor present. The third event, the publication of the Zimmerman Telegram and the First
World War, was a most-likely case, with both present. The second case, the sinking of the
battleship USS Maine and the Spanish-American War, involved one of the determinants, the
independent media, being present, with the other, the symbolic presidency, not yet fully
developed.
My results showed no rally in the first case and a modern rally in the third. In the
second case I found a lagged increase in approval, linked with the policy change rather than
with the rally event itself. This supports the idea that it is indeed the symbolic presidency that
drives people the rally around the flag.
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[The President] is the only national voice in affairs. Let him once win the admiration
and confidence of the country, and no other single force can withstand him, no
combination of forces will easily overpower him.
--- Woodrow Wilson
Chapter 1:
Why Do We Rally Around the Flag?
On the morning of Tuesday, September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush arrived
in a Florida elementary school classroom, visiting in support of early reading programs.
Selected by the Electoral College against the popular vote of the nation, President Bush’s
approval rating stood at 51%. He was a prime example of a weakened President, hampered
by lingering questions of his electoral legitimacy and a narrowly divided Congress. No
President who had been selected by the Electoral College against the popular vote had ever
been re-elected. That morning would change his legacy forever as the attacks in New York
and Washington materialized. Without any substantive action on his part besides speeches,
President Bush’s job approval rating suddenly jumped to 86%, the biggest single change in
Gallup history, and continued the next week by going to 90%, the highest score any President
has registered since Gallup began asking the job approval question.1 With this surge of
political capital, he launched the invasion of Afghanistan with little to no dissent, was able to
pass the USA-PATRIOT Act, criticized by key members of both parties as infringing on
fundamental civil liberties, by huge margins in both houses,2 and enacted, in the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, the largest restructuring of the federal government since WWII. He
capped this whirlwind year off with a rare mid-term seat gain in both chambers of Congress,

1
2

Based on Gallup Polls taken September 7-10, 14-15 and 21-22, 2001.
The Senate vote was 98-1 and the House vote was 357-66.
1

returning the evenly split Senate to solid Republican control and widening his party’s narrow
majority in the House.
If there is a law in presidential and public opinion studies, it is that international
crises, like the attacks on September 11, cause surges in a president’s approval ratings. The
above story is the quintessence of that phenomenon, known as the rally-around-the-flag
effect, and an excellent example of how a president can use it to his political benefit; this is a
critical fact because an increase in approval with the public at large can, as it did with
President Bush, contribute greatly to the political capital and thus to the power of the
president. This work is a story of that effect’s development.
Richard Neustadt said that the power of the president is “the power to persuade.”3
When Presidents are able to draw directly on the public for support, the effectiveness of the
bully pulpit4 allows them to ‘persuade’ the other members of government more forcefully.
Being the sole officer of the national government elected from the whole nation, albeit
indirectly, the President is uniquely able to draw on that national support. The rally effect has
a direct effect on the president’s approval score and because of that is an important
contribution to the executive’s power base.
This is an important time in which to examine this phenomenon. President Bush
gained much of his political capital, at least prima facie, from rally events: first the

3

Neustadt, 1990, pg. 11.
The term ‘bully pulpit,’ first coined by President Teddy Roosevelt, is the ability of the
President to ‘bully’ other actors in the system, especially Congress, by stepping up to the
‘pulpit’ and going public with an appeal to the people. As a single actor with a national
constituency and reputation, not to mention a symbolic position, this works much more
effectively for the President than members of Congress.
4
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September 11th attacks, subsequently the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.5 Rarely in the
history of the United States has US soil been directly attacked; the number of times in the last
century can be counted on one hand, one finger if you count only the contiguous 48 states.
Attacks by subnational actors, like the terrorists of Al-Qaeda, on the scale of the September
11 attacks were unprecedented.6 In this sort of context, it should come as no surprise that
most people were quickly united in their opposition to the perceived source of these attacks
and that their support largely translated into nearly unconditional support for executive
action. The question, though, still remains: why?
The Puzzle
This project revolves around that single central question: why does the rally around
the flag effect happen? The academic literature in presidential studies and public behavior
posit that the rally effect is a result of two essentially modern phenomenon: the symbolic
status of the executive as leader of the nation and the ability of the media to affect public
opinion with massive amounts of information, serving to focus public attention on certain
events. These two are articulated as mutually exclusive alternatives to each other in the vast
majority of publications. The ideal way to examine the role of these two variables is to vary
the existence or strength of one or both and see what sort of effect it then has on the rally
around the flag itself. This not being possible in a real-world situation, the best alternative is
to look for a time before the mass media and the president’s symbolic status were facts taken
for granted in the nation’s day-to-day life.
5

While they gave him a large reserve of political capital initially, President Bush was
subsequently criticized and lost a lot of political capital over both of these invasions, though
much more from Iraq than from Afghanistan.
6
Pancho Villa’s raid on Columbus, NM on March 9, 1916 was the last attack on the US
mainland before 9/11 and like 9/11 was also conducted by a subnational actor.
3

This work tries to uncover whether the Presidents that served before the modern era
experienced the same sort of rally effect that their modern successors to the office enjoy. Is it
the power and camera lights of the modern era, or is it something else, that makes people
rally around the flag and the President? It seems logical to the modern citizen thinking about
the question that the president might have always gotten this sort of support. After all, the
office holder is both the leader of the government and the leader of the nation. If the office
received the same kind of support before the advent of the modern presidency, this creates a
major problem in the literature’s acceptance of the two main determinants of the rally effect.
A rally in the absence of those factors calls them into doubt. However, if the rally effect does
not exist in the pre-modern era of presidential politics, it will not only provide support for the
existing research, but also expand the understanding of how the rally effect itself changed
over time as the determinants of the effect developed. The two determinants are fairly cut and
dry in two of my cases. During the Mexican-American War, neither is present while during
World War I both are fully developed. However, in my middle case, the Spanish-American
War, I found a break in the development of the factors. The mass media at the end of the
nineteenth century had broken free of the political parties’ control. It was sensational, it was
yellow,7 but most importantly it was independent. The same cannot be said about the
symbolic nature of the presidency. During this time, the presidency was beginning to develop
a power base, but the connection to the people had not yet been made. It is this connection
that gives the presidency its position among the great symbols of American patriotism. Being

7

The term ‘yellow journalism’ refers to the sensationalist coverage that gripped many
newspapers around the turn of the twentieth century. The term comes from an early colored
comic strip, “The Yellow Kid,” and is generally considered pejorative.
4

able to examine the effect of the media without the existence of the symbolic presidency will
be extremely illuminating.
To investigate this development, I looked back into American history and selected
events that would, given modern circumstances, create a rally effect for the chief executive.
In the absence of hard polling data, not available until the appearance of Gallup in the early
1930s, I decided on a mixed methods approach to the project. The first part of this approach
was the development of and testing with a proxy measurement for public opinion. I
constructed this by examining the mentions of and attitudes towards the President and
administration policy in the media of the day: the newspaper. I chose three papers in the New
York market for each of my three cases, based on recognized leanings with regards to the
administration: one supportive, one critical, and one considered generally neutral. Moving
from there, I utilized Kam and Ramos’ methodology8 for analyzing qualitative data for
opinions, selecting randomly ten issues from the month before my identified rally event, then
an additional ten from each of the following six months. For each of these issues, I coded
whether or not they mentioned the President or the administration and what the article’s
apparent slant on the topic, if any. For the sake of depth, I also coded mentions and attitudes
towards Congress and public opinion; this allowed me to comment on whether or not the
public, in my measure, was rallying to Congress as opposed to the President, as well as how
the papers were treating open expressions of popular sentiment.
The goal of this work is two-fold. The first and primary of these is an examination of
the rally effect and its determinants, the emergence of the symbolic presidency and the
independent mass media, and, to a lesser extent, the effect of those determinants on the
8

Kam and Ramos, 2008.
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executive branch. The rally effect is important to understand in the American political system
because rallies have a nearly unique ability to facilitate surges, albeit temporary, in
presidential power. The design of the executive branch allows this to happen, as it was
written into the Constitution of 1787 in such a way as to be the center of action. The
Constitution, intentionally or not, vested the new executive branch with all executive
functions, in contrast to vesting of Congress with only those “legislative powers herein [the
Constitution] granted,” an explicit limitation. It was made to be the source from which
appointments to all offices in the system flow. It was given control over the armed forces of
the United States and charged with the “faithful execution”9 of the laws. The rally around the
flag effect lends credence to the idea that Presidents, faced with such crises, accrue a certain
amount of power, at least when measured in the terms of short-term public support, and if not
support and cooperation then complicity from other institutional actors.10 In modern times,
this support is unconditional and nearly unquestioned, without regard to the success or failure
of the President’s specific actions in response to the crisis. The fact that these two items
cause this sort of surge in public approval during crises lends power to the President.11
Understanding where the rally effect comes from and how it develops contributes to the
understanding of presidential power, especially as it operates during times of crisis.

9

Constitution of the United States: Article 2, Section 3. While this is more of a duty than a
power in and of itself, the Supreme Court has interpreted this clause similarly as the
necessary and proper clause in Article 1, giving the President broad discretion to do what he
needs to do to execute the laws, even without a specific grant of statutory power. See In re
Nagel (135 US 1) and In re Debs (158 US 564) for the Court’s opinions on the ‘general
grant’ principle of this section of the Constitution.
10
Muller, 1973, pg. 208.
11
Regan, 2002, pg. 15.
6

Before the executive could call on the people to support his actions against
Congressional opposition, most Presidents were restrained from using their power in such a
way that might make them seem too far outside of a constitutional system in which Congress
controlled the declarations of war and in practice many of the foreign policy decisions. This
restraint came from various sources: Congress, the Courts, and even the Presidents’ own
philosophical understandings of the proper relationship between the executive and the rest of
the government. They continually came to Congress with their actions for ratification. Polk,
as an example, requested from Congress a declaration of war for a conflict that he triggered
by his own movement of troops into a disputed border region in Texas. Lincoln petitioned
Congress for retroactive approval of his use of the federal military in the early days of the
Civil War, as Congress was out of session when the crisis struck. In fact, he had precipitated
Southern action by moving to resupply Fort Sumter despite the threat of Confederate guns.
This deference to Congress changed as the President became more connected to the public
and could use their support as ammunition against his opposition.
After the Second World War, major advances in weapons technology made the world
a much smaller place and the United States was forced by security concerns to become more
involved on the international stage. Almost any crisis anywhere in the world had implications
for the United States. In response to President Harry Truman’s seizure of steel mills during
the Korean War, Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson wrote that “when the President acts
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its

7

maximum”12; foreign policy is one of those areas that Congress has given more and more
over the last century and a half to the executive branch. As the post-World War II world
settled into a world-wide struggle between the superpowers, this combined preeminence in
both foreign policy and the use of force allowed the Presidency to gain an enormous amount
of power in relationship to Congress.13 It can be said that the same things that facilitate the
rally around the flag also have made the Presidency into the fiercely independent and nearly
autonomous actor on the world stage that it has become.
The second goal of this work is to trace the development of the modern presidency in
relation to the president’s connection to the people as a source of power. While the modern
presidency has long been seen as the seat of popular leadership, this was not always the case.
In fact, it was not until Andrew Jackson’s election that popular leadership was really
understood as a proper role for the Chief Executive. Most of the presidents who followed
Jackson, however, disavowed this precedent for much of the nineteenth century. There was
significant worry about the threat that the executive as demagogue might pose to the system
as a whole. Policy messages, therefore, were addressed directly to Congress, when written at
all. This rule restricted information about most legislation to those within the government.
When these messages were published, they were only really accessible to those who could
understand the finer points of the rhetorical and policy-focused language in which they were
written. Elections were conducted similarly, with the candidates speaking through spokesmen
and the parties rather than campaigning themselves. On the other hand, when the President

12

Youngstown Sheet and Tube v Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952). Jackson’s concurring opinion is
not the opinion of the Court, but is the most cited in legal circles with regards to the limits of
presidential powers vis-à-vis Congress. See Epstein and Walker, pg. 293.
13
See McCormick, 1980, pgs. 81-2, and Mullen, 1976, pg. 40.
8

did address his constituents directly, the vast majority of those speeches were instructional in
form, focusing on patriotism and the responsibilities of the day. It was not until the first
President Roosevelt that this began to change. Roosevelt used the popular appeal as a bully
pulpit, gaining support from the people and using it directly against those, especially in
Congress, who opposed him on points of legislation or policy.
The Lessons
What can we learn about rallies from this research? There are a few possible
outcomes from this study. The first is that rallies are not found. In an absence of the
prevailing factors discussed before, the symbolic presidency and the independent mass
media, the President did not seem to gain any major public support from the occurrences of
international crises. Perhaps the support for the government went to some other part of the
system. It is possible that rallies did not happen at all. The second possibility is that rallies
still occurred in this period despite the lack of the accepted factors. If this were the case, the
hunt would be on for another variable or combination of variables that cause the rallies to
emerge even for what is considered a fairly limited institution.
The first possibility, that rallies did not occur before the modern presidency, comes
with a set of implications. Schlesinger sums up this possibility in a short paragraph:
As the parties wasted away, the Presidency stood out in solitary majesty as the central
focus of political emotion, the ever potent symbol of national community. When
parties were strong and media weak, Presidents were objects of respect but not of
veneration. There were no great personal cults of Rutherford B. Hayes and Benjamin
Harrison.14
Both the strong independent mass media and what Tulis would call the rhetorical presidency,
with its emphasis on “direct popular appeal” and “the doctrine that the president ought to be a
14

Schlesinger, 1973, pg. 210.
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popular leader,”15 only emerge in the era of the modern presidency. If these are absent, one
might expect that rally effects would fade as well. The executive would draw its power from
the Constitution”16 directly, resting not only on their powers but on their independent
constitutional position, until the more modern presidents, beginning with Teddy Roosevelt
and Woodrow Wilson, felt appeals to the people were appropriate when contending with the
other branches, especially the Congress. To understand how these factors affect rallies, we
need to understand how both of these independent variables, the existence of the mass media
and the president as the symbolic and actual leader of government, develop during the era of
the traditional presidency and through the transformation of that office into its modern
incarnation.
The second possibility, that rallies do occur in this period of history, begs the most
obvious question: why? It is possible that the Framers intended the president to be able to
draw support from the public during times of crisis. As Publius lays out in the Federalist
Papers, a strong executive “is essential to the protection of the community from foreign
attacks,”17 because of his ability as a single actor to react with speed and purpose and “the
qualities… indispensable in the management of foreign negotiations point out the executive
as the most fit agent in those transactions.”18 Tulis, describing how different objectives were
placed into different branches as they were designed, points out that “’self-preservation’ or
national security [is] of utmost concern to the president,”19 which places foreign relations
solidly within the sphere of the executive’s accepted activities from the beginning. Two
15

Tulis, 1984, pg. 4.
Ibid., pg. 40.
17
Hamilton, et. al., 1999, pg. 421.
18
Ibid, pg. 449.
19
Tulis, 1987, pg. 42
16
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examples from the early years of the Republic set this precedent in action, beyond Publius’
theoretical arguments: the Neutrality Proclamation, issued in 1793, and the Jay Treaty of
1794.
The Neutrality Proclamation declared that the former colonies would not take sides in
the conflict between France and England after the execution of Louis XVI. The right of
President Washington, and by association any other president, to declare neutrality in the
face of the war power given to Congress was hotly debated between Hamilton and Madison.
Under the respective pennames Pacificus and Helvidius, the former stating that it was the
responsibility of the President to preserve peace until Congress decided otherwise and the
latter arguing from a strict constructionist view that Congress, not the President, held the
central authority over foreign policy except where those powers were granted to the President
by the Constitution.20 Ultimately the proclamation was issued and set the precedent that
decisions on official foreign policy stances would be made from the executive. This
proclamation is sometimes pointed to as a forerunner to Washington’s Farewell Address
warning against entangling alliances.
The second precedent, also set by Washington, came from the discussion in Congress
of the 1794 Treaty of London, the treaty officially ending the American War of
Independence. The Jay Treaty, as it is more commonly known, was denounced by the
emerging Democratic-Republicans as being too friendly to England. The House of
Representatives passed a resolution calling on President Washington to hand over all
documents and correspondence relating to the negotiations. Washington refused, stating that

20

Hamilton and Madison, 1845. This is a classic discussion on the relative power of the
executive and legislative branches in foreign policy matters.
11

foreign policy was the province of the executive and while the Senate certainly had a role,
the House did not.21 By providing the papers to the Senate alone and excluding the House, he
established the pattern that the President, with the Senate in an advisory role, was the initiator
of foreign policy in the constitutional system.
A third possibility is that, should one of the determinants of the rally develop without
the other, the effect will behave differently. It is this possibility that could bring the most
value to this project. It will allow me to see what role the two factors have on the rally effect
in isolation from one another.
Working from these three possible results for the study, finding rallies, finding none
or some sort of altered rally effect, I find that rallies do not seem to occur in the same way
that they do in the modern era. However it is not quite as simple as they do or do not occur;
as the determinants of the rally effect developed, the rally around the flag effect emerged and
changed over time. As the nineteenth century progressed, it became more and more
pronounced and began to conform to the modern expectations of the rally by the time of the
First World War. It is, in fact, the third possible result that occurs.
In the earliest case for this work, the rally effect was non-existent. The fact that the
public did not yet identify the President as the main center of policy and reactions to crises,
coupled with the lack of a coherent mass media to disseminate information quickly, the rally
as we know it did not form. In fact, my case study shows that the partisan-driven media used
the issue to largely political ends, both for and against the administration. President Polk
ended up with a statistically insignificant downturn in his approval as a result of the initiation
of the Mexican-American War.
21

Koenig, 1975, pg. 31 and Milkis and Nelson, pg. 87.
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By the time of my last case study, Congressional resistance to the executive’s claim
on foreign policy was gone and Presidents were recognized the prime mover in that area.
They were recognized by the public and by the elites as the setters of foreign policy and
responders to international crises. This is not to say that the Congress, especially the Senate,
completely deferred to the executive in all things dealing with foreign policy. However, it
typically remained silent until it was presented with a question, usually a treaty, and then
responded. It was at this point that Congress might rebel; the failure of Treaty of Versailles is
a prime example of this sometimes-rebellious streak of the Senate against presidential
leadership in foreign policy matters. This is not fundamentally different than recent years.
During the Spanish-American War, my second case study, the media was more
developed and had divorced itself largely from the direct control of the political parties. In
fact, one might say that the newspapers were radically independent; it had swung so far away
from the control of the political parties and towards the pursuit of circulation that they were
willing to do anything, print anything, just to sell a few extra issues. In fact, it was this
sensationalist journalism, called ‘yellow journalism,’ that many credit with forcing the nation
into the Spanish-American War. The President’s power was rebounding after its nadir near
the end of the Grant administration and the White House was becoming more able to set its
own policy and drive it into action. Foreign policy was one of the areas that the executive had
regained the most power. Congress, on the other hand, had not yet come to accept this
completely during this period. McKinley faced a major rebellion among the members of his
party in Congress against his policy of non-intervention in Cuba. This intra-party split was a
major contributing factor to his being forced to ask for permission to intervene; the
alternative was an inter-branch battle with Congress and an internecine struggle within his
13

own party going into the midterm elections. If a party were to rebel or even threaten to rebel
against their own president in this way during a time of international crisis, the dissenters
were be attacked as disloyal, but not against the party; it would be seen as disloyalty towards
the nation. In the late nineteenth century, however, this was not a problem as the president
was not yet that symbol of the country. The fact that this determinant lagged behind the
emergence of the independent media points to this case as the one with the most potential
action. What happens when only the media is present? Does it still result in a rally effect? If
it does, then opinion leadership from the media is supported as the primary determinant of
the rally effect. If none emerges, then it supports the symbolic position of the White House as
being the primary reason that the president enjoys a bump in approval from crises. My
analysis shows that the latter of these two is what occurred. When you remove the symbolic
presidency from the equation, the rally becomes tied not to the event itself but to a change in
policy and/or action on the president’s part. This is not the modern understanding of the rally
around the flag phenomenon.
This work supports the idea that the rally around the flag effect is essentially a
modern phenomenon. Its development coincides with the development of the mass media
and the understanding of the presidency as the proper actor on the foreign stage. In contrast
to the two opposing camps of patriotism and elite opinion leadership, it is in fact the
development of both that creates the effect, not either one in isolation. That said, this work
also points at the symbolic nature of the chief executive as the leader of the nation as being
essential for the effect to materialize.
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Dissertation Overview
This work, in its search for the rally effect in the pre-modern era of the presidency,
does a number of things. First, it lays out in chapter 2 the literature on the modern rally
effect, including a discussion of the most widely discussed determinants of the effect. This is
a very broad set of literature, including pieces from presidential power studies,22 foreign
policy,23 public opinion,24 and institutional relations.25 This is in addition to writings
specifically on the rally effect.26
Chapter 2 continues on to describe my methodology, with mixed qualitative and
quantitative analyses, and data collection scheme, as well as addressing some potential
methodological concerns with the project. It also discusses the methods by which I selected
my cases. The chapter goes on to lay out a developmental theory of the rally effect. I describe
the progression of the rally effect through my three case studies and discuss those cases in
relation to the development of the two main determinants of the rally effect.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 examine three potential historical cases of the rally effect: the
Thornton Affair at the beginning of the Mexican-American War, the sinking of the battleship
USS Maine which touched off the Spanish-American War, and the publication of the
Zimmerman Telegram in the weeks leading up to the U.S. entry into the First World War,
respectively. Each of these three case studies is examined in an attempt to quantify public
opinion and the effect of the rally event on that opinion. These analyses combine the
quantitative analysis of my public opinion proxy measure, developed from content analysis
22
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of newspaper coverage, with a deeper qualitative narrative describing the decisions made by
the administration and the role of public opinion in those choices.
Chapter 6 summarizes the major findings of the project and sets them in the context
of the broader literatures and debates on the relationships of the executive branch and public
opinion. It asserts that the rally effect is an essentially modern phenomenon. It also calls
closer attention to the Spanish-American War as an important case because of the
disconnection in the development of the two determinants, supporting the emergence of the
symbolic presidency as the primary determinant of the rally around the flag effect. However,
it also argues that to fully understand the rally around the flag effect, the literature needs to
be more willing to combine the competing camps of patriotism and media and understand
that both have a role to play in the explanation of the causes of rallies.
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Chapter 2:
Literature, Theory and Methodology
The Office of the President has always had every constitutional characteristic it does
now. Two and a quarter centuries and twenty-seven amendments later, the President is still
the only nationally elected leader, albeit indirectly; the Twelfth Amendment changed the
minutia of the Electoral College, but not its basic character. The President is still a unitary
executive, still not beholden to any sort of formal council, still the commander-in-chief of the
military and still in possession of significant powers of persuasion. The only constitutional
limitation on the President passed has been the Truman-era limit of two terms enacted by the
Twenty-Second Amendment. Passed in the aftermath of FDR’s unprecedented four election
victories, this created a lame duck situation for second-term presidents in which their grip on
power was lessened by their own impending exit; some argue, however, that the divorce of a
second-term President from electoral consequences actually increases the tendency to act
unilaterally.27 Other members of the government, like in the early years of the Republic, are
still under no fundamental obligation to support administration policies at any time, including
times of national or international crisis. There have been no constitutional changes to expand
the powers of the executive branch; why then has it expanded so greatly since the turn of the
twentieth century?
This work argues that the expansion has come because of changes around the office
rather than within it. The effective marriage of presidential power to public opinion and
support employed by Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson and the effective legislative
leadership utilized by William Taft created precedents that the second Roosevelt combined
27
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and used to full advantage during the New Deal, ushering in the era of the modern
presidency. The power of public support in an elected system, coupled with a list of
overlapping crises, the Great Depression, World War II and the Cold War, has lent the
President a huge reserve of power that could be used essentially as desired. In the modern
era, the height of this combination of crisis and public support is best typified in the rally
around the flag effect.
This work is a story of the development of that effect. Generally put, the idea behind
a rally effect is that in a time of threat, the country will pull together and support whatever
the President does in response to that threat. This is expressed as a significant increase in
public support in opinion polls for the President’s job performance. The idea of a “rally
around the flag” effect has been widely accepted since the idea was first dealt with in the
1960s by, among others, Polsby (1964) and Waltz (1967). Rally events received their first
systematic definition from John Mueller in 1973 as an event that “is international… involves
the United States and particularly the President directly…” and is “specific, dramatic, and
sharply focused.”28 What is it, though, that makes rallies happen? That is the central question
for this work and the one that this chapter seeks to frame.
Rallying in the Modern Era
Students of both presidential studies and of public opinion measure the rally effect
across numerous presidential administrations. Edwards points out that the President receives
support from the rally phenomenon “because he is the symbol of the country and the primary
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focus of attention at such times,”29 that attention coming from the mass media. Without these
two factors, the rally effect would, according to contemporary literature, not occur.
Patriotism and the President as center of action. Academic literature points to two
major contributing factors for the rally effect in the modern era. The first of these is a
patriotic attachment to the national government that accompanies a view of the presidency as
the proper source for action. Mueller discusses those people who are “inclined to rally to the
support of the president no matter what he does,” particularly in the area of international
relations.30 These people, he says, strongly identify with the nation itself and tend to see the
president, even from a very young age,31 as the embodiment of the country. As such, they
have a wellspring of loyalty and support for the president. He points this out by measuring
support for the bombing campaign against Hanoi and Haiphong Harbor pursued by President
Lyndon Johnson during the Vietnam War. While opinion on the question varied from forty
points against in September 1965 to even in May 1966, polling showed a seventy-point
margin of support for the expansion after it started just 2 months later.32 Polsby notes that the
“popular response to a president during an international crisis in favorable, regardless of the
wisdom of the possibilities he pursues.”33 Even Operation Eagle Claw, President Carter’s
disastrous attempt to rescue of the Iranian hostages, resulted in a jump in his approval
ratings. In contrast to domestic disorder such as labor disruptions, public protests, and
general civil unrest that all tend to inflame internal domestic tensions, the rally effect comes
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exclusively from the occurrence of foreign emergencies. Those presidents who have been
able to effectively mobilize the nation against specific external threats have, at least in the
modern era of the presidency, been rated favorably because of it.34
O’Conner and Sabato state that “a significant portion of the president’s power comes
from “his position as the symbolic leader of the nation… When the president speaks… he
speaks for the nation in one voice.”35 Cohen agrees, but points out that though the president’s
ability to move public opinion on foreign policy was significant, he failed to affect domestic
issues in the same way.36 Meernik and Ault find that this influence translates into roughly a
six-point shift towards the president’s opinion; issues that involve military intervention get
even larger support.37 Parker sees a broader support for the entire system, with the president
especially important, arising from patriotic feelings surrounding a rally event. She states that
this patriotic feeling can even cause citizens to maintain “more positive evaluations [of the
President] than the economic conditions” might otherwise warrant.38
Rossiter states that the foundation for the greatness of the presidency lies not only in
the fact of its “incredible power but [that it is] a breeding ground of indestructible myth.”39
That statement is well supported as scholars and citizens alike can clearly see that through
much of the twentieth and into the twenty-first century, the President has become solidly
entrenched as the symbolic leader of the nation. The development of that symbolic nature has
its main roots in the Progressive movement of the turn of the twentieth century. The agrarian
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discontent with the existing role of government was “enlarged and redirected,” as Hofstadter
pointed out, by the Progressives near the end of the nineteenth century, causing a major
change in what was accepted as the role of government in the United States. In turn, this
altered fundamentally the “whole tone of American political life,”40 leading directly to a new
understanding of the responsibility of the national government to the people who lived under
it.
The first Roosevelt was committed to the idea that government could and should be a
force for good in society. He pursued his policies actively, something that most presidents
before him had been unable or unwilling to do in the era of congressional government that
had dominated the federal government in the decades after the end of the Civil War.
Goldsmith writes in support of this point that TR “transformed the presidential office from its
inert nineteenth century pattern into a veritable cockpit of political leadership for social
reform.”41 Wilson, who would later come to the office, saw Roosevelt as a good model for
the presidency and, despite his own differences with TR on specifics of politics, admired his
ability to use the office as a leadership position. He said that the President was “the only
national leader” and was “the representative of no constituency, but of the whole people.”42
To facilitate what would come to be called the stewardship theory of the presidency,
in which the President was “bound actively and affirmatively to do all he could for the
people,”43 Roosevelt fostered ties to the people as a base of support. While other leaders in
the nineteenth century had done this as well, Jefferson, Jackson and Lincoln chief among
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them, those leaders had used the mechanism of their political parties. This limited the
symbolic role of the president itself in the minds of the people. Roosevelt, however, directly
connected himself to the people in a way that the earlier presidents had shunned as
demagoguery in an effort to move the entrenched interests of the Republican Old Guard. For
example, TR made a campaign swing through the West and Southwest in support of a change
to the Interstate Commerce Commission, giving it the power to force rate equity for shippers
on the railroads. While the Senate version of the bill had died in committee when Congress
adjourned in the summer of 1905, Roosevelt’s impassioned campaign for the regulatory
expansion was so powerful that, when the bill came back to the Senate the next spring, only
three senators voted against it.44
Modern presidents enjoy this symbolic position without much effort on their own
part, though they have come to support that symbolism themselves. As Hinckley points out,
“it is not only the public that sees the president as symbol of the nation – the presidents
themselves are encouraging this view.”45 The fact is, however, that it has not always been so.
It is to their benefit in terms of power that in the modern era they are able call down upon
themselves the symbolic mantle of national leadership.
Opinion leadership and the mass media. The other main factor pointed to by the
literature is opinion leadership, most often articulated through coverage by the mass media
and with the coverage of elite discourse (or the lack of it) specifically included. Kernell
accepts Mueller’s ideas of patriotism as a causal factor for rallies generally, but adds to the
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concept a further criteria to the earlier definition of a rally event that the event must appear
on “the front page for at least five consecutive days… to guarantee widespread public
awareness” of the event before people can really react to it.46 Brody and Shapiro make this
media involvement criteria more systematic, introducing what they call the opinion
leadership hypothesis as an alternate explanation to the patriotism explanation.47 Based on
literature on the priming of public opinion, they argue that it is the publication or the lack of
publication of elite criticism that drives rallies. Brody reinforces these arguments later,
stating that in the early stages of a crisis the president is the primary source of information
for the media and, as such, gets almost exclusive coverage on the subject.48 Noelle-Neumann
points out that politicians are less willing to oppose a popular president. This lack of dissent
causes a higher perceived popularity, which in turn further depresses dissent. This creates a
downward spiral that silences opposition speech;49 the combination of this spiral of silence
and the President’s monopoly on information causes the country to listen to and believe the
President’s assessment of the situation. The administration’s reactions to the facts on the
ground become widely trusted to be the best course for the nation, in no small part because
these assessments as to the situation and the proper reactions are the only ones available,
especially early in the crisis.
Media, in the form of newspapers, have been around for centuries. Even in the early
years of the United States, the newspaper played an active role in shaping the opinions of the
people, often funded directly by partisan politicians. It was not until the end of the nineteenth
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century with the advent of the wireless telegraph (1897) and its subsequent widespread
adoption that the media truly became ‘mass,’ with major nation-wide newspaper circulation the New York papers reaching more than two million near the end of the nineteenth century and radio, invented in 1916.
As a result, people rely heavily on the media for political information. Walter
Lippmann described the relationship of people to political events in his work by pointing out
that “our opinions cover a bigger space… than we can directly observe. They have, therefore,
to be pieced together out of what others have reported and what we can imagine.”50 Downs
reemphasizes this by pointing out “information which is used by one citizen is often
gathered, transmitted and analyzed by others.”51 This is done in part to reduce the
procurement costs of political information, trading some control over selection for the ease of
“subsidized information,”52 collecting the least expensive information in an effort to “1- help
them decide how to vote, and 2- to form opinions with which they can influence government
policy between elections.”53 The idea is a fundamental one; we cannot, as individuals, be
personal observers of all things in the world that we might have an opinion on. Therefore, we
are forced to develop those opinions by using information gained from others; those sources
are typically elites. People also tend to lean strongly towards presentations of the news that
are “short, simple and highly thematic – in a word, stereotyped.”54 Even when presented with
the chance to collect more detailed political information from special news coverage, people
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for the most part are unwilling to invest the time, despite their opinions that the news is
oversimplified.55
The idea that an informed elite might strongly influence or even dictate public
opinions is by no means new. A century ago, Edward Ross wrote that “the source of public
opinion in a healthy community is not an amorphous crowd, but an organic combination” of
those being influenced and those with influence, the latter of whom serve as guideposts to
public opinion. 56 James Bryce said that the formation of that public opinion is for the most
part the work of a small minority.57 It is their ability to control, or at least strongly influence,
communication that allows these informed opinion leaders to foster group identity and,
therefore, group opinions. If the papers bias their coverage towards support of the
administration, the people would very likely be disposed to move that way as well, thus
creating a rally effect.
However, the point is made by Cantril, and reemphasized by Crespi, that “people are
active, thinking, feeling agents whose perceptions of the world… are always subject to
change as a consequence of how they experience an external world that is itself always
subject to change.”58 Page and Shapiro also work this into their examination of polling
results,59 finding that people react to specific trends, both economic and social, specific
events and the acquisition of new information with changes in their opinions. Phillip
Converse observes that there are important differences in how people think about politics,
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depending on how far down in what he calls the “belief strata.”60 As one goes down through
those strata away from elites and towards the mass public, he states, the consistency of those
beliefs tends to degrade. This is due in large part to the common person’s inability to draw
connections between specific fragmented policy positions.61 The reason for their support of
those elite ideologues, he says, often has little to do with the reasons that the ideologues
themselves have those opinions. Some use this last point to argue that the opinions of the
public at large develop, at some level, in a different way than those of elites.62 However,
people often accept the ideas of those who are closest to them ideologically, an idea put forth
by Zaller,63 and then each of them “reacts to it creatively – and on its own terms. In this way,
…mass opinion turns out to be a selective distillation of expert” opinions.64 Ultimately, that
connection of the people and the press serves to give the President the ability to play the role
of “guardian of national morale… [and] an animate symbol for American sovereignty.”65
The rally effect as power. If we accept Neustadt’s argument and the supporting
words of Eisenhower that the job of the president is to sit in the Oval Office “all day trying to
persuade people to do the things they ought to have sense enough to do without”66 having to
be persuaded, we should ask what gives the President the power to do so in the first place.
These people who need persuading are more or less independent, depending on their
relationship to both the President and to Congress. In some cases they are able to strongly
resist administration directives. Neustadt argues that, while presidents can do some things
60
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through direct command, they have the potential to wield the most power through bargaining
and persuasion. In a system founded on the concept of popular sovereignty, being able to use
personal popular appeal to bolster support for policy choices can give significant backing to
actors in the system. This is true even when used during conflict with other parts of the
system, such as a dispute between the executive and legislative branches. This is exactly how
the rally effect has the potential to give power to the president. Edwards observes that, as the
other major institutional actor in our government, Congress pays very close attention to the
president’s approval ratings. Pointing out “widespread support gives [the President] leeway
and weakens resistance to his policies,”67 he tempers this by saying that, while public
approval is not a guarantee of control, it is “an important background resource for
leadership”68 on policy in general.
The fact is that, with the United States more and more tied to foreign nations through
trade and bilateral executive agreements,69 the power to conduct foreign policy lends an
immense amount of power to the executive in practice. Corwin states that the Constitution is
ambiguous on this subject, including some powers in both the legislative and executive
branches, though he grants that the circumstances of the Cold War shifted the balance solidly
towards the White House.70 However, Powell puts forth a convincing argument that the
Constitution places this power solidly in the President’s hands from the beginning of the
Republic, though it gives to Congress the power to block presidential actions if it so desires
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through the funding process or by specifically prohibiting governmental action on an issue.71
Presidents of no less stature or philosophical difference than Jefferson and Truman would
likely have both agreed with Powell that foreign policy is something that comes directly from
the executive.72 Koenig argues that the presidency is somewhat bipolar on the subject of
foreign policy. One aspect of the presidency emphasizes autonomy and unilateralism, even
the exclusion of the Congress and the public, while the other emphasizes cooperation,
accommodation and working with Congress and the people. He makes the argument that the
former has gained rapidly over the latter in recent decades.73 Fisher roundly criticizes
Congress for abdicating the power over foreign policy and war making to the President,74 but
also recognizes that the people see the president as the leader in such areas. The rally effect,
coming during times of foreign policy crises, magnifies the president’s power in the very
areas that the executive is strongest in and grants the ability in the short term to persuade the
government forcefully of the appropriateness of certain policy positions, much as President
Bush was able to do in the aftermath of 9/11.
The Development of the Rally Effect
Because of this reliance on the mass media and the symbolic nature of the office as a
base for the rally effect, there are significant reasons to doubt the existence the rally effect, at
least in the modern understanding of that term, during the period of the traditional
presidency. Neither of the accepted determinants existed in anything more than nascent form
before the end of the nineteenth century. The executive office was seen as a clerk, doing the
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business of the government, rather than a popular leader from whom policy initiation was
expected. While the mass media is becoming much more independent in the years following
the Civil War, what Tulis would call the rhetorical presidency, with its emphasis on “direct
popular appeal” and “the doctrine that the president ought to be a popular leader,”75 only
fully emerges after the century. If both of these factors are absent, one might expect that rally
effects would fade as well. To understand how these causes affect rallies, we need to
understand how both of these independent variables, the existence of the mass media and the
president as the symbolic and actual leader of government, develop during the era of the
traditional presidency and through the transformation of that office into its modern
incarnation.
Three stages of rally development. Tracing the concurrent development of the
determinants of the rally effect divides its development into three distinct periods: a predevelopment era, a transitional period and a fully developed period. With the major
determinants of the rally effect non-existent, or at best in a very nascent form, the rally
should not occur in the first period. During this time, while the President was certainly the
focus of action in a military sense and, to some extent at least, in a diplomatic sense, he was
not understood to be the leader of the nation. At the time of its founding, the United States
was significantly different from the countries of Europe. It had no true identity of its own. To
be ‘American’ was to be a British subject who lived on or near the East coast of British North
America. Even in July of 1776, however, this was something of a misnomer. While English
transplants constituted a sizable majority in the colonies, every northern European country
was represented. There was little religious conformity, no truly national capital, and no
75
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established ruling or military castes.76 In the early years of the Republic, it was Congress that
primarily played that symbolic leadership role. “We forget too easily,” Rossiter says, “that
Congress… was the focus of the people’s interest in their government through most of the
first century under the Constitution. The Presidency carried with it little of the magic that is
now so notable an element in its strength.”77 Washington especially, but also the first Adams
to a lesser extent, was the symbol of the nation and acted the role. Both saw a symbolic role
for the office of the President of the United States, a person who was the singular leader of
the entire country, the only person whose electoral constituency was every voter in the
nation. They felt that a certain dignity and grandness was needed in the office and both set
out to imbue their job with that grandeur.
The presidents who followed them, beginning with Jefferson, sought to downplay this
role and return the office to something closer to the common man. Jefferson began sending
the constitutionally required message on the State of the Union to Congress, rather than
delivering it himself, something that would become precedent Until Woodrow Wilson came
to office. While Jefferson embraced the executive power, realizing the need for a strong
leader, he governed through his leadership of the party, not through his own stature as
executive. Madison further abdicated the power of the executive by allowing leadership of
the government to pass from his hands into that of the party leadership in the House of
Representatives, and especially Speaker of the House Henry Clay. When the War of 1812
came, though Madison tried to rally the people to the flag, “the rapid decline of the
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presidency after Jefferson’s tenure left Madison in a poor position to rally either Congress or
the American people.”78
Andrew Jackson represented a new invigoration of the executive office, linking for
the first time the office to the people themselves rather than simply taking a backseat clerkstyle approach to government, as had the previous three presidents. While executive power
enjoyed something of a resurgence through the Age of Jackson, especially with Tyler and
Polk, the issue of slavery tied up the presidency with weak compromise Democrats that were
at the same time unwilling and unable to express strong leadership in the face of the divisions
that would lead the country into the Civil War.
Lincoln was Jackson-like in his leadership. He mobilized the Union to face the
Confederacy on the battlefield, exercising many powers not explicitly given to him by the
Constitution. He justified this by pointing out that it would be pointless to defend the letter of
the document if the country fell apart because of it. However, he recognized the primacy of
Congress in this period, coming to the legislative branch for retroactive approval of his
actions during their recess and deferring to their opinions on the subject; both chambers, sans
Southern delegations, gave their approval.
Looking next at the mass media during this time, we can see an openly political role.
The first media emerged in the ancient world, with drama and early books, and many of these
were explicitly political in nature. The media was already a force in society; as Thomas
Carlyle pointed out as early as the 1840s, “there were three Estates in Parliament, but in the
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Reporters Gallery yonder, there sat a fourth Estate more important than they all.”79 However,
it was not until the nineteenth century and further improvements in mechanical reproduction,
such as the rotary steam press, that the newspaper truly became a mass media. During this
period, the newspaper was not yet a power that could really directly affect politics, being
mostly a creature of the political factions in the country, serving largely as mouthpieces for
partisan politics.
As late as the turn of the nineteenth century, “editorializing was seen as not quite the
business of a newspaper. One, the New York Journal, went so far as to print editorials in
italics (itself as indicator of a personal hand).”80 The law even recognized these differences in
some places, such an in England, where opinion papers were not subject to the newspaper
stamp taxes. James Bennett founded the New York Herald in May 1835, and introduced a
new form of reporting: the interview. This allowed him to beat out his competitors with new
material because in a way he was creating the news that he was reporting.81 This was the
change that started the media on the road to political force free from direct party dominance.
During this period, however, it had not broken those ties and was not independent.
The second period, the emergent period, has some of the signs of a rally, but will not
be full-blown or unconditional. After Lincoln’s active use of the executive office during the
conflict, Congress began reasserting itself. This began with the impeachment of Andrew
Johnson on largely political grounds, and continued for much of the rest of the century.
During this era, the President was better understood to be the leader of the nation’s foreign
policy, but even in this did not go unchallenged by the legislative branch. The Senate
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sometimes rejected treaties simply because they had not been consulted extensively enough
during the negotiation process. For the most part, the executives drew what little power they
did from the Constitution,82 relying on their expressed powers and their independent
constitutional position as opposed to a connection to the people. They did not hold the
symbolic national leadership position that modern presidents enjoy.
Near the end of the century, technology was developing for the printing of
newspapers such that tens of thousands of copies could be printed, folded and cut every hour.
The newspaper was becoming a truly mass media with the potential to be a real player in the
political landscape. The innovation that finally allowed the newspapers to divorce themselves
from the parties was advertising. Before the mid-nineteenth century, a major supplementary
source of income for most newspapers was a combination of subventions and blackmail, the
former paid by the government or parties to foster favorable reporting and the latter paid by
those who did not wish their names and/or situations to be published. It was a move away
from sources, what modern sensibilities would deem disreputable at best, towards advertising
as a major source of secondary income that would finally usher in the era of the independent
press. The New York World was symbolic of this stage of the newspaper’s development.
When Joseph Pulitzer bought the World in 1883, it only had a circulation of about 15,000.
Pulitzer, though, dedicated the paper to “the cause of the people” and to exposing “all public
evils and abuses,”83 those crusades becoming the cornerstone of its success. Successes like
the funding for the pedestal for the Statue of Liberty brought lots of attention, but the paper
was just as well if not better known for muckraking and yellow journalism. The battle
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between the World and William Randolph Hearst’s Journal for the publishing market in New
York drove both papers to sensationalism, appealing to people’s desire for scandal to gain
circulation numbers and the advertising dollars that came with them. While the
sensationalism eventually faded and both publishers later regretted their “yellow sins,”84 the
power of the newspaper as crusader for truth still remained.
Finally, the third period is that of the modern rally. Rallies during this period will be
focused on the President and, as Polsby says, occur “regardless of the wisdom of the policies
he pursues.”85 In this era, the media have fully developed into an independent political force,
at times pursuing their own goals, at others supportive or critical of the administration’s
agenda. The rise of the New York Times serves as the hallmark for the final stage of mass
media development in the pre-New Deal era. As a counterpoint to the rabid, one-upping
sensationalism of the World and the Journal, the Times was early on “recognized… as a solid
and reliable paper… independent of financial and political power brokers.” The new owner
Adolph Ochs was convinced “that what New York wanted and needed was more and better
straight news.”86 On taking over, he immediately expanded the local and national news in
amount and depth, as well as covering the business and financial sectors of the city,
something that no one else at the time was doing. With a skilled editorial staff blessed with
foresight, the Times scooped its competitors time and time again, reporting the Russian
Navy’s annihilation at the hands of the Imperial Japanese Fleet at the Battle of the Tsushima
Strait and later the sinking of the Titanic correctly and hours before the other major
newspapers got reliable information. It is this sort of solid, independent and reliable news
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reporting that has become the industry standard for the media, both print and broadcast, in
the modern era.
The presidency itself by this time had become acknowledged as the symbolic leader
of the nation, one that should be supported without question in a time of crisis. The more
modern presidents, beginning with Teddy Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, felt appeals to
the people was appropriate when contending with the other branches, especially the
Congress. Every president in the modern era claims an exclusive power over foreign policy
and, for the most part, the Congress has largely abdicated that power. With this relinquishing
of power by the legislative branch, presidents are in a unique position in the field of foreign
policy to dominate as both the substantive and the symbolic leader, allowing them to be the
focus of the people’s patriotic attachments and identification.
If this theory bears out, it will support the existing literature in the idea that modern
rallies are just that: modern. It will not only supply weight to the idea that the combination of
the symbolic presidency and the opinion mobilization of the mass media combine to create
this rally around the flag and around the president in particular, but also that the symbolic
presidency in particular is what gives the rally its start. That contribution would be important
and interesting to be sure. Just as interesting and possibly more so, however, is the possibility
that these cases fail to support the theory as laid out above. If these cases show full-blown
rally effects in such a time, this creates a number of problems for the current literature on the
early presidency, on the rally effect or both. Questions such as ‘how responsive to public
opinion was the traditional presidency?’ and ‘does the traditional presidency gain power from
its connection to public approval?’ become valid in this sort of situation.
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Testing the Theory
To test this developmental theory of the rally effect, I decided to select one case from
each of what I expected to be the three different periods in the development of my
determinants. Speaking generally, each of the cases selected need to fit with Mueller’s
definition of a rally event: “an event which (1) is international and (2) involves the United
States and particularly the president directly; and [is]… (3) specific, dramatic and sharply
focused.”87 The first case will represent a least-likely case study.88 By choosing a pre-Civil
War event and coding the reactions to that event, my theory assumes that I will find no
significant rally, as the public doesn’t interact with the elites through mass media on the same
scale, nor do they have the same patriotic allegiance to the president as the proper source for
action. With the second case, I expect to see some form of rally, as the mass media is
emerging, especially in the New York market with the struggle between the Hearst and
Pulitzer publishing empires, and the concept of national consciousness is beginning to exert
its dominance over more local identities with one consequence being the acceptance of the
President as the national leader. It is this middle case that I expect to be the most interesting.
While the mass media is fully independent at this time, the idea of the president as symbolic
leader of the nation is lagging well behind his ability to lead in the terms administrative
functions. This lag in development allows for the analysis of the rally effect during a time
when one factor, and not the other, is developed. My third case will be early in what I expect
to be the modern era of the rally effect, after the acceptance of the President as the public and
legislative leader in the government operating directly for the interests of the people as a
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whole. Furthermore, placing my third case within the transition period between the two
modes of presidential leadership,89 roughly between the beginnings of the two Roosevelt
administrations, I will be able to further look at the evolution of the rally effect as a
contributor to executive - in contrast to legislative - power.
With these items in mind, my final case selections were the opening months of the
Mexican-American War, the Spanish-American War and the mobilization of the US for
World War I (1917). The three specific rally events, arranged sequentially, will be the
reporting of the Thornton Affair (May 10, 1846), the explosion and sinking of the battleship
USS Maine (February 15, 1898), and the publication of the Zimmerman Telegram (March 1,
1917).
The methods employed in this work will be mixed. The first portion of each case will
be a quantitative analysis that will attempt to measure public opinion on the President and on
Congress. These are the two logical institutional targets for any rally of public opinion
coming from the crises examined. I will also look to see how the papers are treating public
opinion as well. This last piece contributes to the analysis by giving insight on how the elites,
represented by the editorial staffs of the papers, are discussing the actions and beliefs of the
non-elite members of society.
In the absence of hard public opinion poll data from the time, decades before Gallup
and Roper looked at FDR’s presidential approval ratings in the first scientific polls, this work
needed some sort of equivalent proxy measure. To develop this, I looked at the discussion of
the government in the available media of the time, the newspaper. Specifically, I used the
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most vibrant media market in the country: New York. I chose this specific city, as opposed to
other possibilities, due to previous usage in various research projects.90
First, I selected three specific potential rally events, one from each of the three
periods I expected to find in the rally effect’s development. More specifically, I had to select
the date for each, namely the first date that the event would start affecting the papers’
coverage of the President, Congress and public opinion. Related to this selection, I had to
select papers from which to code based, as I mentioned before, on their partisan leanings. In
two of my cases, this was relatively easy to do via third-party sources independent of the
papers themselves. However, in one case, I read a full month’s worth of editorials from six
different publications to determine the leanings myself.91 While I developed a contingency
plan to account for situations in which acceptable papers were not present in the New York
market, this come into play and that plan will not be outlined here.
Next I selected ten issues of each paper for the month before and for the six months
after the rally event, giving me a set of seventy issues for each, for a total of two hundred ten
individual issues from which to code for each case. For example, the Thornton Affair, the
event that sparked the Mexican-American War, occurred on April 25 and the President was
notified late on May 9. The event was not publically reported in Washington until May 10.
Under the coding scheme, I coded from April 10 – May 9 as pre-rally, with May 10November 10 as my post-rally period.
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After reading each article, I coded it for two things: mentions of the President,
Congress and public opinion; and attitude towards those three targets. Each article was coded
as mention (1) or no mention (0). Thus, for the Spanish-American War, a direct reference to
President McKinley, “the president’s policy towards Cuba” or “the current administration’s
relations with Spain” were all coded as mentions. At the same time, simple mentions of the
state of Cuba, the movements of military assets, or members of Congress, without the above
mentions, were not coded as referring to the President, though the last may have been,
depending on the specific mention, coded as a mention of Congress. Finally, the tone of the
article was assessed and coded as to whether it was generally supportive of or positive
towards the specific institution’s goals, antagonistic or in opposition to those stated goals, or
neutral. Separately they were coded as supportive (1), neutral (0) or unsupportive (-1).
Individual articles could and, in some cases, were coded for mentions of and attitude towards
more than one of my areas. If an article had both positive and negative statements in it, which
some did, they were summed up, with negative scores becoming -1, positive scores becoming
1, and zero sums being left at that score.
Two potential criticisms arise from this method of data collection. The first is the idea
that this creates a construct validity problem. This posits that the measure used does not in
fact capture public opinion at all, but rather elite discourse. This problem is recognized and
understood. However, there is no way to differentiate between elite and broader public
discourse without scientific polling data, which does not exist for the time period in question.
With this concern in mind, I have taken a number of steps in an attempt to account for this
problem. The papers that were selected for coding all have large readerships for their
respective times, indicating that they are written with a wider non-elite market in mind; this
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is especially true in the latter two cases. I am also coding published letters to the editor as
separate articles, allowing for some capture of direct public opinion statements, albeit
screened by the editorial staff.
The second criticism is the problem of using media-based textual analysis as my
central data source, while arguing that there is no mass media in (at least some of) the time
periods under examination. This critique is less concerning than that outlined above. The
media that will be coded are not mass media in the modern sense and have local circulation
in the New York area, typically of less than 150,000 daily, rather than the modern circulation
of the New York Times Sunday edition, numbering nearly 1.7 million nationwide. In the last
case, as the circulation of the New York papers increases drastically after the turn of the
century, this criticism becomes more of a concern. However, as this is a study intended to
examine the concurrent development of the rally effect with the emergence of the mass
media and the attachment to the presidency as a symbolic leader for the country, the
development of the mass media is expected and furthermore understood as an asset rather
than a point of weakness.
I examined the collected data in an attempt to see any change in the patterns of
support in the media outlets for the president and Congress. As hard quantitative methods,
such as regression, that would be available for use on modern data are not appropriate for
proxy data such as I used, much of each of the three substantive chapters will be analysis of
summary statistics, with some light quantitative analysis, such as T-tests, to show possible
differences from the norm. A concern with this quantitative measure, as with proxy measures
coming from qualitative sources, is not a hard enough measure to do any substantive
quantitative work on. This is a valid criticism, but in the absence of rigorous scientifically
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collected data, this sort of textual analysis is the best proxy measure of public opinion
available for the time. The idea that quantitative analysis is always the best is not necessarily
valid, either. As Salmon (1990) pointed out, “causal concepts cannot be fully explicated in
terms of statistical relationships” (pg 168). The addition of a qualitative examination works
to address much of the problem.
In that connected qualitative analysis, I told the story of the periods in question, trying
to reconstruct the shifting patterns of support for the national government and for the
president in particular. Process tracing “attempts to trace the links between possible causes
and observed outcomes.”92 By looking at as detailed a historical record as possible, including
interview transcripts, historical accounts, and other sources, the researcher tries to draw a link
between the story as his or her theory says it should be and the history that is recorded.
Kingdon’s look at public policies, Putnam’s study of Italian civic tradition and Allison and
Zelikow’s examination of the Cuban Missile Crisis are all good examples of process
tracing.93 The scope of this paper, covering three discrete events in depth, will not be as indepth as these studies. This portion of the analysis will be detailed enough to examine the
trends in public opinion of the executive and how the events changed or did not change how
the public saw the office and how the office dealt with that perception.
A final methodological concern comes from the use of the media and the connection
of the newspapers to the parties. Early in their history, as I have stated earlier in this chapter,
the newspapers functioned essentially as mouthpieces of the parties that sponsored them,
strictly toeing the party line. In some cases, the Presidents even changed the staff to put into
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place editors more to their own liking and more amenable to their policies. This practice
changes over the course of time as the papers make a break from the partisan identifications
that their earlier incarnations had embodied. As the papers move away from partisan control,
this becomes more problematic for the selection criteria laid out for this project. This is
especially relevant in the case of President Wilson, the Zimmerman Telegram and US entry
into WWI. Before this change, Democratic papers would always support a Democratic
President, Republican papers would always support a Republican President, and they would
each always report more negatively on a President of the opposition party. After this change,
the papers would find themselves freer to change the tone of their reporting based on how
well the President is lining up with the issue preferences of the specific editorial staff. The
only situation in which the two methods of selecting the coded papers for the case study
would differ is if the President himself changes his stated policy in response to the rally
event. If this occurs, the party-affiliated papers would presumably not alter their coverage.
They are either supportive or in opposition to the White House based on their partisan
attachments. However, if the President changes policy in a time where the papers are
supportive or critical based on policy preferences, the papers would be expected to flip, with
a paper supporting an earlier policy now being critical and vise versa. While there is a
difference in the outcomes of these two coding schemes, the changes cancel themselves out.
In other words, it is presumed that, assuming no rally of public support, one paper will
remain supportive, one critical and one neutral no matter what the President does. If he
makes no change, the papers will remain the same before and after the rally event. In a
situation where the President changes policy in an era of issue-preferring editorial staffs (as
opposed to partisan-preferring staffs), the papers will simply flip-flop, with the previously
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supportive paper being critical, the critical becoming supportive and the neutral remaining
the same. Since the spirit of the selection criteria is an attempt get a broad sample of the
political spectrum of the time, it is just as appropriate to select the papers in the sample based
on their policy preferences as it is to select them on the partisan identifications. This move
from partisan alliances to ideological alliances might be expected to increase the rally effect
as editorial staffs find themselves more able to change their opinions based on the ‘facts on
the ground.’ This would become an expected outcome of the evolution of the independent
mass media and lend strength to the developmental theory of the rally effect that I am testing.
There are a number of potential concerns with regards to the specific cases chosen
and how the circumstances of those analyses work into the theory. Discussion of those issues,
as they are specific to the cases in question and less concerning for the project as a whole, is
deferred here and will be addressed within those chapters.
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Chapter 3:
The Rally Effect in Infancy: The Mexican-American War
Introduction
On April 25, 1846, Captain Seth Thornton, a regular Army veteran of the Florida
Indian Wars, rode at the head of a group of 63 dragoons into a Mexican ranch just on the
American side of the Rio Grande. As Thornton and some of his officers questioned a
Mexican civilian, looking for information on the reported movement of Mexican forces
nearby, gunfire erupted from hundreds of Mexican soldiers hidden in the brush around the
ranch. Trapped in a corral with no cover and taking murderous fire from all sides, the
American soldiers quickly surrendered, with 11 men dead and 6 others wounded. The first
shots of the Mexican-American War had been fired. This predictably sent a shockwave of
anti-Mexican sentiment and patriotic fervor through the population of the young nation. A
hundred years later, Presidents could have counted on this sort of incident for a surge in
public approval for them and an accompanying increase in their political capital and, as
Neustadt puts it, their “power to persuade.”94 Did it, however, send the same support to
President James Polk’s aid?
Recapping from my theory chapter, the causes of rallies are identified throughout the
academic literature as centering around two general items: patriotism and elite behavior.
Especially important for this work are the existence of both the symbolic presidency, the
recognized target for that patriotism and center for action, and a coherent and independent
mass media to codify and express that elite opinion to the mass of the American public.
During the period of the Mexican-American War, the above causes for the modern rally
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around the flag effect were lacking or, at best, in their infancy. The twin issues of slavery and
states’ rights were increasingly dividing the nation and the occupants of the White House had
been, since the departure of Andrew Jackson, largely weak compromise candidates95; Polk
was no exception to this rule. In fact, he had made himself something of a lame duck by
pledging at the divided Democratic National Convention to serve only a single term, the only
President to date to do so.96 Regional identities were still strong, with many people
identifying themselves first as citizens of their states rather than of the United States. In fact,
the way that the “United States” as a name of the country was indicative of this difference; at
this time it was considered a plural term (“The United States are” or “The United States see”)
as opposed the singular (“The United States is” or “The United States sees”) used in later
years.
The media as an independent political force did not exist at all. It was only a few
years before the war, in 1843, that Richard Hoe invented the rotary steam press, creating the
penny-press industry in the US and Europe.97 While numerous, especially in the large cities
of the country, the vast majority of newspapers were essentially political mouthpieces of the
major parties and packaged the ‘news’ in favor of their supporters. Their main sources of
income were subventions and blackmail, the former coming from government and the parties
directly and the latter from people who didn’t want certain issues, especially social
indiscretions, reported on.98
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The Mexican-American War was the country’s first experience in aggressive war,
where the US actually invaded the territory of another nation and defeated them by forcing
them into submission. While wars of aggression were defined much later by the United
Nations, it is fairly clear to historians that, while some of the actions taken by General Taylor
on the Rio Grande would have been justified as self-defense, assuming that the border claim
itself was legitimate, but that the later campaigns into what would become the American
Southwest and central Mexico could not be so easily legitimized. This is especially true with
a hindsight understanding of the Mexican army’s capabilities. It will be interesting to see if
and how much this fact will play out in the analysis of public opinion.
Case Selection
As explained in an earlier chapter, one of the case studies included in this work
needed to be solidly within the era of the traditional presidency. An examination of the rally
around the flag effect in this period is essential as it captures the presidency during a period
when it was still in its developmental infancy and, despite having some powerful men in
residence, was far from the prime mover of American politics that it is in the modern era. I
chose the Mexican-American War because it clearly does not have the hallmarks of
modernity that the literature points to as being responsible for the rally effect.
Communications across the country still took weeks at this time, even during crises such as
the outbreak of military hostilities. Most interests were still regional, with allegiances more
to state identity than to a national one. This is a perfect example of a least-likely case, using
Eckstein’s terminology.99 There should not be a significant rally to the president in this time.
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The concern when setting a rally point upon which to base the textual research for the
Mexican-American War comes in the lag of communication during the time. Under modern
circumstances, the actual event causing the rally effect would easily and logically be chosen
as the point from which to mark our rally. This is not a good point to mark public opinion
from in this case. The telegraph, the first real method of near-instant long-distance
communication, was less than ten years old in the United States and had not yet reached all
parts of the more developed East Coast, much less the untamed and disputed frontier of
Texas. Because of this, news of the Thornton Affair, which occurred on April 24, did not
reach Washington until the late evening of May 9, more than 2 weeks later. By this point,
Mexican artillery had traded fire with the border encampment Fort Texas (later renamed Fort
Brown, then Brownsville) and General Zachary Taylor had fought two battles with Mexican
forces. The official resolution of war, attached to appropriation bills and passed by Congress
on May 13, is a much better point from which to count. This information would have almost
certainly reached the New York papers on the same day of the President’s signature, quickly
put into print then distributed to the public. In the end, though, I decided against this as well.
Because the attack had not been kept secret from the public, most papers began publishing on
it in advance of the declaration. I decided, instead, to place the rally event for the purposes of
coding on the date of its first possible mention in the papers. The report from General Taylor
came to the President late in the evening on Saturday May 9. As none of the papers published
late enough in the evening to print the news that day, I chose to count from May 10.
Selecting papers from this period of history for the quantitative component of this
chapter posed its own special problem. The papers of the time were essentially arms of their
supporting political parties and served largely as their mouthpieces. The New York Sun,
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edited by Moses Beach and best known for its much later “Is there a Santa Claus” editorial,
was the major Democratic paper in New York City, already by then the largest city and news
market in the Union. The Sun was, as Nelson describes it, “expansionist, bellicose ‘Young
America’ personified, ”100 and went as far as to advocate throughout the war for the inclusion
of all of Mexico into the United States. The New York Herald, edited by James Gordon
Bennett Sr., serves this study as the opposition Whig paper, though it had originally
supported Polk’s Democratic nomination for President. Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune,
belying its strong political ties of the future to the radical faction of the Republican Party,
was politically independent at the time. It, like the Herald, was very strongly anti-war,
though not necessarily anti-administration. This fact highlights my original reason for
spreading out my selection of papers beyond simply one; a range must be sought that will
balance out, ideally, the strong partisan leanings of the papers, both for and against the
administration and the policy that is being examined, in this case the annexation of Texas, the
desire to acquire California, the wish of the South to acquire new slave territory,101 and the
dream behind ‘Manifest Destiny,’ that of a country stretching “from sea to shining sea.”
Polk and the Early Presidency
James Polk came into the Oval Office at the time in which the power of the
presidency was at a crossroads. To really understand the office that Polk stepped into, we
need to understand the program of the strongest executive to that time, Andrew Jackson, and
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how he had altered fundamentally the understanding of the relationship of the presidency to
both Congress and to the people themselves.
Andrew Jackson, the hard-driving Revolutionary War veteran, had changed the
executive into a popular leader. The theme of the Jackson presidency from a political point of
view was equality of opportunity, the idea that no person should have special privileges
beyond that afforded to everyone. Keeping in mind that this was a philosophy of its time in
that it excluded African-Americans, Native Americans and women, this was still a significant
shift.
Jackson had what might seem to us today to be a contradictory view of government.
He directly attacked national institutions and expenditures, seeking to shrink the power of
Washington. He eliminated the national bank, pulled federal subsidies from highways and
canals, and constrained the size of the national military, especially the army. His
pronouncements on the subject would warm the hearts of modern-day Republicans. While it
came from his successor, Martin Van Buren’s first message to Congress summed up
beautifully Jackson’s ideas towards government’s interaction with the people:
All communities are apt to look to government for too much… the less government
interferes with private pursuits the better for the general prosperity… its real duty is
to leave every citizen and every interest to reap under its benign protection the
rewards of virtue, industry and prudence.102
At the same time, he argued that the president was the true representative of the people
themselves. The Jeffersonian wing of the Democratic party, lead by John Quincy Adams and
Henry Clay, adhered to the old party principles of legislative supremacy. In the pre-Jackson
era, presidents had reached out to the people, but with the understanding that the Congress
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was the true representative body of the citizenry. Jackson, however, pointed to the fact that
people voted, albeit indirectly, as a great mass for the chief executive and as such he was the
representative of the whole people, rather than any one district or state. This was a direct
challenge to the idea that Congress was the holder of that title. It gave to the White House a
new potential source of power: popular power.
A number of changes in the electoral system gave a lot of credence to this new
popular appeal made by “Old Hickory.” By the time of Jackson’s first election in 1828, only
two states, Delaware and South Carolina, still used legislative selection to name electors for
president. The others all had direct election by the public of their electors.103 With the
exception of George Washington, the parties had until that time nominated presidential
candidates in congressional causes, a practice informally and somewhat derisively known as
“King Caucus.” After Adams had been elected in 1824 without the caucus’ approval, the
practice collapsed and was replaced by the practice of having national presidential
nominating conventions, a practice that exists to this day. However, Jackson became the first
president since Washington to come to the office with no involvement, direct or indirect,
from the Congress. Combined, these structural changes meant that, for the first time, the
President had valid grounds to argue that he had a mandate from the people. Taking this new
source of power solidly in hand, Jackson moved to expand the power of the executive branch
greatly.
This shift had infuriated the Whig party, but they could not deny the power of the
Jacksonian popular tactics that had won him reelection and ushered his Vice-President,
Martin Van Buren, into the executive mansion as well. Adopting the populist appeals of the
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Jacksonian campaign strategies helped the Whigs elect William Henry Harrison, a hero of the
Indian Wars, to office in 1840. 104 Some scholars think that Harrison planned on giving up
control of many of the executive functions to Congress, taking on a sort of figurehead
status.105 Whatever plans for the office Harrison may have had, they did not come to fruition,
as he died one month into his term, leaving John Tyler to the office. Tyler’s place on the
party ticket had been an effort to balance the divided Whig party’s larger wing in the north,
with its nationalist leanings, and its smaller states’ rights southern faction. Tyler, a “lapsed
Democrat who relapsed after assuming” the presidency,106 took the reins of power in a time
when the succession to the presidency was not certain, setting the precedent that the VicePresident becomes President in his own right. He also resisted much of his own party’s
domestic agenda, including vetoes of two Congressional attempts to revive a national bank in
1841.
While Tyler was successful in preventing a Whig-backed evisceration of executive
power, he was not able to prevent Congress from taking back some powers. In foreign policy,
the Senate began to more jealously guard the ‘advice’ portion of the “advice and consent”
clause of the treaty-making power, repeatedly defeating treaties on which they had not been
consulted.107 Congress began demanding more information on executive actions, though Polk
himself denied these.108
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Polk, when he came into office, was a worthy successor to the Jacksonian concept of
the executive. He was one of if not the hardest working chief executives in the history of the
United States. He was poor at delegating responsibilities and took much of the work of the
office onto himself. He had a single secretary, Joseph Walker, whom he paid out of his own
pocket and, when Walker went on vacation, the eleventh President of the United States did
double-duty. “Young Hickory,” as Polk was called by some, upheld all of the rights and
privileges that Jackson had won for the office, and even expanded the power of the
presidency in some areas, especially with regards to day-to-day management of the various
departments. Meeting with his Cabinet over 350 times in the course of his single term, Polk
made his six department heads work full-time year-round, eschewing the practice of giving
the secretaries long vacations during Congressional recesses.109 While later presidents in the
nineteenth century did not follow his example with regards to the direct and close supervision
of the budget (with the exception of Lincoln), Polk asserted the right of the president to
directly supervise and control the activities of the various departments, something that would
become the norm in the twentieth century.
If the presidency itself was at a junction, the country was as well. Much of the young
country was still agricultural in nature, with Southern cotton being by far its biggest export,
but the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution can be seen, especially in the northeast. The
number of Americans employed in the manufacturing sector was approaching a million in
1845, more than doubling over the course of the decade. The boom of the railroads was
beginning. Even in agriculture, manufacturing advances in machine tools were advancing
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production. As a whole, the nation was beginning fundamental changes that would change
the course of its history.
Background
The root causes of the Mexican-American War, as with so many conflicts between
neighbors, go back many years before the guns actually started firing in April of 1846. In
1823, shortly after overthrowing her first post-Spanish government, Mexico allowed Stephen
Austin’s father Moses and a band of American settlers to start a colony in the far-flung
border province where it had little luck setting up outposts of its own. The only conditions
were that they had to learn Spanish, become Roman Catholic and renounce slavery, though
the last rule was modified to allow the importation of adult slaves, but not their sale. In less
than ten years, there were more Americans in Texas than Mexicans, many of whom remained
Protestants and traded in slaves, defying official government policy.
By 1830, the head of the Mexican Boundary Commission, Manuel de Mier y Teran,
warned that if American immigration was not curtailed, that Texas would be “lost
forever.”110 The Mexican Congress banned further US immigration and the importation of
any further slaves. They also moved to encourage settlements by other groups in the area and
built military outposts designed to extend the country’s hold into the area more solidly. In
1833, the Texans held their first convention and subsequently requested full status as an
autonomous state in Mexico. When they realized that autonomy was not going to happen, the
leaders of the province determined that nothing short of full independence would satisfy
them. When Sam Houston went to Washington to drum up support, President Andrew
Jackson was sympathetic, but was not willing to offer any direct assistance. Texas declared
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its independence in 1836 and, with tacit American support but not much more, managed to
win that independence through force of arms. It cemented its place as a recognized
independent nation by establishing diplomatic ties to Great Britain, France and the United
States over the next few years.
President Tyler made it a goal for his administration to get Texas into the Union, but
the treaty of annexation failed to get the needed two-thirds support in the Senate, northern
senators worried about the extension of slavery and everyone concerned about the war that
Mexico promised if annexation became a reality. In the wake of the election of Polk, a
candidate that ran in strong support of the annexation of Texas, the outgoing president tried
again, this time as a joint resolution. This time it worked and in the last days of Tyler’s
administration Texas became a state.
The annexation ultimately created the border dispute that would touch off the war. By
the vast majority of historical precedents, the Nueces River was the southern border of Texas.
Spain drew the boundary between Texas and Coahuila on that line in 1816 and it remained so
for the next two decades on maps and atlases, including Moses Austin’s own map when he
was colonizing Texas at the invitation of the newly independent Mexican government.
It was not until the rebellion against Mexican rule and the never-ratified Treaties of
Velasco that Texas made a claim to the land between the two rivers; it was made less for the
arid snake-filled waste at the lower end of the Rio Grande and more in support of a claim on
eastern New Mexico and especially Santa Fe. The Texas Congress declared the Rio Grande
as the border shortly after independence. Once statehood came in December of 1845, the
White House began recognizing the border at the Rio Grande and Secretary of War William
Marcy ordered Taylor to move to occupy the disputed area until the boundary had been
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finalized. Clearly the Mexican did not have an opinion on this issue, as it considered all of
Texas to still be part of Mexico.
Rally Event: The Thornton Affair
In the days and weeks leading up to the Thornton Affair, the New York papers didn’t
deal with the Texas issue deeply. Most articles dealing with the President at all were
concerned with Oregon. They focused around the negotiations on and subsequent passage of
permission for Polk to serve notice to Great Britain that the US was pulling out of the treaty
for joint administration of Oregon, negotiated in 1827. What little was said in the opposition
papers about the Texas boundary question was predictably put in scornful terms, declaring
that the President had not provided General Taylor with enough troops to accomplish the
goals set forth.111
News of the April 25 attack took until May 9 to reach Washington and was reported
publicly to Congress at noon on May 11. The President’s message boldly asserted that “a
state of war now exists” and that Mexico had “invaded our territory and shed American
blood on American soil.”112 It touched off a firestorm when it was finally publicized. The
evening supplement of the anti-war Herald described Taylor’s position as “most disastrous
and perilous,” surrounded by thousands of Mexican troops and cut off from his supply base.
“Such imbecility, incoherence and inconsistency,” the same editorial went on to say, “have
never been visible in any administration, as now appear to mark the conduct of the present
one in relation to foreign affairs.”113
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The vast majority of the country’s citizens were caught up in the war fever. There was
strong opposition in New England, remote from the frontier and strongly anti-slavery.
However, this was tempered once war was declared by the recognition that the nation’s
troops in harm’s way needed support even in the midst of opposition to the policy that put
them there. That aside, support was strong everywhere else in the nation. However, Congress
was strangely divided, at least in regards to what we would consider ‘strange’ in the terms of
modern rally effects. The Democrats, controlling both chambers of Congress, brought the
President’s message to the floor quickly. However, it hit solid Whig opposition, most of
which cried foul, arguing that Polk had begun the war himself by moving Taylor’s force into
the disputed region. The Democratic leadership attached a preamble that stated that war
existed to an appropriation for ten million dollars and fifty thousand men. While nearly every
Whig supported striking this statement from the bill, they were overruled on a party-line
vote.114 Outmaneuvered, the Whigs found themselves caught between a political rock and
hard place: they could oppose money designated for the troops in the field and already in
combat or support a bill that recognized the state of war. In the end, only 16 votes, 14 in the
House and 2 in the Senate, opposed the appropriations bill. The war was now a fact by
Congressional resolution.
The papers reacted predictably to this. The Sun managed to take both sides in a
strange way; in the same article, the editors commended the independent course and attention
to principles of the opposition, especially Senator John Calhoun of South Carolina, but still
discussed the opposition as misguided and dangerous to the unity of the nation in a time of
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crisis. The Whigs railed against the bill and lauded Calhoun by name. “Our admiration of
[Sen. Calhoun],” wrote the Herald’s editorial page, “increases from the fact that… he refused
to vote upon the question as it was presented,” being a completely unfair and blatantly
partisan tactic.115 The Tribune attacked the move to war, saying that while the war would
undoubtedly “afford an opportunity for the display of patriotism and valor,” any value would
be overwhelmed by increased government centralization, a huge national debt and the
exposure of the nation’s financial weaknesses. If it went on long enough, it could also lead
“to the interference of the Great Powers [of Europe].”116 They went on to say that Congress
had been forced to vote “not merely on confidence, which is bad enough on great matters of
public concern, but on faith which… is the evidence of things unseen.”117
The media, as members of Congress had, reacted along party lines. Democrat-leaning
papers denied accusations of aggressive war and described the conflict in a combination of
ways. The Sun stated that it was “an acknowledged law of nations that when a country sinks
into a state of anarchy… it becomes the duty of the most powerful of [its] neighbors to…
settle its affairs.”118 The Sun’s editorial staff was making the basic argument that, because
Mexico could not control its northern territories, the United States should step in and help by
divesting its southern neighbor of them. Others emphasized the abuses that the government
had put up with over time and to which the country was now honor bound to respond.119

115

Herald, 5/15/1846.
Tribune, both from 5/15/1846.
117
Ibid., 5/16/1846, emphasis in the original.
118
Sun, 5/28/1846.
119
While not in this potion of study for purposes of the quantitative data, the New York
Evening Post and the Washington Union both ran stories to this effect on 5/12/1846.
116

57

They also accused the Whigs of being “willing to tie up the hands of the president in such a
manner as must ultimately bring disgrace upon the nation.”120
The anti-war papers denounced the move as a simple case of an unjust imperialist
land-grab. “No true honor, no national benefit, can possibly accrue from an unjust war,”
penned the politically independent Tribune. “Shut your eyes to the whole course of events,”
Greeley wrote sarcastically, “and it will be come easy to prove we are a … ill-used people
and Mexico has… greatly imposed upon us.” 121 If one looked at the full balance of the facts,
he said, it was obvious that the administration was acting both unjustly and imperialistically
towards Mexico.
Bennett’s Herald, despite its strong Whig leanings, changed its tune in the days right
after Congress acted. Its editor mused, almost prophetically it seems, that the war could lay
the “foundation of a new age… affecting both this continent and… Europe.”122 This mirrors
to an extent the tension that was felt in the Whig members in Congress, caught between two
undesirable choices. However, both the Whig and the independent anti-war papers
continually attacked President Polk himself and the pro-war faction in Congress while taking
care to remind readers that they did in fact support the soldiers in the field. “Never,” railed
the Herald in reference to the way that Congress had slipped the declaration of war in as a
preamble to a military appropriation bill, had a party placed “its sordid purposes into the
arena of necessary legislation with a front more impudent, unjust and unjustifiable.”123
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The public, for its part, seems to have largely signed on to the war effort. Even in
New England, the center of anti-war opposition at the government level, volunteer companies
were quickly formed. Calhoun recognized this, writing disappointedly that the public was
like “a young man of 18, full of health and vigor and disposed for adventure of any
description, but without wisdom or experience to guide him.”124
The Polk administration may have in fact used the war and the awkward position that
it was forcing its political opponents into as a lever by which to force through measures that
might not have otherwise passed, something that modern presidents enjoying a rally would
certainly find familiar as a legislative strategy. After several hectic weeks of foreign policy
legislation, Polk managed to prod the Congress into addressing his domestic agenda,
specifically the independent treasury and a lowering of the tariff. The Whigs tried to use the
war as a means of opposition to the domestic bills. They argued that it was foolish to, at the
very time that the nation’s budget needs were exploded due to war expenses, lower customs
duties. The administration countered by saying that encouraged imports would more than
make up for the loss in per-import income. The latter argument carried the day.125
Looking to the quantitative data, there is not much to support a finding of a rally.
Rally events show an immediate and nearly unconditional increase in the focus on and
support for the president in the modern era. This occurs with regularity despite the success or
failures of the President’s actions. While mentions of the president should increase after the
publication of the Thornton Affair, they do not; in fact, while not statistically significant,
they actually decrease slightly in the months after the beginning of the war. Mentions of
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public reaction towards the war and commentary on public opinion by the papers increases
slightly, but again not in a statistically significant manner. The only statistically significant
increase in mentions comes for Congress. Mentions of the legislative branch increase by
more than a third on average over the six months after the first mentions of the Thornton
Affair, as compared to the month before.126
When understood in the context of the strong political parties that were centered in
the Congress, this is not a significant surprise. Much of the division over the war was along
partisan lines and, with the party leadership in Congress, the debates in that body would
become the most fertile ground from which to cover government action on the topic. What
does this mean? I believe the increase in mentions of Congress has to do with a party system
that, at least in comparison to today, was relatively disciplined. The partisan debates of the
day were played out in the chambers of Congress. Executive direction of these battles during
the early years of the nation came from behind the scenes and as such did not make for juicy
headlines. If you wanted to see and cover the root of politics in 1846, you looked to Capitol
Hill, not to the White House, and the data presented in this case bear this out.
To see evidence of a rally, I looked at the attitude of those mentions. The coverage of
the president, surprisingly from a modern standpoint, goes more negative in general, though
it misses statistical significance (except at the 0.2 level). While mentions of public opinion
also dip into the negative, this change is even less significant than the one for the president.
Again, we see that the only significant change comes in the attitude towards Congress; the
approval drops by over a quarter of a point (on a 2-point scale).
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It does seem that the press became more antagonistic towards government in this time
of crisis. My examination turned to see if this was an effect of the papers themselves, rather
than a change in opinions. While both the Herald and the Sun moved towards their respective
bases, the Tribune, which had endorsed Polk in the election, switched from moderately
supportive of Polk to full-out anti-war mode, blasting away at both the President and the
Congressional leadership, run by the Democrats. It is exactly this major shift, while the other
two papers move to their partisan extremes, which concerned me. Is this shift masking an
actual rally? In fact, it could be obscuring a statistically significant shift in the patterns of
mentions as well. I felt this was plausible enough to warrant a closer look, especially since
the Tribune had nearly double the count of articles that the Sun had, and consistently half
again the number that the Herald published.
When I reexamined the data and excluded the Tribune from the model, I found a
completely different story. The significance of changes in Congress, both in mentions and in
attitude, disappears. The only statistically significant finding is on the papers’ attitudes
towards public opinion.127 The papers reported on opinion more favorably after the Thornton
Affair hit the market. Much of this was reporting on public rallies and the like related to the
war. While impossible to prove, it seems reasonable to think that this represented at least to
some extent editorial pandering to the readers. It is a brave editor that is willing to tell their
own readers that they are wrong on a topic the readers feel strong about. Any changes in the
number of mentions of and the attitude towards President Polk and his policies remained
insignificant.
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In the modern era, people rally to both the Congress and the President. The old adage,
“politics end at the water’s edge” hold true in contemporary times, but apparently not during
the Mexican-American War for Polk and the Twenty-ninth Congress. Even though patriotic
fervor was sweeping the nation, it does not seem that the Democrats, whether in Congress or
in the White House, managed to gain any additional support from this rally event. In fact the
Democrats lost control of the House in the 1846 midterm elections, despite significant
military victories in the ongoing war. The people certainly supported the troops and the war
itself. It appears that there was a disconnect in the minds of the voting public between the
fortunes of the Democratic party and the President in the elections on the one hand, and their
patriotic support of the troops in the field and of the country as a whole in a time of war.
Looking into the historical literature,128 it seems that the midterms were dominated by a
number of issues, only one of which was the war itself. Even in strongly anti-war districts,
the vast majority of those members who had voted for the war measures were sent back to
Washington.
The War
When General Taylor moved to occupy the disputed region between the Rio Grande
and the Nueces River, it was evident that this would cause a reaction from Mexican forces.
This possibility was discussed at length in cabinet meetings. When the hostilities began,
General Taylor found himself on the border with most of the tiny United States standing
army, around 4,000 men. He quickly sent a report to Washington and penned urgent requests
to the governors of Texas and Louisiana for volunteer troops, four regiments each, totaling
about five thousand men.
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On May 9, word reached Washington that the expected “collision between the
American and Mexican forces” had occurred.129 Two days later, the delay owing to the fact
that May 10 was a Sunday, Polk sent a strongly worded message to Congress stating that
Mexico had “shed American blood upon American soil.”130 Congress, amid some debate,
voted to approve an appropriations bill that contained a statement of war by large majorities
in both chambers and the president signed it on May 13. Senator Calhoun, who refused to
vote on the measure because of the preamble, stated bluntly with a touch of prophesy:
It [Polk’s actions leading to the war] sets the example which will enable all future
Presidents to bring about a state of things, in which Congress shall be forced, without
deliberation, or reflection, to declare war, however opposed to its convictions of
justice or expediency.131
Polk himself took an unprecedented role in the direction of the war. He showed what the
presidency could do administratively in a time of war and established “that a president
without previous military experience could provide decisive wartime leadership.”132
However, Polk was a loyal Democrat and worried about the reputation that Taylor, a Whig,
was getting from his victories and tried to remove General Winfield Scott, another Whig,
from overall command by the creation of rank above him.
Political intrigue and partisan bickering aside, the people were vastly in favor of the
war. “Nothing could dim the enthusiasm,” wrote Johannsen, “of that spring in 1846 when the
first reports of victory on the Rio Grande were confirmed.”133 Even the opposition papers,
like the Herald, recognized this unity: “How is this to be accounted for, this almost perfect
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union throughout the national mind… this sublime spectacle of military preparation, and
military transition.”134 The Herald’s editors attributed it to the power of the press, though
others, including the Democratic Sun, stated that it was a mere fact of the republic: each
person who shared in the government of the country “feels that the defense of his native land
or of his country’s rights depends upon himself,” and that each time “the language of
menace, or an act of outrage or insult” was directed at the government, it became a personal
issue.135
The public was warned by the government and the media that Taylor’s position was
precarious, facing as he was more than double his own numbers. The Sun, echoing stories
from the Democrat flagship paper Washington Union, reported that the news of the victories
at Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma might be premature and exaggerated.136 Taylor’s own
dispatches, coming two days later, dispelled the public alarm and Washington “immediately
assumed an air of celebration.”137
The government’s authorization for fifty thousand volunteers was filled within a few
weeks, in some places as much as ten times over, such that lotteries had to be held to sort out
which of the volunteers would be allowed to enlist. A few Whig papers, in the wake of the
quick victories in the war’s first two battles, charged that the President had summoned too
many volunteers to only be worried about Mexico and really intended to use them instead
against Great Britain in Oregon.138
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Over the six months after the initial attack on the Rio Grande, the time period covered
in this study, Gen. Taylor repeatedly won stunning victories against numerically superior
forces, relieving the Mexican siege of Fort Texas and occupying the northern Mexican cities
of Matamoros, Camargo and Monterrey. News of other victories in New Mexico and
California helped popular support as well. Despite this support for the troops, the vocal
opposition to the war policy continued and got stronger. According to the Whigs, General
Zachary Taylor and his “valiant band of intrepid adventurers [had] won brilliant victories [at
Pala Alto and Resaca de la Palma], the logistical incompetence of the current administration
notwithstanding.”139 The Tribune suggested Polk’s impeachment as “an indemnity to the
American people for the loss of… lives, which have been sacrificed in Mexico…”140 Putting
that into the modern context illuminates the difference in the political climate between the
1840s and the modern era of American government. Imagine the firestorm had a paper
suggested the impeachment of FDR after Pearl Harbor or Bush after 9/11; it would certainly
have paid a high retributive price in circulation numbers and advertising.
A significant partisan move on the part of the administration in September came
when General Taylor negotiated an eight-week cease-fire with Mexican authorities. Polk was
enraged by this and promptly ordered Taylor to continue his advance and moved to set up a
second front invasion by sea. Whig congressional candidates had a useful argument that the
President was interfering with the commanders in the field and therefore unnecessarily
lengthening the conflict. Polk, for his part, had a deep distrust of the Whig generals, Taylor
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and Scott, and their political ambitions,141 so much so that he sought unsuccessfully to create
a new general rank above both of them, into which he could place a loyal Democrat.
As the data show, there may have been a disconnect in the minds of the people of the
United States between support for the war against Mexico and support for the administration,
especially when they got to the ballot boxes. In the modern era, these two ideas often become
conflated. Because of the perception and often-explicit charges that any opposition to the
administration’s policies is unpatriotic, expressions of dissent become suppressed, either
through a lack of expression or through a lack of reporting on those disagreeing messages.
The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks is a good example of this conflation. During
the 2002, bucking the historical trend of the president’s party losing seats in midterm
elections, President George W. Bush and the Republican Party in general were able to
marshal significant electoral gains against the Democratic Party both in Congress and at the
state level throughout the nation. However, during the period under examination this was not
yet the case. Early on, Polk seemed to be able to railroad Congress by “fusing Polk’s partisan
objectives with national patriotism.”142 However, as the war went on, political elites and
citizens alike were more and more able see a separation between the administration and their
loyalty to the country itself. The Democratic losses in the Congressional midterm elections in
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the fall and spring of 1846-47143 are especially illuminating with regards to this separation
between public support for the war and support for the president.
These particular midterm elections do show a widespread dissatisfaction with the
Polk administration, but the popularity of the war itself was not in question. While the war
was plainly the most important single issue when taken from a nation-wide perspective, a
huge number of more regional issues played a large role in the election. Throughout the
western states, Polk’s settlement of the Oregon dispute in June with England at the 49th
parallel, breaking his famous “54’40” or Fight” pledge of the campaign, and his veto of the
Rivers and Harbors Bill in August were very unpopular. In protectionist areas, including the
South, the passage of the Walker Tariff was denounced. The conservative financial sector,
without regard to region, attacked the establishment of the independent treasury. Finally, the
growing internal divisions of the party, especially on the issue of slavery, weakened the
Democrats going into the elections.
One interesting feature of the Congressional elections of the time was that the lame
duck session of Congress lasted almost a full year after most of the elections were finished.
Those elected early in the fall of 1846 and the following spring didn’t take office until the
Thirtieth Congress began its first session in December 1847. This gave Polk and the
Democrats in the House of Representatives time to bring the war to a favorable conclusion
before the partisan reactions that caused them to lose control of the House in the elections
bore fruit with the Thirtieth Congress.
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Conclusions
With the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, ending the Mexican-American War, and the
subsequent Gadsden Purchase, the United States increased its land area by a third, second
only in expansion to the Louisiana Purchase. One of the most important acquisitions for the
history of the young nation would be California and the excellent Pacific ports, especially
San Francisco, which Polk and presidents before him had long sought. Though it was the
land that sparked the conflict in the first place, the strip of dusty wasteland in Texas between
the Nueces and the Rio Grande became almost an afterthought, even more so after the
California Gold Rush began.
Polk was the last man to occupy the White House whose administration was not
dominated by the slavery question. As a result of the massive expansion of American
territory in the West, the “debate over what to do with the spoils of the Mexican-American
War”144 made it impossible to reconcile the internal divisions of the Democratic Party over
the issue. The party would survive the charges of treason against it after the Civil War only
because of its strong base in the South, but would take nearly a century to return to anything
like its former power on the national stage; Woodrow Wilson would be the next Democrat
after Jackson to be elected to the White House for consecutive terms. The Whigs, standing
firm for national unity, would soon find themselves rendered irrelevant, marginalized and
subsequently replaced within a decade by the Republican Party. Slavery would dog the next
four presidents, evenly divided between deferential Whigs (Taylor and Fillmore), who left
the issue to Congress, and weak Northern Democrats (Pierce and Buchanan) willing to leave
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slavery as a political issue to the states, as they tried to diffuse rather to solve the problem. It
would subsequently define the presidency of the fifth.
The power of the executive was coming into its own in the mid-1840s, owing much to
the expansion of power that came from the Jackson administration. However, the presidency
does not yet have the position as a symbolic leader to whom the public looks, nor does it yet
have the support of a politically independent and strong mass media. Because of that, I did
not expect to find any significant rally. In fact, nothing was exactly what I got. While modern
rallies seem to give an unconditional rise in support, coverage of Polk and the rest of the
government seemed to stay the same or even decrease slightly in approval. Even with what is
anecdotally strong public support for the war,145 the President and even his party in Congress
do not seem to be able to garner any political benefit from that support. While the war
certainly was a topic of much discussion, domestic issues also played as big a role, if not
bigger. Polk’s veto of the Rivers and Harbors Bill made the West feel betrayed, the possible
expansion of slavery upset the North146 and the lower tariff irked businesses that would have
to compete with cheaper imports; it all came out at the ballot box. In fact in the 1846-7 midterm elections, conducted while the war was going on, the Democrats managed to lose 32
seats and control of the House of Representatives to the Whig Party, which included a
freshman representative from Illinois with an important but as of yet unforeseen destiny
ahead of him. No modern President, actively engaged in a popular war, would have to worry
about midterm results such as these. Here, there is no rally to be seen; let us look elsewhere.
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Table 1:
Examining Press Accounts, Pre- and Post-Publication of the Thornton Affair
N (Pre-Event)
Mentions of:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

N (Post-Event)
39
41
48

220 (36.67/month)
329 (54.83/month)
320 (53.33/month)

Mean (Pre-Event) Mean (Post-Event)
Attitude on:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

-0.0514
0.0975
0.1256

-0.2550
-0.1843
-0.0367

T-Value
0.5389
2.3808
0.9525
T-Value
1.3840
2.0420
1.2643

P-Value
0.5905
0.0182
0.3419
P-Value
0.1676
0.0420
0.2071

Note: The dates are April 10-May 9 (Pre-) and May 10-Nov 10 (Post-). This will affect the count
comparisons for mentions only, but not the T-test results.

Table 2:
Examining Press Accounts, Pre- and Post-Publication of the Thornton Affair
(excluding NY Tribune)
N (Pre-Event)
Mentions of:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

N (Post-Event
24
25
29

Mean (Pre-Event)
Attitude on:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

112 (18.67/month)
155 (25.83/month)
147 (24.5/month)
Mean (Post-Event)

0.0417
0.1667
0.2917

0.0625
-0.0387
0.4497

T-Value
1.4999
0.1354
1.1417
T-Value
0.1006
0.8474
2.1720

P-Value
0.1359
0.8925
0.2555
P-Value
0.9200
0.3979
0.0312

Note: The dates are April 10-May 9 (Pre-) and May 10-Nov 10 (Post-). This will affect the count
comparisons for mentions only, but not the T-test results.
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If I can only go out of office…with the knowledge that I have done everything in my
power to avert [war with Spain] with the success that has crowned your patience… I
shall be the happiest man in the world.
-- William McKinley, to outgoing President Grover Cleveland,
on the eve of his inauguration
Chapter 4:
The Rally Effect Transitional -- The Spanish-American War
Introduction
On the evening of February 15, 1898, the American battleship USS Maine sat
peacefully at her anchorage in Havana, Cuba. Suddenly and unexpectedly, a massive
explosion split the night. The front third of the ship disintegrated as her forward magazines
exploded, five tons of gunpowder stored for her main guns, killing almost three-quarters of
her crew and sending her quickly to the bottom of the harbor. If this had happened fifty,
seventy-five, or a hundred years later, there would have been little doubt that Presidents
Truman, Nixon or Clinton would have seen a significant jump in their approval ratings, this
being a classic rally event. However, we are still dealing, at the end of the nineteenth century,
with a different time and understanding of the office of the Chief Executive. Did President
McKinley get a rally from the loss of Maine?
In this chapter, I will be looking at this question. After discussing the particular
methodological advantages of selecting this event and conflict, I will examine the nature of
the presidency at the turn of the twentieth century in general and McKinley’s administration
in particular. I’ll then move on to the event itself, looking at both the media and
administration reactions to the event and how those affected and were affected by public
opinion.
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Touching briefly on earlier material, the causes of rallies are identified throughout the
academic literature as centering around two general items: patriotism and elite behavior.
Especially important for this work are the existence of both the symbolic presidency, the
recognized target for that patriotism and center for action, and a coherent and independent
mass media to codify and express that elite opinion to the mass of the American public. The
Spanish-American War represents a period in which these determinants for the modern-style
rally effect are emerging, though at different paces. As advertising replaced subventions and
blackmail147 as the chief source of newspapers income, the media of the time was becoming
much more free to tell its own stories. Often these stories were embarrassing to the political
elites, but many of the papers did not care, as they had decided to be crusaders for the public
good. The media retains a touch of this crusade even today, but it was more important for
many papers nearer the turn of the twentieth century. The embarrassment of the elites made
for good headlines that sold papers; circulation numbers, and the accompanying advertising
revenue, drove the papers to print more and more lurid and more marginally truthful stories.
This is the age of ultimate media freedom, that of yellow journalism.
Not only was the media maturing into a credible political force, especially in the New
York market with the circulation war raging between the Hearst and Pulitzer publishing
empires, but the presidency was changing as well. In the years after the Civil War and
Lincoln’s expansive use of executive power, Congress had reasserted itself in a number of
ways. Andrew Johnson, Lincoln’s hapless successor, was rendered nearly superfluous by
impeachment and near-miss at being removed by the Senate, a single vote determining the
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outcome; never before had a president been impeached and, in the one time since, the vote
for removal was nowhere near as close. Ulysses Grant, though a forceful battlefield leader,
repeatedly capitulated to Congressional leaders, especially in the Senate, leading to the nadir
of executive power.148 However, his successors in office, Hayes, Garfield, Arthur and
Cleveland, would each contribute to the reemergence of a strong independent executive
branch. Despite this reemergence of executive power, the office was still constrained in the
scope of its power vis-à-vis Congress. By the time that McKinley confided in his secretary
that he could “no longer be called the President of a party [but instead] the President of the
whole people,”149 the executive branch was independent and ready again to take a leading
role in government. It did not, however, occupy a symbolic leadership role. It was accepted
as the source of national action, but not the symbol of the nation. That symbolic role would
not come until the White House was able to link itself directly to the people, both rhetorically
and in the terms of explicit leadership. McKinley was still very much tied to the Republican
Party, unwilling to go to the people directly without that intermediary.
The Spanish-American War, being the first unifying conflict after the bloody internal
one, also served to unify the nation around the flag and to distract it from the lingering
memories of its own self-destructive paroxysm.150 This case represents a peculiar case in the
pre-modern era of the Presidency. There was a significant delay between the event that
would, in modern times, tend to cause a rally to the President and the actual declaration of
war. Thus, the Spanish-American War gives us an opportunity to see what the struggle within
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the government itself and between the President and public opinion can do to presidential
approval. It gives us a chance to see what a delay in definitive presidential action on the rally
event might do to his approval and also affords the opportunity to see the two factors of the
modern rally in separate effect. During this period, there was, putting aside its sensational
tendencies, an independent media, but the White House was not yet the symbolic leader of
the people as a whole. If the data analysis shows a rally occurred based around the event
itself, it lends support to the media as the source of the rally effect. This would suggest that
the people are being moved to supporting McKinley by opinion leadership coming from the
newspapers. However, if it is focused around the change in the president’s actions, then it
lends support for the symbolic nature of the presidency being the main determinant. In this
situation, the increase in approval is due to the president’s actions, not a reaction to the event
itself, in the absence of the symbolic president. The latter would not be a rally in the modern
sense; it is instead is the expression of a policy preference.
Case Selection
When deciding on cases, one was needed during the period from the Civil War to the
beginning of the first Roosevelt administration. This period is important in particular because
it is a time when the media maturing into a force, especially in the New York market with the
circulation war raging between the Hearst and Pulitzer publishing empires, but the symbolic
position of the presidency is lagging behind. Therefore, this case presents the best
opportunity to examine which of the two has a stronger causal impact. To fulfill this role, I
chose the Spanish-American War, setting the rally event as the explosion and subsequent
sinking of USS Maine on February 15, 1898 in the harbor at Havana, Cuba. The Republican
Party, despite solidly controlling both houses of Congress and the White House, was
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internally divided and had problems resisting the push of public opinion towards war.
President McKinley, despite his own aversions, emotional, economic and political, ended up
having to declare war in the face of a massive groundswell of both public and Congressional
opinion against Spain and in sympathy with Cuba Libre.
For the quantitative portion of my analysis, I chose three prominent newspapers from
the New York market, using the methodology described at more length in chapter 2. Relying
heavily on Wisan to provide for my selection criteria, I settled on Whitelaw Reid’s Tribune,
Edwin Godkin’s Evening Post and William Randolph Hearst’s flagship paper, the Journal.
While these papers agreed sometimes with each other and other times vehemently disagreed
about the Cuban question, they represent a fairly accurate spread of the political spectrum of
the time. Hearst was a staunch Democrat, very supportive of intervention against the alleged
atrocities being committed by the Spanish government in Cuba. Reid was basically a
mouthpiece for the Republican Party. Reid’s Tribune tended very strongly to march reliably
to whatever tune the Republican leadership was playing. Godkin, while conservative,
generally advocated moderation both on Cuba specifically and politics more generally.151 He
argued, right up until the declaration of war passed, for staying out of the conflict. It should
be pointed out that, while both the Tribune and the Evening Post were considered
conservative papers, the spectrum that I am trying to best represent is the range on the Cuban
issue, not the larger partisan spectrum in American politics of the time, though the latter is
important as well. The importance of this spread on the subject cannot be overemphasized, as
any person is affected strongly by his or her own preconceived notions on a specific topic.
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McKinley and the Transitional Presidency
The presidency of the late nineteenth century, like the country itself, was one that was
in transition. The United States at the time was coming into its own as a world economic
power; the country’s output overtook the entire British Empire in the last quarter of the
century. Railroads tied the country from coast to coast and a strong navy helped its merchant
fleet into new markets overseas. Despite the Monroe Doctrine’s codification of Washington’s
warning against ‘entangling alliances,’ nothing was said against economic expansion. It was
that expansion that was bringing the US onto the world political stage. In the Western
Hemisphere, with no opposing major power and no Monroe Doctrine limits, the US acted as
big brother, intervening both diplomatically and directly throughout the region. Directed by
the president as Commander-in-Chief, we can see all of the modern war powers, albeit
written smaller at this time.
When it came to major power foreign policy, however, Congress still laid claim to a
significant role. Congress had in fact become accustomed to a measure of dominance in the
post-Civil War era, especially with regards to the development of that area of policy. Since
the end of the Jackson administration, the White House had been largely occupied by
compromise Presidents, mostly weak and ineffective, which had served to tip the balance of
power towards Congress.152 The Senate regularly defeated even some of the most important
and publicly supported treaties during this period. The best example of this was the failure in
of the 1897 Olney-Pauncefote Treaty, an agreement between the U.S. and Great Britain to
submit any future disputes to arbitration. Despite strong administration and public support,
the Senate stood firm that it should be able to decide on a case-by-case basis whether or not a
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specific issue should be submitted to arbitration. Congress sometimes even worked at crosspurposes to the administration. At the height of the Civil War, the House unanimously passed
a resolution decrying the overthrow of the Mexican government and the installation of
Emperor Maximilian by France. The administration, understandably occupied by domestic
matters and not wishing to further antagonize the French who were already sympathetic to
the Confederate cause, went so far as to have Secretary of State Seward write a note to Paris
disavowing the House resolution.153
In the era of the modern presidency, the president has a near monopoly on the
decision to use military force overseas. The rally literature points this out as a reason why the
president is afforded the benefits of a rally effect.154 However, during the run-up to the
Spanish-American War, it was not the president who chose to use force in his own right.
Instead Congress and public opinion, the latter expressed largely but not exclusively by the
press, pushed him to take control. Had McKinley not stepped in and taken the reins, he might
very well have had Congress declare war in spite of him and thus lost much control over the
development and resolution of the conflict. Had the President abdicated this initiative to
Congress, it could have changed the entire course of American politics with regards to the
Commander-in-Chief clause and war powers. The ability of Congress to interfere in major
ways in what we consider today to be a nearly exclusive domain of the executive hints at
something that is lacking in presidency of that time: a symbolic claim to be the representative
of the nation as a whole.
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The role of the media in politics was changing as well. For most of the history of the
nation up to the time of the Cuban crisis, the media had played the role of reinforcing party
politics, usually serving as the public mouthpieces for the various parties, and reinforcing the
norms of upper-middle class and elite society.155 Two innovations would cut the strings that
the parties and elites used to control the press and turn them into their own political force: the
interview and advertising.
The interview as a new way of reporting started in 1835 with James Bennett’s New
York Morning Herald. In a way, Bennett was creating the news he was reporting, rather than
relying on it being fed to him.156 This would be essential later in the century when the yellow
press of Hearst and Pulitzer would thrill the nation with intricate, lurid and often completely
fictional accounts from Cuba. Advertising served to give the newspapers an independent
source of funds. Like the independence from Congress that a protected salary affords to the
Chief Executive, the move away from less reputable sources of funding, as described earlier,
allowed the press to finally come into its own as a politically independent force in the
American system.
We have an interesting case and an opportunity in McKinley and the SpanishAmerican War, in that one of the accepted modern determinants is not fully developed at this
time. There is an independent, albeit sensationalist, mass media. We do not have, however, a
symbolic pedestal from what President McKinley can act with impunity against his political
opponents in the government, namely Congress. This poses an important opportunity with
regards to the development of the rally effect. To be able to test one of the two determinants
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in the absence of the other is to be able to see whether it can create a rally effect on its own.
If it does, it calls into question the importance of the other factor at all; if it does not, it calls
into question its own influence on the rally effect.
Rally Event: The Maine Explosion
Early in January of 1898, riots in Havana erupted and three newspapers that had been
anti-Weyler157 had their offices destroyed. While there was no overt threat to American
businesses or citizens, the administration dispatched USS Maine to Cuba on a goodwill visit.
It was a thinly veiled reminder that the US was watching events very closely and would not
tolerate threats to its citizens. The press generally approved of this action by the
administration,158 though some questioned the timing, stating that “a warship is a curious
kind of oil on troubled waters,” one that might stir up tensions despite the avowed peaceful
nature of the visit.159 The officers were welcomed by Spanish officials and treated with all
the normal courtesies shown to visiting dignitaries, including visits to the ship by Spanish
officials, a banquet for the officers hosted by Fitzhugh Lee, the US Consul-General in
Havana, and the hosting of Captain Charles Sigsbee, the ship’s Commanding Officer, at a
bullfight.160
One occurrence did serve to spoil the apparent atmosphere of studied courtesy. On
February 9, the Journal published a private letter, written by the Spanish minister to the
United States Enrique Dupuy de Lôme, to an influential Spanish editor and politician. This
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letter contained a number of very disparaging references to the President; these references
included that McKinley was weak, played his politics to the mob, and was the equivalent of a
political hack. While the Journal itself had used far more derogatory references to the Chief
Executive itself, it charged de Lôme with “the greatest offense with which a diplomatic
officer can be accused” and demanded that he be sent “ home at once in disgrace.”161 While
Reid’s Tribune was not as vindictive, it too called for the Spanish diplomat’s expulsion and
declared that his usefulness in Washington was at an end. The editorial page stated bluntly
“the necessary preliminaries to his departure cannot be too speedy to satisfy public opinion…
Senor de Lôme, the door stands open!”162 On the other end of the spectrum, the Evening Post
was in complete agreement that de Lôme had to go, but was much more sympathetic to the
minister’s predicament. Godkin wrote that the “chances were a million to one that this
particular letter would never see the light, but it was de Lôme’s bad luck to have the one
chance go against him, and here he is with his diplomatic career cut short” in disgrace.163
At 9:40PM, February 15, the forward third of the Maine disintegrated in an enormous
explosion caused by the ignition of her magazines. Two hundred and sixty-six men, almost
three-quarters of the crew, lost their lives and eight more died later of resulting injuries.
Despite calls for calm from both Captain Sigsbee and Counsel-General Lee, the media frenzy
began immediately, led by Hearst and Pulitzer. The Journal’s circulation went from less than
half a million per day in the first week of the year to over a million during the week after the
Maine’s explosion. Hearst’s headlines appeared to be blatant attempts to stir up anti-Spanish
sentiment in the readers. Some examples included “THE WHOLE COUNTRY THRILLS
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WITH THE WAR FEVER,” “Captain Sigsbee practically declares that his ship was blown
up by a mine or torpedo,” (which he had not) “Proof of a submarine mine,” (which the article
never mentioned) and “THE MAINE WAS DESTROYED BY TREACHERY.”164 In fact,
the Journal went on with these sorts of headlines for weeks after the sinking.
The Tribune accepted the accident theory, warning against early “guess-work” as to
the causes of the explosion. While Spain should not be morally accountable “for the crime of
an irresponsible wretch,”165 Reid’s paper did argue that the colonial power could be held
financially responsible for a failure of reasonable diligence if the cause turned out to be
external in nature. In line with expectations for the pro-administration paper in my sample,
the paper repeatedly expressed confidence in McKinley’s ability to handle the situation: “the
honor of the nation is in safe hands. The President will never suffer a stain to be put upon it
nor will he hurry on a war that may with honor be avoided.”166 It also pointed out in a thinly
veiled swipe at the melodramatic articles coming from the Journal and the World that,
considering the ambiguity of the causes, that the situation imposed “upon the people of both
countries the duty of not allowing themselves to become excited by criminally sensational
newspapers…”167
Godkin’s Evening Post spent a good amount of space debunking the lurid headlines
of its yellow competitors. It attacked the World for its interference in the investigation with
its own divers and ship and blasted the Journal for its headlines and reward offer. Godkin
wrote that “a thousand different explanations have been offered by editors and reporters who

164

Journal, 2/17, 2/18, 2/20 and 2/23, respectively, emphases included from the original.
Tribune, 2/17.
166
Ibid, 2/26.
167
Ibid, 2/17.
165

81

were not there and a thousand different [pictures] given by persons who did not see it.” It
quoted a professor of the Ordinance Bureau that no torpedo could possibly have done so
much damage and an engineer who, having been involved in the ship’s design and
construction, stated that the design itself invited disasters such as the one that had just
happened.168
Amidst all of what would be called today ‘hype’ over the sinking of the Maine, was
there really a change? Rally events show an immediate and nearly unconditional increase in
support for the president in the modern era; do they do the same at the end of the nineteenth
century? Looking at the qualitative data, it seems that the country is singing loudly for war,
but do the quantitative data play the same tune?
Using content analysis, I examined the change in tenor of the papers before and after
the destruction of Maine. As shown in Table 3, mentions of the President in the month before
the first reports on the Maine nearly doubled during the month after in the papers
examined.169 This was expected and presages the way that the modern presidency is treated.
When the rally event happened, the nation looked to the president for action. At this point in
time, the country was still largely parochial in its concerns, but an earlier event pointed out a
coming change in the wind. The Venezuelan Border Crisis in 1895 resulted in an “explosion
of jingo feeling” and made the Cleveland administration remain quiet about the whole
situation until the popular sentiment had calmed down. With the Cuban crisis, the public was
being whipped up by the yellow press and would not be calmed.170 McKinley was brought
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into the front because the people knew that issues of foreign policy generally, and the
military more specifically, are his portfolio. A strong proponent of public opinion and its
primacy in governmental policy, he found himself pushed in a direction that he found
personally unacceptable.
However, during the same two months, there was no statistical difference in how
those mentions actually treated the president and his policies towards Cuba. This is in fact
very similar to the results that Offner found when looking at correspondence sent to
McKinley.171 It seems that, though the people were looking to the president for action, they
are at the same time more ambivalent towards his policy choices and, unlike the modern
public, not by and large supporting him unconditionally. They looked to the White House to
carry into action what they thought should happen, rather than trusting the president to know
and do what is best. The modern president is dealt with as the symbol of the nation. Dissent
with him during a time of national crisis is deemed unpatriotic and dangerous to political
careers. During McKinley’s time, this was obviously not yet the case; he did not yet occupy
that symbolic position that would have made him unquestionable, at least in the short term, in
the way that the modern president does.
Similar trends exist with regards to Congress, but mentions by the press of public
opinion change significantly. While the anti-McKinley papers continued extolling how the
public “thrills with the war fever,” the lone pro-administration paper in the sample, the
Tribune, began to back away from public opinion, mentioning it very sparingly until after
war was declared more than two months later. Modern media are important in supporting the
rally effect. Dissent is curtailed, either by opposition leaders choosing not to express it or the
171
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media not reporting it when they do, dubbed “the spiral of silence” in modern literature.172
During the run-up to the Spanish-American War, however, some of the papers were happily
reporting dissent among the Democratic opposition to the administration’s policies on the
Cuban crisis. In the era of the symbolic presidency, this would be unpatriotic; during the era
of the traditional presidency, this was simply business as usual.
Background
Looking at the qualitative data, I find a lagged increase in support for McKinley,
based not on the sinking of USS Maine but on the declaration of war, a concrete action on his
part rather than an event external to the administration. It seems that McKinley is not
benefitting from the increase in attention on him. Patriotism is everywhere, but he is not the
focus of it. To better understand the shifting patterns and to support the quantitative data, we
need to better understand the qualitative study around the numbers.
For that understanding of why the sinking of the Maine was such a watershed
moment, we need to understand the roots of the simmering conflict. February of 1898 was far
from the beginning of the problems between Spain and the United States. The causes of the
Spanish-American War go back more than two decades to the Ten-Years War, a Cuban
insurrection in the 1870s that, despite being settled by some unfulfilled promises of
autonomy from Madrid, never fully ended. The insurrection of 1895, which directly led to
the war, simply represented a major up-tick in the ongoing anti-colonial insurgency. It was
this increase in violence that really brought the issue into the newspapers and thus the
American public’s view.
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Finally, the Spanish government, resolved to put this ongoing rebellion down by any
means, appointed General Valeriano Weyler to do so. Weyler was an effective anti-guerrilla
general. He quickly countered the insurgent’s tactics by isolating them from each other and
from less troubled areas by means of fortifications. He put out counter-guerilla groups,
allowing them to search out and attack the insurgents under their own rules. These groups
would become more feared than the regular Spanish army. What would earn him
demonization in the American media, however, was his plan to isolate the guerillas from
their popular support by gathering the civilian population into ‘reconcentration’ camps. He
pulled the farmers off the land and put them into camps in and around the cities. This was
supposed to both protect them from the insurgents and deprive the rebels of their support. In
the end, he was not able to provide for the hundreds of thousands of people moved and the
camps became rife with hunger and disease; tens and possibly hundreds of thousands died.
Lurid stories of these camps and other humanitarian problems all over the island did much to
move American public opinion against the Spaniards.
Beset on one side by the insurgents and by the loyalists on the other, Cuba itself was
being destroyed. Cuban insurgent General Maximo Gomez instituted a scorched earth policy.
He was convinced that the reason that the Ten Years’ War has failed was that the more
affluent Cubans had not been affected directly by it. By targeting the island’s rich
agricultural industry, the loyalists on the island would be forced to accept the revolution and
Spain would ultimately grant Cuba independence as the cost of maintaining control would
quickly exceed the benefits of the income from her colony. Cuban agriculture was devastated
almost immediately. While the cane fields had produced more than a million long tons of
sugar in 1895, they only managed barely a fifth of that amount the next year. American
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businessmen, strongly invested in plantations on the island, felt the pinch as their fields were
not immune to being burned simply because they were foreign owned. While the “Butcher,”
as Weyler became to be known, and his atrocities against the ‘innocent Cubans’ made good
front page news in the newspapers in the era of yellow journalism, economic interests were
turning decidedly sour of the subject of the continuing struggle in Cuba as well, but for
different reasons; these reasons were more about pocketbooks and less about the reported
suffering of the Cuban people.
The emergence into the American consciousness was in large part a consequence of
the method used to support the Cuban rebels. The Cuban poet, philosopher and nationalist
José Martí spent several years organizing Cuban expatriates in numerous countries into a
huge network of support while encouraging generals from the Ten Years’ War to recruit
actual combatants. The support network, coming from foreign sources, could supply the
rebels logistically without having to deal with direct Spanish intervention. Filibustering
ships, as the small fast supply ships were called, set sail from ports in various Latin American
countries and Great Britain, but the majority of them came from the United States. At the
repeated insistence of Spain, the United States made an active effort to curb these
revolutionary supplies from reaching Cuba, but enough evaded the Revenue Cutter Service
(the forerunner of the modern Coast Guard) that Spain complained loudly that the US was
not doing enough. The need to patrol aggravated the Americans, the ships that made it
through aggravated the Spanish and mutual aggravation made them distrust and dislike each
other.
Despite Spanish complaints to the contrary, it is not clear that much aid reached the
rebels by this method. Trask states that, out of 71 documented filibustering expeditions that
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set out for Cuba from various ports, only 27 can be confirmed as having reached the island.
Of the ships that failed in their attempt, U.S. naval forces in fact intercepted the vast
majority.173 The papers were somewhat divided on this subject. The Tribune argued that the
responsibility for stopping filibustering was on Spain and that she ought to be able to control
her own ports and coasts, especially if there in fact was no war as Madrid claimed. The
Evening Post was much more solidly against the practice and found it “reassuring to know
that the Administration has no sympathy with filibusters…”174
A New York City-based group that called itself the Junta coordinated the pro-Cuban
groups responsible for supplying the revolutionaries with the material of war. While its
contribution of war material to the effort was not insubstantial, the main contribution of this
committee came in the form of propaganda, swaying public opinion to the support of the
rebel cause. The group constantly fed a stream of print-ready dispatches to the New York
press that only told of Spanish cruelty. With Heart’s Journal and Pulitzer’s World in a major
circulation war, the presses ran hard trying to be the first to publish the sensational stories.
The Journal gave the Junta a full column of front page space to report about how in a recent
battle, “the Spaniards, at first victorious, stabbed to death all Cubans who came under their
power.”175 They also repeatedly published letters from alleged eyewitnesses about attacks on
defenseless peasants, women and children. Wisan points out that, of the stories of atrocities
in Cuba published in the Journal for the whole month of December, 1897, not a single one

173

Trask, 1981, pg. 5. While Trask’s math is a bit lacking (his successes and failures do not
add up to the number of attempts), the numbers are included here as an illustration of his
general point that filibustering was not exceedingly effective as a means of supply for the
rebels.
174
Tribune, 6/11, and Post, 3/15.
175
Journal, 10/15/1897.
87

came from the observations of an impartial third party or from one of the Journal’s own
reporters. Published as reports of “recently arrived Cubans” or letters to the editor, it was
generally known that these came almost exclusively from the Junta.176
The yellow papers were not alone in their publications from the Junta. Though the
Tribune hoped early on that the failures of the attempts to put down the rebellion would not
push the Spanish into harsh measures, they subsequently published a report about Spanish
cruelty at Baire obtained from the Cubans. The Evening Post even printed a comparatively
mild story about wholesale prisoner executions.177
This biasing of the press by the Junta was bad enough for Spain’s image with the
American public, but Madrid complicated the matter by banning press coverage of the
conflict in Cuba. This further biased the press against them and made reporters even more
inclined to rely on first-person accounts from pro-rebel sources that were, because of the ban,
the only sources willing to talk to them. Throughout the struggle before American
intervention, the major papers railed against Weyler’s policies towards the Cuban
insurgency. The Journal described the inhumane treatment of political prisoners and the
burning alive of suspected sympathizers.178
Because of this media biasing, the public was early on sympathetic to the Cuban
cause. Parallels were drawn repeatedly to the United States’ own struggle for independence
against Great Britain. The Tribune outlined this sentiment early in the crisis, stating bluntly
that “Spain [is] an inert nationality… It is only a question of time when their [Cuba’s and
Puerto Rico’s] independence will be established and power given to them to determine their
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future. They are as much entitled to it as our American colonies were in their revolt from
British rule.”179 That said, there was little enthusiasm with the public for direct intervention
in Cuba early in the rebellion. “The American people deeply sympathize with the
misgoverned Cubans,” the Tribune stated, “but they are not anxious to fight for them or to
obtain that island by conquest.”180
The Allianca incident, however, in March of 1895, did much to touch off sensational
reporting and rabid anti-Spanish sentiment within the press and subsequently the public as a
whole. On March 8, a Spanish gunboat attempted to stop an American merchant ship, the
Allianca, on suspicion of filibustering, or smuggling arms to the Cuban insurgents, off the
coast of Cape Maisi at the eastern end of Cuba. The American vessel refused to stop and the
gunboat fired upon her unsuccessfully several times during a chase of about 20 miles. Here
we see the first signs of interventionist sentiment. The governor of Georgia stated quite
bluntly to the Tribune that “Cuba should cease to be Spanish and become American.”181
While not pro-Cuba Libre, it certainly indicates a desire in some parts of the country to
intervene in the insurrection. The Evening Post was angry as well, but not about the incident
itself. Godkin wrote with his typical biting sarcasm that the other papers were playing up the
incident into “a deadly insult which cannot be wiped out, except in double-lettered editorials
and a sale of at least eleven extra copies.”182 The incident was handled through the office of
the Spanish Foreign minister and resolved, but had done damage in the eyes of the public.
The yellow journals did not let the incident go unremembered.
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Despite the distinct move towards anti-Spanish and pro-Cuban sentiments in the press
and the public, the Cleveland administration resisted successfully the pressure to intervene.
However, in his last message to Congress, the outgoing President hinted that American
patience on the Cuban issue had its limits. If things continued on the way they were, “a
situation will be presented where our obligations to… Spain will be superseded by higher
obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize or discharge.”183
President-elect William McKinley, at the same time that President Cleveland was
delivering that message to Congress, was being viewed with some enthusiasm by both those
who desired intervention and those that desired exactly the opposite. The pro-Cuban press
outlets looked for a more aggressive stance from him. The Journal stated as much as only
three days after the election. As December began, it became quite blunt in its assessment:
“The present… administration is far more pacific… in its foreign policy than the incoming…
one is likely to be.”184 However, the anti-interventionists were also hopeful that McKinley
would not change the fundamentals of the Cleveland administration’s policy toward the
island. Godkin editorialized that McKinley “will do everything in his power to restrain the
wrath” of the pro-war Republicans, but at the same time wondered if he could resist
indefinitely.185 Several papers reported that McKinley had responded favorably to
Cleveland’s last message to Congress and the conservatives hoped that this meant patience
would be the order of the day. The announcement that John Sherman, an ardent
interventionist, would be Secretary of State was followed by Sherman’s quick repudiation of
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his earlier views; this sudden change heartened opponents of interference with regards to
McKinley’s future plans towards Cuba.186
If the Democrats in Congress were willing to beat up President Cleveland, one of
their party members, they were more than happy to use “increasingly expansive liberal
rhetoric to launch partisan attacks on McKinley’s policies.”187 McKinley made his position
known very early after inauguration, as one of the first Cabinet meetings “resulted with the
understanding that the policy hitherto pursued [towards Spain], of strict neutrality and
enforcement of neutrality laws, would be adhered to so long as the conditions remained”
fundamentally unchanged.188 McKinley himself stated as much in no uncertain terms: “We
want no wars of conquest, [and] we must avoid the temptation of territorial aggression. War
should never be entered upon until every agency for peace has failed.”189 The problems came
for Republicans, however, who had happily lambasted Cleveland on Cuba. They were now
faced with the choice of either supporting their president or supporting Cuban independence,
something for which they had already come out strongly. They chose the latter and an
administration committed to non-intervention found itself battling its own partisan allies on
the issue for the next year.
This internal struggle was reflected in the press as well as in the halls of the Capitol
building. The Hearst-Pulitzer rivalry went on as strong as ever. In September, the new
ambassador to Spain, Stewart Woodford, arrived in Madrid and presented a note to the
Queen-Regent of Spain that stated plainly that if Spain did not bring peace to Cuba by the
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end of October, the United States would feel itself at liberty to do whatever was needed to do
just that. As with other policy pronouncements, this began a new round of journalistic
sensationalism. The Journal accused the administration of trying to affect elections, with
votes going to the polls only two days after the new deadline.190
Within two weeks of the note’s delivery, the Spanish government had fallen and
Práxedes Sagasta, leader of the Liberal Party and a former Prime Minister himself, moved
Spanish policy towards the left. He acted to recall Weyler, to soften the reconcentration
policies and worked towards a settlement with the rebels that was hoped would lead to home
rule. The people of the US and the press seemed honestly happy about this result. The
Tribune thought that he would be willing to grant a measure of autonomy to Cuba like “that
which Canada now enjoys.”191 Despite praise for new Prime Minister Sagasta and Segismudo
Moret, his choice for Minister of Overseas Colonies, the papers were generally pessimistic
about the chances he had for actually resolving the conflict without granting full
independence to the Cubans. The Journal said that “the retirement of the Azcarraga Ministry
will put renewed strength into the struggling patriots”192 and that they would not quit until
they won their freedom.
The Interim Period
The press fired up public opinion after the sinking of the battleship Maine in favor of
everything from intervention to relieve suffering Cubans to revenge against the perpetrators
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of an “act of dirty treachery on the part of the Spaniards,”193 “Intervention,” the Journal
railed three days after the explosion, “…was our duty before the Maine was destroyed; it was
our duty before De Lôme wrote his letter, and it is our duty now.”194 They reported on
numerous public demonstrations adding to the clamor for war. In New York, many theaters
began to play the national anthem before performances to popular acclamation. The press
also began extensive reporting on the preparations for war. Even the Post covered the
expedited orders for rifles made to the Winchester Company, the movement of massive
shipments of gunpowder and the Bethlehem Iron Works’ acceleration of government
contracts. This all had the effect of making hostilities feel all the more inevitable. Patriotism
was in full swing, but McKinley, without being the symbol of the nation, was not reaping the
benefits.
The government, for its part, was torn. At this period in time, Congress in general,
and especially the Senate, still held for itself a stronger role in foreign policy that it now
claims and it took to reminding President McKinley of this numerous times. Before the
Maine incident, Congress had actually cut the budget of the War Department for coastal
defenses by half a million dollars, four million short of the requested amount. Afterwards,
however, the Congress unanimously passed a fifty million dollar defense appropriation,
something universally lauded in the press. The Journal immediately began speculating as to
what it might be spent. The other papers of my sample were more prudent. The Tribune
opined that the bill was “proof of the spread of patriotic prudence” among Congress and that
the best way to preserve peace was to prepare for war. The Evening Post was in agreement,
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saying that Spain “will want [war] less than ever when she sees that American sentiment is
united in the support of the President.”195 This last quote is interesting, as it hints at the
beginning of the recognition of the President in the mind as the symbol of the country. They
could just as easily said “in support of the Cuban people” or “in support of Congress,” but
they pointed to the President specifically. The Tribune, however, was a bit premature in its
ascribing to the president the unity of American sentiment. With McKinley being burned in
effigy and his portrait torn down across the nation, the country may have been united, but it
was definitely not in its support for McKinley.
Cleveland had had significant problems controlling Congressional Democrats who
became increasingly vocal about their support for the Cuban insurgency. McKinley stepped
into the Oval Office with essentially the same wait-and-see policies that the previous
administration had followed, but with a much more pro-independence party than the
Democrats had ever been. While the Democrats now could attack the administration on
partisan grounds, Republicans found themselves torn between supporting their man in the
White House and sticking to their previous policy positions. For the next year, McKinley
would fight with both Democrats and Republicans on Cuba; this fight would also be played
out in paper editorials.
Three events changed the way that the administration handled Cuban policy in the
interim period. The first was a speech by Senator Redfield Proctor (R-VT) on March 17.
Proctor’s speech was significant for a number of reasons. He was very influential with the
business interests of the nation, the strongest group in the nation against the use of force in
Cuba. He was seen as a calm and contemplative Senator, one that did not speak often and
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who was certainly not a firebrand even when he did make speeches. Proctor was a former
secretary of war, giving him authority both on military matters and as a party insider.
Journalists widely reported that he had been prompted to visit Cuba by the administration,
though the White House repeatedly denied this. His calm and skeptical approach to the
subject lent authority to the information he gave. The account focused most of its time of the
condition of the people and the prospect for the success of the Spanish reforms. Proctor’s
speech was sent by the Associated Press in full to be published all over the world. His
account of the reconcentration camps and the dismal chance for Spanish success moved
many towards intervention. As Linderman points out, Proctor “offered war founded on an
undiluted humanitarianism” and “invited the nation’s willingness to act unselfishly as an
agent of civilization.” The speech was given significant attention in many of the papers. The
Journal reprinted the entire speech and stated that the senator had “unconsciously or adroitly
[made] an argument for intervention,” and that through his speech had “administered the
finishing blow to the self-styled ‘better element’ that has allied itself with tyranny and
inhumanity in Cuba for the sake of increasing its dividends,” an obvious swipe at
McKinley’s anti-intervention business supporters. The pro-administration Tribune was
impressed as well, saying that “a note of absolute sincerity rings true in every word… his
words are not the first to be spoken on the point, nor… the last, but… no others are likely to
exercise a more convincing force” that they would be in favor of intervention. The Post,
however, barely covered the speech at all, and only said editorially that the manner of
Proctor’s speech brought the topic “before us with more vividness than ever.”196 With his
pro-business followers shifting into the pro-interventionist camp due at least in part to the
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speech the speech left McKinley and the Speaker of the House, Thomas Reed, nearly alone
in opposition.
The second event was the publication of the report of the Navy’s Court of Inquiry
into the destruction of the Maine. The report arrived in Washington on March 24 and the
President and the cabinet spent much of the next day studying the 400-page document,
subsequently passing it along to Congress on March 28. The document, fixing blame on an
external explosion for the destruction of the battleship, did much to fuel the war fever,
despite the fact that it explicitly stated "the court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing
the responsibility for the destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons."197 All of the
papers in my sample covered the four hundred-page report extensively, but it was their
reactions to the accompanying message that were the most interesting for this project.
Unsurprisingly, the Journal came out swinging at the President, illustrating the message as a
rope binding Uncle Sam’s hands as Spain threw bombs at him labeled “Maine disaster,” “De
Lôme letter,” and others. It reported on McKinley being hung in effigy in Colorado and
Spain’s flag being burned by students in Omaha.198 The Tribune and the Post both stood for
peace. The former, predictably supporting the President’s every move, said, “reparation for
the Maine could be made peacefully” and warned against “jingoes who want war for war’s
sake.”199 The Post took a similar tack, saying that the war hysteria was being driven by the
publishers of the yellow papers to sell papers and encouraged members of Congress to resist
the “hysteria which goes by the name of patriotism.”200
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Finally, the day after the report came to them, a revolt materialized among House
Republicans, attentive to the press and the fact that the people read the newspapers
extensively; they began demanding action on Cuba and threatening, without action, to vote
for a resolution that would recognize Cuban independence and declare war in spite of the
President’s and the Congressional leadership’s desires to the contrary. Even in the Senate,
rebellion was simmering and Vice-President Hobart told McKinley that he could “no longer
hold back action by the Senate; they will act without you if you do not act at once.”201 This
reduced McKinley’s ability to maneuver diplomatically, as Congress was threatening to take
the initiative away from him in a short amount of time. If this had happened, his ability to
control the war and the aftermath would have been severely curtailed and the unity of the
party, needed to compete successfully in the fall midterm elections, would have been
threatened.202 Coverage of this in the media was very sparse as this happened behind closed
doors. However, one might imagine the negative backlash had the Republican Party revolted
in a similar way against President Bush in the weeks after the September 11 attacks; it is
harder to imagine that the House members would have participated in the intraparty revolt in
1898 had they thought the results against them would have been as bad.
The president resisted the push for war during this period for a number of reasons.
The first of these was his personal aversion to war. As a Civil War veteran and a participant
of some of the bloodiest battles of the conflict, he knew the terrible cost it had on the people
who fought in it. Second, he was painfully aware of the inadequacy of the American military
to fight even a declining power as Spain. The standing army was virtually non-existent and
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organized to fight wars against the Native American tribes, not a modern military. Third,
McKinley worried that a war would hurt the economy, something that was his primary focus
during the campaign and in office to date. Finally was his idea of what path the country
should take forward. He wanted to make sure future generations did not look back at this
intervention as unjust. It had to be linked “in meaning and purpose to the enduring values and
interests of the country.”203
Armed with his reasoning, McKinley was able to resist immense public pressure to
intervene on behalf of the Cubans. In March 1898, McKinley gave an interview to the
Pittsburgh Dispatch in which he laid out some of his reasons for resisting the public push for
war. He knew that the longer he resisted, the less popular he became, both in the public and
in Congress. However, he firmly stated he would not lead the country into war based on
public opinion alone. Because of this resistance, the papers on the Democratic side
lampooned him as a man driven by the business interests. The Republican papers defended
him as patient and peace seeking. However, by the last days of March, the House
Republicans began rebelling against the administration and, when intervention and war
became inevitable, the Republican papers lined up with the pro-intervention camp as well;
Godkin of the Evening Post summed it up quote well in an editorial:
We have done everything in our power to prevent this lamentable result. Now that
war seems inevitable, every interest of the nation and the world demands that the shortest
possible job should be made of it.”204
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The public, too, was in state of war fever. In Virginia, McKinley was burned in
effigy, something that would be unheard of in the modern day US.205 Public demonstrations
called for war, with crowds chanting, “Remember the Maine! To Hell with Spain!” The
President’s picture was booed in theaters and removed completely in some places.
The President was stuck without support; between the public, whipped up by the
sensational journalism of Hearst and Pulitzer, and Congress, revolting against his leadership
based in large part on pressure from their constituents, he had almost no one on his side. He
had a choice to make; on one hand he could go with public opinion into war against Spain,
something he found personally distasteful and morally objectionable or he could, on the other
hand, attempt to turn the tide of public sentiment, to “move beyond his limited conception of
his office” and make a “serious attempt to alter the substance of public opinion’s demands
upon him.”206 This latter choice would have been something much more available to him had
he enjoyed a more robust symbolic position from which to advocate, but he did not. Many
have made the argument that, “left alone, McKinley would probably have avoided a war, as
he was a peaceful and gentle man… Congress was bent on war… the populace clamored for
war”207 and because of this, McKinley was forced into a conflict that he didn’t want. Croly
points out that
Up to the last moment, the President sought to find some middle ground…He sought
to placate American public opinion by acting energetically on behalf of American citizens in
Cuba and by pressing Spain to improve its conduct of the war and to redress the grievances
of its Cuban subjects. If the Maine had not blown up, he might have succeeded… As it was,
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the President risked his popularity and confidence of the country by his reluctance to
abandon a peaceful solution.208
It would not have been so much of an issue if the public had the notion of McKinley
as the symbol of the nation; his choice of policies, peace or war, would have been much more
readily accepted and trusted. Peace would have been much easier for him to pursue.
McKinley finally delivered a moderate message to Congress on April 11, asking for
permission “to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between…
Spain and… Cuba… and to use the military and naval forces of the United States… for these
purposes.”209 It is interesting to note that the war message McKinley sent to Congress made it
clear that American intervention was in American interests and meant to impose “hostile
constraint on both parties to the contest,” meaning both the Spanish army and the Cuban
insurgents.210 Congress passed what amounted to an ultimatum to Spain; McKinley signed it
on April 21. As expected, Spain almost immediately declared war and Congress reciprocated
on April 25, backdating the beginning of the war McKinley’s signature on their resolution.
The War
The circumstances of the Spanish-American War’s beginning gives us, in the form of
a significant interval between the rally event and the declaration of war, a unique opportunity
to see the effect of public opinion on the actions of a President who is reluctant to conform to
the desires of the electorate, namely to go to war. The quantitative data show in Table 3 that,
while the President was becoming more important in the press’ discussion of the Cuban
question after the destruction of the Maine, there was no significant difference in the way
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they actually treated him. He is the mover of action in the country and the papers understand
this, so they are covering him more. He is not the symbolic leader of the nation, however,
and is not yet unassailable, so they are still covering him in the same way. Whether positive
or negative, they are simply doing more coverage. It seems the event that triggers the surge
of support consistent with the rally effect is not the Maine sinking but the declaration of war
itself. Once war was declared, the newspapers began immediately lining up behind the
President. Public opinion was widely reported and nearly unanimous in support of the
administration and its Cuban policies. The shift in the qualitative data is clear in Table 4.
While mentions of the White House, already significantly increased in the wake of the Maine
incident, do not increase significantly beyond that point, the increase in support for the
President is substantial, significant to the 0.05 level. Patriotism seems to be grabbing the
nation now in a way that it had not during the Mexican-American War in that the President is
getting a benefit from the crisis, but it only materializes after he changes policies to be in line
with public desires that he receives it.
The methodological concern here becomes whether the observed shift in the data is
due to an actual shift to the President’s support from opposition or whether it comes from the
shift in the President to a policy that is more amenable to the editorial staffs of the papers in
question. To address this issue specifically, I examined how the papers behaved with regards
to specific policies. Did they change their attitudes towards specific policies? If the President
is seeing a surge in support because of his change in actions, the papers will not change their
attitudes towards Cuba; they will simply note the President’s change and go on.
Alternatively, if it the papers are lining up behind him, there will be a shift in how they talk
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about the Cuban issue. Earlier indiscretions will fall away from mention or be redefined as
virtues.
In fact, both of these things happened. The conservative papers in my sample, the
Tribune and the Post, changed how they were covering the conflict. The Evening Post,
having been anti-war, did not substantively alter the way it reported on Cuba, but did begin to
report more positively on the military and public opinion towards the conflict. The Tribune
jumped sides completely, going from stating that “It would not be a pleasant thing, nor a
thing to be done lightly or hastily, for this country to interfere in Spain’s domestic troubles”
to saying that the House, in passing a resolution calling for the President to intervene in
Cuba, had “acted wisely” and complaining about Senate delays: “A week ago the Senate was
ready to act…all that was wanted was for the President to get out of the way. Yet the Senate
still deliberates.”211 The opposition paper in the data set, Pulizer’s Journal, was both antiadministration and anti-war to begin with. They swung hard at McKinley throughout the
period before the Maine disaster and ran what would be called irresponsibly sensational
stories today, many of which called out the White House for failures to respond to the oftenfictional atrocities and dishonors. After the declaration of war, the Journal doesn’t suddenly
find its journalistic ethics, but does refocus its rhetoric onto the Spanish and away from
domestic targets. The change comes, then, as a reaction to favorable policy changes and not
as a rally. McKinley is still a traditional president: a clerk, expected to fulfill the wishes of
the people as expressed by their representatives in Congress and, while not punished
explicitly, certainly not rewarded for forging his own path politically. He is not yet the non-
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partisan symbol of the nation from whom the people can accept on a gut-level essentially
anything dealing with an us-versus-them sort of crisis that foreign policy situations present.
The focus of the government once the war began was the successful prosecution of
the war, and rightly so. However, the President took care to frame the conflict in such a way
that it would not be seen either overseas or at home as an imperialistic land-grab. The
president, as described by future Speaker of the House Joe Cannon (D-IL), kept his ear “so
close to the ground it was full of grasshoppers.”212 That ear was telling him that the people
were fired up about the destiny of the nation and what they saw as the country’s duty to the
rest of the world. The idea of crusade was in line with their opinions, not conquest.
The first engagement of the war came not 90 miles off the American coast but on the
other side of the world. Commodore George Dewey’s squadron took a leisurely morning to
dismember the entire Spanish Asiatic fleet in Manila Bay, the Philippines. While more than
300 Spaniards and all seven Spanish ships went to the bottom of the bay, not a single
casualty was suffered on the American side. Public opinion soared. Surely this lopsided
victory was proof of the rightness of the American cause, the papers proclaimed. Despite
crusade leading them to war, conquest was the result, and some of the overseas holdings
taken from Spain are still in American hands.213 McKinley and most of the Cabinet found
that, especially in the Philippines, taking the most valuable part of the archipelago (Luzon
Island, with the harbor and coaling station at Manila) would invariably lead directly to
having to acquire the entire island chain. They were unwilling to share the strategically
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important islands with other powers, such as Germany and Japan, and Spain was in such a
position after the conclusion of the war that they could not hope to defend any of their
holdings there. The choice became take nothing and step away, allowing the Filipinos to have
their try at independence, or take on the entire chain and inherit Spain’s war to put down the
insurrection.214 The latter became official policy and it wasn’t until 1902 that the conflict was
ended. McKinley managed to sell this to the American public as a crusade nonetheless,
portraying America’s role as a missionary one, one that would bring civilization to the
Filipinos.
Conclusions
The Spanish-American War heralded the emergence of the United States from
regional power into great power status, gaining for the first time overseas colonies. This
would also set the stage for a President who became increasingly engaged in the development
of foreign policy and as a result increasingly seen as the proper location for that power.
While Congress pushed McKinley hard for war and support of the Cuban cause before the
war, the President was able to capitalize on public support in the post-war months, leading to
huge electoral victories in the 1898 midterms, the 1900 presidential election and legislative
victories that expanded American territorial holdings for the first time overseas and tacit
approval for participation in the 1899 Hague Conferences on international peace.
In a transitional case for the development of both the idea of the President as a center
of political action and for the mass media, I expected to see a small rally. However, the case
is odd due to the reluctance of the President to act in accord with the demands of public, and
Congressional, opinion. After the destruction of the Maine, the president suddenly became
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much more important to the public and the press. Even though the attention McKinley was
getting was negative largely in the public’s eyes, as he was not acting the way they in large
part wish him to, it was attention. That negative pressure became positive approval as soon as
the President, in the wake of the Proctor speech, the Navy report on the Maine and the
rebellion of the Republican rank-and-file in Congress, finally requested what amounted to a
declaration of war from Congress. Thus, the expected rally did materialize, but only after the
President changed his policy to one more in line with that of the public and the rest of
government.
The President is becoming the accepted center for action, as indicated by the major
increase in attention on McKinley as soon as the Maine incident occurs. However, the idea of
the President as a symbolic leader for the nation seems to be lagging behind and does not yet
warrant the unqualified support, regardless of specific policy actions, that our contemporary
chief executives receive. That is the interesting finding in this case specifically. Without that
symbolic position for President McKinley to operate from, he was not able to control the
flow of the public debate on the Cuban crisis to the extent that modern presidents can. He
was unable to appeal directly to the public for support, his presidency being of the traditional
era and those sorts of connections directly to the public not yet being acceptable. Likewise,
the public did not see his position as necessarily a leadership one for the entire nation and,
seeing him as an executor of Congressional policy, do not defer to his information and
position as a leader on foreign policy.
Modern rallies, however, do not behave in this way. They seem to be unconditional
surges in support; McKinley did not enjoy that luxury. The support he received was
predicated on his switch in policy, not on the event. The newspapers certainly cover the
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administration more following the disaster in Havana harbor. They do not line up definitively
behind the President until war is imminent. Without the symbolic position, he does not
receive the deference and benefit of the doubt that modern presidents receive. There is a
rally, but in the absence of the symbolism of the executive, it is not modern.
Table 3:
Examining Press Accounts, 1 month Pre- and Post-Maine
N (Pre-event)
Mentions of
President
Congress
Public Opinion

N (Post-event)
36
128
60

Mean (Pre-Event)
Attitude on
President
Congress
Public Opinion

T-Value
62
90
43

5.57
0.219
0.012

Mean (Post Event)

T-Value

0.115
0.1
0.116

0.46
0.4447
0.3626

0.2
0.07
0.083

P-Value
> 0.0001
0.8275
0.9906
P-Value
0.6466
0.6557
0.7179

Table 4:
Examining Press Accounts, Pre- and Post-Declaration
N (Pre-event)
Mentions of
President
Congress
Public Opinion

N (Post-event)
150
362
169

Mean (Pre-Event)
Attitude on
President
Congress
Public Opinion

T-Value
172
448
232

Mean (Post Event)

0.1689
0.0967
0.1273

0.3488
0.3213
0.75

0.9614
0.5338
0.6287
T-Value
2.1105
5.2179
15.2712

P-Value
0.3375
0.5941
0.5302
P-Value
0.0356
> 0.0001
> 0.0001

Note: The dates are Jan 15-Apr 21 (Pre-), Apr 22-Aug 15 (Post-). This will affect the count comparisons for
mentions only, but not the T-test results.
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]It would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal with foreign problems,
for all my preparation has been in domestic matters.
-- Woodrow Wilson
Chapter 5:
The Rally Effect Ascendant -- World War I
Introduction
On January 16, 1917, Arthur Zimmermann, Foreign Secretary of the German Empire,
sent a coded telegram to the German ambassador in Washington, DC, to be relayed to the
ambassador in Mexico City. The telegram instructed Ambassador to Mexico Heinrich von
Eckardt, in the case that it appeared likely the US was about to enter the war, to approach the
Mexican government with an offer of a military alliance. In exchange for this alliance,
Mexico would receive “generous” financial aid and a substantial portion of the territories lost
at the end of the Mexican-American War, specifically the southwestern states of Texas, New
Mexico and Arizona. Such a direct threat, an incitement for Mexico to enter the war against
the United States in a secret military alliance with Germany, would have most certainly
caused a major up-tick in the approval ratings of modern presidents. The question for this
chapter centers on whether or not President Woodrow Wilson gets the same sort of surge in
support from the publication of the telegram.
Touching briefly on earlier material, the causes of rallies are identified throughout the
academic literature as centering around two general items: patriotism and elite behavior.
Especially important for this work are the existence of both the symbolic presidency, the
recognized target for that patriotism and center for action, and a coherent and independent
mass media to codify and express that elite opinion to the mass of the American public. By
the eve of American entry into the First World War, the media had changed radically. It was
107

now a truly independent political force; they had divorced themselves from the party control
that had almost exclusively dictated news coverage for much of the nineteenth century. That
said, however, they were not the objective reporters of news that the profession aspires to be
today. Journalism historian Michael Schudson points to the intra-war era, especially the
1920s, as the time in which journalistic codes of ethics and objectivity were born. These
came about as a result of skepticism concerning the shapers of public opinion from the war
years. War propaganda had showed that facts were not indisputable, but were subject to
opinion and interpretation. While not as strong as the press at the turn of the century, the
papers still strongly reflected the sometimes deeply partisan opinions of the editors. It wasn’t
until the idea of what he calls the “democratic market society,” in which ideas are advocated
and debated until a ‘truth’ is decided on, “was radically questioned…” that “the ideal of
objectivity as consensually validated statements about the world, predicated on a radical
separation of facts and values” came into being.215 Until that point, he observes, the focus
was on printing facts, without much heed to the opinions of the writers that would necessarily
color those facts.
Wilson entered the White House in the aftermath of major changes brought about by
the first President Roosevelt. Roosevelt had done two major things to alter the way that the
executive branch was understood. First, he had explicitly returned to the long-abandoned
Federalist ideas of executive power, combining it with a popular leadership that was
reminiscent of Jackson. He felt that the right way to govern was to be “Hamiltonian in [the]
belief in a strong and efficient national government and Jeffersonian in [the] belief in the
people as the ultimate authority and in the welfare of the people as the end of
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government.”216 Second, he ushered in a new style, as Tulis describes it, of leading the
government: rhetorical leadership. While remaining within the appearances of the traditional
presidential roles, TR made manifest James Bryce’s 1891 prediction that “the tendency
everywhere in America is to concentrate power and responsibility in one man”217 would lead
to a strong executive. Roosevelt made the people the ultimate authority in the political
system; he was willing to appeal to the ‘boss’ during inter-branch struggles. This made him a
very effective and popular leader and cemented the place of the presidency as the symbolic
leader of the nation and, as such, the proper initiator of action at the federal level.
Case Selection
The final case for my study of the development of the rally around the flag effect
needed to be one in which the modern presidency was coming into its own. World War was
an ideal case to select, as both of the determinants of the rally effect, the symbolic presidency
and the independent mass media were present by the second decade of the new century.
When setting a rally event from which to select coding dates, I realized that, unlike
my first two cases, the entry of the United States into the Great War did not have a single
causal event. The Mexican American War had the Thornton Affair, the Spanish-American
War had the Maine, and later WWII would have Pearl Harbor, but WWI did not have this.
There were a number of good reasons for American entry into the war: the sinking of various
American-flagged passenger and commercial ships and British ships that carried significant
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numbers of American citizens,218 German sabotage leading to the massive munitions
explosions at Black Tom and Kingsland, the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in
February 1917 and the Zimmermann Telegram, published in March 1917. This myriad of
events posed a significant problem; coding from each of these events would create a set of
data all its own and, depending on the cases specifically, those time periods might not
overlap or even cover any non-neutral American involvement in the war.
To resolve the issue, I selected the event closest to the declaration of war, the
Zimmermann Telegram. This event is methodologically attractive for a number of reasons.
First, its proximity to the declaration of war, five weeks, hints at its importance in Wilson’s
decision to finally enter the war that he had been reelected to keep the United States out of.
Second, when it did became public, the reactions ran the full gambit from accusations of
being a forgery perpetrated by British Intelligence to trick the United States into the conflict
to immediate calls for war. None of the other events caused this sort of outrage across the
political spectrum. Finally, looking back to Mueller’s definition of a rally event, he stated
that a rally event “is international… involves the United States and particularly the President
directly…” and is “specific, dramatic, and sharply focused.”219 Of all the events that I
considered as possible rally events, the Zimmermann Telegram is the most specific and
sharply focused, and one of if not the most dramatic. It directly threatened the United States
with invasion from a country in whose own civil war the US had been both indirectly and
directly involved. As a military threat, it most intimately involved the United States and the
218
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President in his role as Commander-in-Chief. Mirroring the coding decisions for the
Thornton Affair in my chapter on the Mexican-American War, I decided to code from the
date of the message’s publication, March 1, rather than the actual date of the transmission, as
this would be the time at which public opinion would be affected.
This event and date selection created a possible endogeneity problem. Coding from
March 1, the data would be affected by an exogenous event, the announcement of the
German intent to renounce their pledge to avoid the unnecessary sinking of neutral shipping
and the resulting deaths and resume unrestricted submarine warfare. This resumption,
announced on January 31, occurred just on the other side of what would be my collected
data. If I were unable to account for the possible effect of this additional event, the validity of
the entire analysis could be in doubt. To address this problem, I collected and coded data
from January 1-31, providing me with the means to code outside of the period influenced by
the German announcement as well. This extra data will strengthen the analysis by allowing
me to see what, if any, effect the additional provocation by the German Empire against the
neutral shipping rights of the United States might have on the attitudes towards the President
and the Congress.
When I moved on to selecting papers from which to code, I was faced with another
problem. The literature on the history of journalism has a significant gap during the period
from about the turn of the twentieth century to the early twenties when it comes to
identifying the partisan leanings of various publications. Once the age of yellow journalism
was over in the very early years of the century, the media began to move away from overt
partisanship and as a result the literature does not identify them nearly so clearly. To address
this problem, I was forced to rate their political preferences myself. To this end, I decided to
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code for a month of editorials, the most likely place to see overt partisanship crop up. In an
effort to avoid biasing my data by coding from the period of the rally, these coding dates
came from September 1916, six months before the rally event that this study examines. I
chose randomly ten editorial sections from that month for each of the major New York
papers, continuing through them in order of their circulation numbers, from highest to lowest,
until I got three papers that would fulfill the needs of my model. The three papers that I
settled on were the American, the Tribune and the Times.
The Times serves as the pro-administration paper in my dataset. The editorials from
September 1916 showed a distinct favoring of Wilson and Wilsonian policies in the run-up to
his race for re-election against Supreme Court Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who was
drafted by the divided GOP convention. In fact, in my reading of the editorial articles the
only thing said in support of Justice Hughes was a defense of his right to speak against
hecklers who disrupted a campaign speech in Nashville, TN. Other than that, those editorials
that discussed national politics were decidedly pro-administration. It is not clear that this is
the beginning of the Times reputed liberal leanings, but the paper did lean towards the
Democrats at this time.
Throughout September 1916, Hearst’s New York American made clear its anti-Ally
(and especially anti-British) sentiment, accusing the English of blockading American
ports,220 and arguing that the civilization of the Balkans under German influence would be
better than “Russia’s degrading and brutal tyranny.”221 It also detested Wilson himself,
accusing him of caving in to British pressure against American neutral rights, backing away
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from promises to the Philippine people and wanting to leave them to be taken over by the
Japanese after the country’s siginicant investment in their “civilization.”222 This was so
prevalent and obvious a bias that only a month later, in November 1916, the British and
French governments banned the use of their mail and telegraph cables by Hearst-run
papers.223
The Tribune did not seem to like much of anyone particularly well. It repeatedly
attacked Wilson’s position on the Eight-Hour Bill. The editors of the Tribune saw it as a
“disgraceful surrender to the railroad brotherhoods…”224 On foreign policy, it treated him
sarcastically at times; on Mexico, it pointed out that, since the railroads had managed to get a
concession from the administration, why should Mexico not try to get a piece of the action, to
a rumored tune of $200 million?225 However, the Tribune’s editorial staff set this against a
strong anti-German bias in the war as well. The paper supported Congressional authorization
for the president to enact trade reprisals against the Allied powers for infractions against
American neutrality, but expressed its support over and over for those same Allies “because
it [believed] that American interests, American principles and American ideals [were] being
served by the nations who [were] fighting Germany, and… that German defeat [was] as
essential to America as to Europe.”226 Because the editors of the Tribune seemed fairly
evenhanded in the dislike for all parties I included this paper as the neutral contribution to my
sample.
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This change in the selection criteria for the papers included in the sample was made
necessary by the evolution of the papers away from being what amounted to in the nineteenth
century partisan opinion papers. They became independent of the parties that had heretofore
sponsored them and, in some cases, directly selected their editorial staffs and instead
expressed the ideological and issue-based policies of their owners and editors. While the
change from expressly partisan criteria to policy/ideological preferences is a significant one,
the effect of it is much less so. The effect of a presidential policy change would predict no
difference under partisan selection criteria, as the partisan papers would shift their coverage
to simply mirror the president’s new policies. This retains the essential nature of the
selections, with one paper on each of the ends of the spectrum and one near the center. Under
ideological criteria, the papers flip on their opinions of the president when he changes policy,
but here again are predicted to remain on the ends of the policy spectrum, with one
supportive, one critical and one neutral paper.
Wilson and the Nearly-Modern Presidency
The Office of the President of the United States in 1917 had come a long way in the
seventy years since Polk and the Mexican-American War. Lincoln had expanded the implied
powers and responsibility of the executive branch to include the preservation of the republic.
McKinley had laid the foundations for international involvement as the US gained its first
overseas territories. Roosevelt had shown the ability of the office to be a popular leader,
ushered in the stewardship theory of the presidency, demonstrated the power of the bully
pulpit and the ability of popular appeals to lend support to the president politically.
Wilson, the only political scientist to date elected President, came to the White House
with a cogent theory of how to reform the executive. As a student and professor, he described
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what he felt was a lack of energy and consistency in government. To address this, he favored
in his early writing a shift in power from the President to an executive board analogous to the
British Cabinet, addressing what he felt was the uselessness of the post-Civil War
Presidency.227 Wilson changed his mind, however, with the example of Theodore
Roosevelt’s vigorous leadership, and he came into office believing that the best hope for
national leadership laid in a vigorous, powerful president. While Wilson fought vehemently
with Roosevelt over specifics of policy, he also admitted that Roosevelt was an effective
leader, one that led Congress rather than being led by it. He modified the earlier President’s
call for the direct popular rule, which he felt was the beginning of a slope that would lead to
demagoguery, into the idea that the executive should be a strong party leader; this would tie
the executive and legislative branches together, would contribute to the ability of both
branches to govern more effectively and vigorously, and not run the risks that a vast
expansion of executive power might.228
Wilson changed a number of things with regards to the office. For the first time since
John Adams was in office, he fulfilled the constitutional mandate for a State of the Union
message by appearing on Capitol Hill and speaking to Congress. The President did not, as
had been customary since Washington, address his message to Congress. He made clear that
his audience was the citizenry of the nation and that he would deal with Congress through the
people.229
The people had changed their view of the role of the presidency as well. One of the
most telling articles on how much the ideas on the presidency had changed since Polk and the
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Mexican-American War came from a paper not in this study. On February 3rd, the Cleveland
Press editorialized that “Germany must understand – and every other nation in the world
must understand – that the voice of the president is the voice of the United States of America;
and that the whole hundred million of us STAND BY THE PRESIDENT.”230 The President
was now accepted as the leader of the country, at least with regards to foreign policy, no
matter what the actual politics of the individual citizens or, in this case, newspapers happened
to be.
Background
When the Zimmermann Telegram was published, the European War was nearly three
years old, with no end in sight. The lightning-fast German offensive in September 1914 had
been barely stopped by the last line of Allied reserve forces on the Marne River and the
Western Front quickly settled into the grinding attrition of trench warfare. However, the
causes of the telegram reach back to the eighteenth century and the delicate web of political
and military alliances that formed the balance of power and kept the peace in Europe for a
century. By reaching out in this way to Mexico, Germany was seeking to balance the weight
of the United States on the Allied side with the possible addition of Mexico and Japan to the
Central Powers. This was classic nineteenth-century balance of power strategy.
The US, on the other side of the Atlantic from the fighting, had stayed true to
Washington’s warning against entangling alliances and the tenets of the Monroe Doctrine
and had remained neutral in the conflict. The nation professed neutrality, though many
scholars have seen definite Allied sympathies. Jim Powell points to the American reaction to
Germany’s announcement that it would sink all ships in the war zone around the British Isles
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as an example of this one-sided neutrality.231 Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, the
strongest anti-war voice in Wilson’s cabinet, urged the president to prohibit Americans from
traveling in the war zone, worried that the loss of American lives, whether on neutral or
belligerent vessels, would lead to the public demand for vengeance for those lives, leading in
turn to vast numbers of more deaths. Wilson advised citizens in Mexico during the civil war
south of the border that they remained at their own risk, but no such advice was coming for
those in the European war zones.232 This gave the implication, later made explicit by the
President in notes to Germany, that the Central Powers would held to a different standard on
the High Seas than Mexico was: namely, being held responsible for the deaths of American
civilians in the war zone. This is pointed to as evidence of Allied sympathies in the Wilson
administration because the fact was that the only ships crossing the Atlantic for Americans to
ride on flew Allied flags. Great Britain used her massive navy to impose a blockade on
Europe. Eventually, the declared contraband goods that would be excluded by the British
blockade was expanded gradually from explicitly war material, such as guns and
ammunition, to include even food and other essentials, threatening the non-combatant
enemies of the British Empire with starvation. Germany, unable to lift the blockade by the
force of her own traditional surface navy, responded by employing a new weapon: the
submarine. Because the submarine’s vulnerability on the surface made it much more
effective as a surprise weapon, the Germans endeavored to advise neutrals of the dangers of
the war zone, even paying for full-page advertisements in New York papers, before
commencing to sink ships in the areas blockaded by the British. Wilson strongly criticized
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German for her uncivilized submarine warfare, but remained curiously silent on British
violations of neutral shipping rights.
When the British steamer Lusitania was attacked and sunk on May 7, 1915 off the
coast of Ireland, with the loss of 128 American lives, Secretary Bryan urged Wilson to avoid
the appearance of official partiality to the Allies. Citizens who enter the war zone aboard
Allied vessels should do so at their own risk, he argued. Furthermore, shielding war
contraband by having passengers aboard was not to his mind morally justifiable, likening the
practice to putting women and children in front of an army. Wilson instead listened to the
advice of Robert Lansing, then the Legal Advisor to the State Department, that the
accountability of the German government to the neutral nations included the loss of
American lives even on Allied passenger vessels. After Bryan resigned over the issue on
June 9, Lansing replaced his former boss as Secretary of State. Bryan intended to use his
resignation and newly found position as a private citizen to advocate for peace and against
what he saw as Wilson’s partiality towards the Allies. The press sharply criticized him for
abandoning his post in the government at such a critical time. They went further and praised
Wilson for his patient and deliberative handling of the tense situation.
The Germans responded to the American government’s protests by limiting their use
of the U-boat for two years. However, no such American criticism was levied against
England for her blockade of all materials from reaching her foes on the continent. 233 In fact,
on Lansing’s advice, the president explicitly rejected the German arguments that the
blockade was illegal and an attack on innocent civilians; this rejection, considering extremely
provocative by Bryan, was the ultimate cause of his resignation from office. Wilson, for his
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part, would take great lengths to avoid getting “swept by emotion into belligerency: ‘there is
such a thing as a man too proud to fight… a nation being so right that it does not need to
convince others by force that it is right.’”234 He was resisting what he thought was public
opinion in favor of what he felt was right.
In August, the torpedoing of another British vessel, the Arabic, caused calls for harsh
measures from members of the cabinet. Wilson, aware of the deep divisions between those
incensed by the loss of American lives to the German U-boats and those who stood for the
support of national rights and honor but wanted peace, felt that the latter was in the strong
majority. He directed his new Secretary of State to enter direct negotiations over the issue
with the German ambassador, Johann von Bernstorff. Supported by the German military
leaders who were understandably worried about the vast manpower and industrial resources
of the US coming into the war on the side of the Allies, the German government pledged not
to sink passenger liners of any nation without warning and provision for the safety of the
passengers aboard.
In mid-March, a German submarine sank the unarmed French channel steamer
Sussex. Clearly a violation of the Arabic pledge, the president threatened to sever diplomatic
relations with Germany if such attacks continued. Again the Imperial diplomatic corps
managed to avoid a rupture and renewed the earlier pledge to not sink unresisting passenger
and merchant vessels without warning and providing for the safety of the passengers.
However, this promise reserved the right to return to unrestricted warfare if the Americans
did not obtain concessions from the Allies for neutrals to trade with either side; Wilson
pointedly ignored this portion of the communiqué.
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Throughout the first two years of the war, President Wilson pushed both the Allies
and the Central Powers for peace, sending envoys repeatedly across the ocean to get the
powers to talk to each other somewhere other than the battlefield. As early as the fall of
1915, the US was advocating peace. The British welcomed the Americans effort towards
peace. However, they offered terms to end the war so blatantly pro-Ally that Germany would
certainly reject them. Noting that if anyone rejected the terms that the Americans should
enter the war on the other side, it was an obvious effort on the part of the Allies to merely get
the Americans into the war on their side. The initiative failed primarily because the Allied
leaders dead-set against a negotiated peace so long as it seemed that they could still win on
the battlefield.
The public seemed to appreciate these efforts, as well. Wilson campaigned for reelection largely on the fact that he had kept the country out of the war. Hughes himself made
a point of conferring extensively with German-American and Irish-American leaders, giving
the impression that he was at least listening to leaders on both sides of the issue of the
conflict. His public pronouncements on the subject advocated strict neutrality, as opposed to
the one-sided neutrality that he argued was coming from the administration. However, with
the collapse of the Progressive Party, Theodore Roosevelt had returned to the Republican
fold. Roosevelt’s much more bellicose attitude towards Germany allowed the Democrats to
paint Hughes and the Republicans as pro-war. Early returns indicated an impending win for
Hughes; Wilson went to bed too early to hear the first reports that the western states had
given him a slim victory, 277-254 in the Electoral College and a razor-thin margin of less
than 600,000 votes in the popular tally.
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After his reelection, Wilson still held out hope for peace. He made two more efforts
on that path. The first of these the request for a list of war aims from all of the powers. The
idea behind this was that such lists might be used as the basis for a negotiation. The Allies
published a list that was punitive towards Germany. This list included demands for restitution
and reparations to the Allies, as well as assumption by Germany and the Central Powers of
complete responsibility for beginning the war. While the Kaiser’s government stated
generally that they would be willing to enter into negotiations, they did not outline their
objectives because it would likely have weakened their position at the negotiating table and
had a negative effect on public opinion at home.235 While Fischer argues that the war aims of
Germany were expansive,236 the publication of these aims would have likely been a no-starter
for any peace negotiations. His second attempt was an appeal, made in a speech to the
Senate, for a “peace without victory,” in which neither side would impose terms upon the
other that would cause lasting resentment and cause for future war. While generally
applauded as an admirable statement of principle and mentioned by the Germans as a
possible path to peace in the same breath that announced the resumption of the submarine
campaign against England, this message was also essentially ignored by the powers.
In the month before the publishing of the Zimmermann Telegram, the situation with
regards to American neutrality was becoming more and more precarious. On February 1, the
German Foreign Minister gave public notice that the Imperial Navy would again begin
unrestricted submarine warfare, something that they had previous repudiated under the
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Sussex Pledge in May 1916. All of the papers in the sample reported on Congress, but rather
than comment on the issuance of the opening on unrestricted warfare, the members that the
papers talked to all stated that the issue was properly in the hands of the President and the
State Department, something that likely would not have happened during earlier periods in
this study. During the run-up to the Spanish American War, members of Congress excoriated
President McKinley repeatedly, both before and after the explosion of USS Maine. Frank
Cannon, a Republican Senator from Utah, asked bluntly “what is it that stays the hand of
McKinley? We have waited long, but our waiting has been in vain and our cup of waiting is
now full.”237 After the Mexican-American War was in full swing, Congressional Whigs
repeatedly attacked President Polk as having started an immoral and aggressive war; the
House would later censure him for it. This would have been unthinkable in the build-up to
the U.S. entry into WWI.
The New York papers, in their editorial treatment of the situation, were united and not
nearly as reluctant to comment as the members of Congress. The Times put out that there was
no way that “the Government and the people of the United States [would] put up with this
German order forbidding to them the open pathways of the seas.”238 The Tribune, normally
measured in its attitude, stated clearly that the US could not, “without the completest loss of
self respect, accept the conditions which Germany” announced would be imposed on neutral
shipping. They did take the opportunity to take a small dig at the President, saying that the
“country must… face the situation which he tried for so long to avoid facing,” suffering
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instead in “humiliation and sycophancy” 239 as the Germans broke their diplomatic promises
again and again. However, the tone of the paper was decidedly patriotic and supportive of
American rights on the high seas. The American, in its typically anti-Allied way, stated that
“no sensible American expected [the Germans] would continue to submit to seeing their
women and children starved by sea warfare” without striking back. However, even the
editors of that paper, “profoundly hopeful that… peace [might] be maintained…with honor,”
stated that if Wilson could not find another path but by the sword, that they would “walk
loyally in that way with him.”240
When I began analyzing the quantitative data for this event, it seemed as though the
announcement of Germany’s return to unrestricted submarine warfare was very significant to
both the mentions of and the approval for the President. It also appeared that this effect was
limited, as one might expect from the rally effect, to the executive. Mentions increased on
average by nearly a third after the announcement. The mean approval rate went from slightly
negative to relatively positive. While both of these very statistically significant, the
announcement appeared to be a strong candidate for the rally event in this study. However, I
isolated the announcement from the effect of the Zimmerman Telegram by comparing the
month before the announcement at the end of January only with that period of time between
the two events; the significance crumbled. The apparent increase in mentions of the President
became extremely insignificant and, while the change in approval remained slightly
significant at the 0.1 level, it did not nearly approach the 0.001 level of the broader analysis.
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Two days later, Wilson announced in a speech to Congress that diplomatic ties with
Germany would be broken. One article shows that the rally effect was beginning to move on
the issue. While the note accompanying Polk’s request for war in 1841 was met with a fierce
and partisan debate, “President Wilson must have been gratified,” the Tribune opined, “to
find such unanimity of support. There was no thought or breath of partisanship.”241 While the
House did soon pass the Armed Ship Bill, a congressional authorization for the President to
place naval guns and gun crews to man them aboard merchant vessels, twelve anti-war
Senators managed to filibuster the bill until it died at the end of the session; Wilson
immediately moved to arm merchant vessels on his authority as Commander-in-Chief.
Rally Event: The Zimmermann Telegram
Ironically, the event that may have been the largest single impetus for American entry
into World War I was made possible by efforts to broker peace in that same conflict. The
United States was secretly allowing Germany to send messages to its diplomats in the
Western Hemisphere under the cover of American consular traffic, as President Wilson held
out hope that retaining contact with the Germans would help in the peace process. However,
this specific telegraph line, crossing British soil, was being monitored by British intelligence
and the code that encrypted it had been partially broken. Originally intercepted on January
19, the British hid the fact that they were monitoring neutral consular communications by
getting an original of the coded message from Mexico City; the message had been relayed
from Washington to Mexico City via commercial telegraph lines and a bribe gave them a
copy of the message from the telegraph office’s records. On February 23, the British Foreign
Minister Arthur Balfour met with US Ambassador to Britain Walter Page and gave him the
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text of the message. Page forwarded it immediately to Secretary Lansing. As soon as a
corroborating copy of the original telegram was obtained from the telegraph office, Lansing
went to the White House to show the message to the President. While Wilson initially felt
that the document might have been a forgery perpetrated by the British to bring the US into
the war, Lansing soon convinced him of its authenticity. He decided that the document
should be leaked to the press; the head of the Associated Press, sworn to secrecy about the
source, was given the text of the message and allowed to publish it.
The message inviting Mexico to enter the war was front-page news in every paper
across the country on March 1. It immediately touched off a firestorm. One paper included a
political cartoon showing the telegram as a bomb blowing up in the hands of the German
foreign minister. Another paper printed an editorial that bluntly stated “Germany has been
making war upon the United States for more than two years. It has not been an open and
honorable war but a sneaking and despicable war… in all the history of nations there is no
other record of such a lying friendship as that which Germany has professed for the United
States.”242 As a further sign of how powerful an effect this publication had on the American
people came in the form of an overwhelming and almost immediate passage of Wilson’s
long-floundering Armed Ship Bill. When Senator Robert La Follette Sr. filibustered the bill
to death in the Senate at the end of the previous Congress, the Wisconsin liberal’s actions
were so unpopular that the next Senate created cloture, a parliamentary means to overcome a
filibuster and force a vote on bills. For the first time in the chamber’s history, the filibuster
was not absolute.
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American public opinion was already running strongly anti-German and anti-Mexican
at the time of the telegram’s publication. The former was due to the German policy of
submarine warfare that had sunk American ships in British waters and killed American
citizens sailing on British ships, including most notably RMS Lusitania a year and a half
earlier, coupled with the recent announcement that German would return to unrestricted use
of that tactic, breaking a promise to Wilson to respect neutral rights on the high seas. The
latter was largely because of the ongoing revolution in which the Wilson administration had
switched sides several times and a number of cross-border raids conducted by former
Mexican General-turned-rebel-leader Francisco “Pancho” Villa in the Southwest; in fact, a
force of 10,000 troops under General John “Black Jack” Pershing had only recently left
northern Mexico after spending ten months in pursuit of rebel general.
This is not to say by any means that all emotion in the country was pro-Allies or even
pro-war; much of the opposition came from the Midwest, Led by Wisconsin’s Sen. La
Follette, a dozen Senators resisted the drive for war, destroying the principle of the unlimited
filibuster in the US Senate in their opposition. Substantial numbers of people in the Midwest
and West, an area that had been heavily settled by immigrants from the Central Powers, were
still in favor of peace and neutrality. The Chicago Tribune repeatedly praised Wilson for his
stand against the “drums of war” being pounded by the Allies,243 though it did move to
moderate support for intervention in the war after the publication of the Zimmerman
Telegram. To the left of Wilson on the political spectrum, Eugene Debs called for organized
labor to stand against the war. Debs and the American Socialist Party argued that the
industrialists and the financiers were manipulating public opinion into war with a mind to the
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big military contracts that would come their way if the country entered the conflict. He called
for a general strike if war did come. Debs would later be jailed for speaking out against the
draft and serve three and a half years in prison.
After the resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare, the Germans had not wasted
any efforts on encouraging the US to stay out of the war. In February, submarines sank more
than three-quarters of a million tons of Allied and neutral shipping, including two American
ships that were warned and went down with no loss of life. When the liner RMS Laconia, a
British armed merchant cruiser, went down near the end of the month, two American women
lost their lives. This continued even after the publication of the Zimmermann note. Three
more American ships were sunk through March, with the loss on one of them of 15 lives. All
of the newspapers in my sample carried multiple reports of public meetings calling for war.
Thousands demonstrated in Philadelphia’s Independence Square for war. Even in Chicago,
the heartland of the neutrality and isolationist movements, the Governor of Illinois addressed
a massive public meeting that was followed by a protest march urging the government to
declare war.
Wilson lamented to a friend, even at the end, that joining the war “would mean that a
majority of the people in this hemisphere would go war mad… and devote their energies to
destruction… Once lead this people into war and they’ll forget there ever was such a thing as
tolerance… If there is any alternative for God’s sake let’s take it.”244 Wilson finally found
himself forced to call a special session of Congress for April 2.
His earnest wish aside, he addressed Congress in cool and confident tones. He
described his efforts for peace and German’s increasingly belligerent moves towards the
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country. He described the remaining options but also stated that “there is one choice we
cannot make, we are incapable of making: we will not choose the path of submission.” It is
telling about the state of public opinion that it was the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
Edward White that touched off, with a single resounding slap of his hands over his head, the
thunderous applause that answered this line. It is just as telling of the President’s deep
sadness over the nation’s entry to the war that, upon returning to the White House that
evening, he confided to his personal secretary that his “message today was a message of
death for our young men. How strange it seems to applaud that.”245
The Data
When the time to select actual data came, I was faced with a major methodological
problem that the two cases in my preceding chapters had not posed. Coding from March 1,
much of my post-event data would fall into the time period after the passage of the Espionage
Act of 1917. Passed June 17, 1917, about 2 months after the US officially entered the war,
the act was to be enforced against anyone who had opinions that ran contrary to the national
war effort, especially the German-language and socialist presses, on the basis that it would
interfere with the success of the armed forces of the U.S. or promote the success of its
enemies. In this atmosphere, political dissent, such as unsupportive coverage in the press,
might have been looked upon as giving aid and comfort to the enemy. At the very least the
passage of this act could have had a chilling effect; editors, concerned about consequences,
may have toned down opposition to the administration’s war policies. The later Sedition Act
of 1918, outside of the time period examined in this study, made the implicit suppression of
opposition speech under the Espionage Act explicit, punishing “any disloyal, profane,
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scurrilous, or abusive language” about the government, the military or the flag. The typical
punishment for violations of either law was denial of use of second-class mail rates, but
could range up, at the sole discretion of the Postmaster General, to denial of access to the
mail system completely or even refusal to deliver any incoming mail to the editors. The latter
two punishments typically spelled death for publications. This would certain support a rally,
as it would have had the potential to squash any dissent immediately.
Keeping this in mind, I decided to analyze my collected data in a number of ways.
The first two would be similar to the Spanish-American War data, comparing the data before
and after the publication of the telegram, with a second set run before and after the
declaration of war on April 6. Like that in my previous chapter, it would give me the
opportunity to examine independently the effect of the rally event and that of the declaration
of war itself. I also resolved that, if there were a rally apparent in the data from the pre- and
post-event analysis, I would further examine the effect of the declaration within the rally
period; this would work to reduce the problem of the internal validity of pre- and postdeclaration analysis being affected by the intervention of the rally event itself.
Finally, a comparison of the data from before and after the passage of the Espionage
Act will attempt to account for the effect of that legislation on my dataset. Once the first two
analyses are complete, a specific date range for the third would be determined. If there was a
rally, as expected, I decided to run data from the largest period of ‘rally’ time, from the rally
event or the declaration, through to the Espionage Act and compare that to media accounts
after the act’s passage. By only running it during the period of the rally itself, I hope to find
out if the Espionage Act creates an artifact in the data set by having a chilling effect on
dissent from the official government policy.
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When I examined the data before and after the rally event itself, the President
suddenly received a surge of mentions in press coverage. The press became much more
interested in the actions and the opinions of the President when, much like in the modern era,
the nation perceived an external threat. The German telegram posed just such a potential
threat. Discussion of the President and Congress, especially on the issue of arming merchant
vessels and the telegram itself, dominated the front page of each paper in my sample for days
after its initial publication, nearly to the exclusion of all other topics. The coverage became
much more positive as well, with a high level of significance in this change. An illustrative
example comes with Wilson’s efforts to place naval guns and gun crews on American
merchant vessels for protection against the submarine threat. Before the rally event the
Republican members of both chambers had serious reservations with portions of the armed
neutrality bill, especially the portion giving the President the power to interpret and react to
future events without the approval of Congress. Enter the Zimmermann Telegram and the
accompanying public outcry against Germany. The bill, including the controversial
provisions, passed quickly on a large majority in the House within a few days after the
publication of the telegram. The Times pointed out that “patriotic zeal was at fever heat in the
House… and was responsible for the passage… by the overwhelming vote of 402-13” of the
bill to arm the merchant ships.246
Public opinion also increased in coverage, with the overwhelming portion of that
coverage coming from reports of protests and from letters to the editors. An example of this
was the publication of a letter from the faculty of Brown University, up until that time holdouts for peace, that stated they were “anxious for peace, but [believed] that permanent peace,
246

Times, 3/2/1917.
130

or even peace in the immediate future, is impossible if for the United States if militarism is
victorious in Europe.”247 An early article reported on a secret German propaganda press
thought to be operating in New York and printing “scurrilous circulars attacking [President]
Wilson… by thousands.”248 Reports of public meetings and demonstrations all across the
country were reported throughout the sample articles. Those that came from the Midwest and
West were sometimes remarked on by the newspapers as being indicative of the true
American nature of those largely immigrant populations that had heretofore been anti-war or
pro-German in sentiment. An interesting side-feature was that the average number of
mentions of Congress over the same period seemed to drop, though the coverage was more
positive; neither of these results managed to reach statistical significance.249
As I moved to the next section of my analysis, the effect of the actual declaration of
war,250 it seemed that the attention on President Wilson was not affected by the
Congressional action, though the coverage did, again, jump in its support for him. This
increased approval can be seen in the type of things were being covered. Elihu Root was
covered telling the Republican Club of New York that “it was the duty of all Republicans to
stand behind the President in the present war, no matter what mistakes might be made…”
Root was particularly authoritative on this topic as he had been Secretary of War under
McKinley and Roosevelt, as well as Secretary of State under the latter, before being elected
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to the Senate for a single term from New York in 1909. Others at the same meeting expressed
similar feelings.251
Coverage did not appear to increase for Congress or for public opinion, either. Much
of the coverage of the legislative branch became a simple listing of actions taken without
much commentary, indicating that the papers considered the legislative branch to be taking a
backseat role to the executive. One noted exception was the proposal for a joint
Congressional committee on the prosecution of the war. Mentioned in April, it never moved
very far in the proposal stage, as Wilson was adamantly against it.252 This mention, however,
was very matter of fact and did not betray the thoughts of the paper on the proposal itself and
was consequently coded as a neutral portion of a neutral article on Congress. However, while
Congress saw no increase in support, the public saw another jump, similar to the rally event
itself. A representative example comes from Hearst’s American, quoting a representative
from New York who had been on a speaking tour of the Midwest: “Upon leaving for the
West I had misgivings as to the feeling regarding the war which I should find in that section
of our country… I am convinced that the people of the Middle West are… American to the
core.”253 It is telling that such a supportive comment would be published in the paper that
played the role of anti-Wilson and anti-Allied exemplar in the sample. New York Senator
William Calder was quoted on the subject of public opinion towards the war; before the
President’s war message, he had received more than ten thousand letters on the subject of the
war, two-thirds of them being against. However, after the message, the tone of the letters
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changed dramatically, with “many Americans [coming] to him and [saying] that the country
could depend on them to fight for it.”254
When I took the period of time before the revelation of the telegram out of the
analysis, isolating the effect of the declaration itself within the rally period, the results
changed in a number of important ways.255 The increase in coverage of Congress became
significant, probably reflecting the focus of Congress on putting the country on a war footing.
This included the debate over arming merchant vessels, giving to the President the hotly
contested power to judge and react to future events and the acrimonious debate over arming
merchant ships that had led to the demise of the unlimited filibuster rule in the Senate. This
assumption is supported by the fact that the opinions of Congress did not change
significantly. The tone of the coverage of public opinion had a significant increase, though
the amount of it did not. The Tribune covered a significant change of tone from one of the
German-American weekly papers: “It is not unpatriotic for an honest paper or an honest man
to oppose going to war… We have opposed war. Our side has lost. We are American and
while our heart goes out to Germany… we feel that our common duty demands we stand
behind our government.”256 One surprise was the fact that the attitudes towards the President
only barely made it to significance at the 0.1 level, hinting that the declaration itself was not
nearly as important an event in the support for the President as was the publication.
Comparing the way in which the papers discuss the two topics with regards to the two events
is supportive of this finding. The American, on the day after the Zimmermann Telegram was
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published, talked about a hypothetical alliance of Japan, Mexico and Russia that “would set
back a hundred years” the progress of the United States and reduce the country “from the
first nation in the whole world to a second rate nation, impoverished…surrounded, with only
one coastline and that turned towards the… Old World and not towards the New.” In
contrast, the same paper barely mentions the actual declaration, stating that it is a “mere
statement, affirming the state of affairs that already exists” between the two nations.257
The last event that I examined was the passage of the Espionage Act, looking for a
possible chilling effect on any dissent in the model and causing a rally to show where none
might otherwise. While sound as an assumption on the face of it, the Act seemed to have
very little effect on the way the government was being covered, with the President and
Congress failing to change significantly in either amount or tone. Interestingly, however, the
tone of public opinion coverage changed somewhat. The main change comes with reference
to the socialist papers’ protests against restrictions placed on them under the Espionage Act.
They began to be referred to as “seditious,” “incendiary” and “radical,”258 as well as the
general tone of the coverage being much supportive of the government position on the
publications.
The War
World War I, especially on the Western Front, was brutal in the minds of American
readers. The papers had carried the details of the war, relayed by trans-Atlantic telegraph
cable, since the outbreak of the fighting in August 1914. The American public, however,
hungered for the news of the war and the papers increased their coverage accordingly, with
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most of the larger papers, including all three in my sample, printing five to eight pages of war
coverage by the end of 1914.
In the six months after the publication of the Zimmermann Telegram covered by this
study, not much happened in France with regards to the American Expeditionary Force.
When war was declared, the US Army had only about 200,000 men in uniform. By the end of
the war, nearly four million would have served in some capacity. In mid-May, General
Pershing was named as the commanding officer of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF).
The first units of the AEF landed on the continent in late June 1917. Under orders from
Washington to retain the identity of his units as a “distinct and separate component of the
combined forces,” Pershing resisted the efforts of the British and French commanders to use
the newly arrived doughboys as replacements for their own depleted regiments. He won out
and by September, just after the time period covered in this work, the American commander
had set up his field headquarters and American forces shortly thereafter stepped into the line
against the German Army. When Secretary of War Newton Baker was visited by Pershing
just before his departure for Europe, Baker told the general that he had almost complete carte
blanche when it came to the prosecution of the war in Europe; Washington would only issue
two orders: go to France and come home. It was success or failure that would be the hallmark
of his tenure as seen by the American public. “If you make good,” Baker told him, “the
people will forgive almost any mistake. If you do not make good, they will probably hang us
both from the first lamppost they can find.”259
While the Army took time to draft and train soldiers to fill out its woefully inadequate
ranks, the US Navy was far better equipped for the war and saw action immediately in the
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Atlantic. A large portion of the American Atlantic battleship fleet was attached to the British
Grand Fleet in early December and for the remainder of the war, helping to keep the German
High Seas Fleet bottled up in their main base, Kiel. The main contribution of the American
Navy came in action against the submarine menace. When Admiral William Sims,
commander of the American Atlantic destroyer forces, arrived in England on attached duty to
the British Admiralty, he was given the uncensored count of British merchant losses. He
immediately saw the danger; Britain very quickly would begin to lose the war if the
submarines continued to be such a threat. He quickly advocated the use of destroyers against
the U-boats. When the British bluntly told him that the Royal Navy did not have enough to
cover the merchant lanes outside the Channel, Sims cabled home for his own forces. When
they were shown to be effective by escorting a convoy from Gibraltar to England with no
losses, the Admiralty finally acted on the convoy-escort system; shipping losses dropped by a
third that very month and continued on a downward trend for the rest of the war. By the
middle of the summer, three dozen American destroyers were operating in British waters and
Sims was a hero among the ruling circles and the public of the kingdom.
Once the United States entered the war, the government almost immediately moved
to regulate the coverage of the conflict. On April 13, the Secretaries of State, War and the
Navy jointly asked President Wilson to create a Committee for Public Information, which he
did the next day.260 The popular image of the Committee for Public Information (CPI) is that
of a censorship committee; however, Creel himself repeatedly denied that label repeatedly.
He was “strongly opposed to the censorship bill,” a separate bill that would have created
restrictions and criminal penalties on the press for the publication of certain subject
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matters.261 Instead, the CPI published a short list, relative to the European censored subjects,
of 18 points that the press was requested to keep secret and the “enforcement [was] a matter
for the press itself,” leaving the various editors to judge the content of various stories against
the list and consider the needs of the armed forces and the safety of the men in uniform.262
An example of this self-regulation and independence came as the US forces arrived in
France. The last of the four groups of troop transports landed July 3 and that fact was
promptly put out on the presses to the media, along with the report that two submarine
attacks on the transports had been fought off with no American losses and at least one
submarine sunk. Concern arose, however, when the AP published a dispatch reporting that
unnamed American naval officers in England had declared that the attacks on the troop
convoys had been exaggerated stories of driftwood and large fish or whales. Creel and the
CPI quickly put out the report of the commanding admiral of the cruisers and destroyers
tasked with escorting the transports, Admiral Albert Gleaves, confirming and elaborating on
the reports of the submarine attacks. All three of the papers in the sample carried the initial
reports of the attacks and the subsequent safe arrival, but they all carried strong editorial
questions about the authenticity of the reports after the AP published the anonymous dispatch
casting doubt on the report. A comparatively evenhanded editorial from the Times titled “The
Committee of Public Misinformation” exclaimed that while the “American people may
pardon for a time the suppression of news” in the interest of the safety of the armed forces,
they “will never pardon expanded, adorned exaggerated and untruthful accounts.” It went on
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to call in no uncertain terms for Creel’s removal.263 Testifying perhaps to the independence
of the media, none of the papers carried any sort of retraction of this doubt, even after the
military authorities came out in support of the CPI’s accounts.
Other portions of the American public at large were not so reticent as the press to bow
to government regulations. The War Industries Board, established in July 1917, was tasked
with responsibility over war production, prices and purchasing whatever was needed to keep
the military supplied in the war effort. The public had to make do with less variety amid the
demand for war material. In August, the Food and Fuel Control Act (also known as the Lever
Act after its author) created two agencies, the Food Administration and the Fuel
Administration. These two agencies were very effective at eliciting voluntary compliancy
with rationing efforts. Under future president Herbert Hoover, the Food Administration
organized “Meatless Tuesdays” and “Wheatless Wednesdays.” Running the Fuel
Administration, Harry Garfield, the eldest son of assassinated President, instituted “Gasless
Sundays” and “Heatless Mondays.” The latter administrator even closed all factories east of
the Mississippi River for a day to get fuel to idle ships on the East Coast. The public took all
of these measures in stride and the citizens were remarkably willing to accept the war
restrictions on the staples of their everyday lives. If this were asked of modern Americans,
the answer might be decidedly more negative. However, with the requests coming on the
basis of patriotism and honor, Americans were willing to give.
The newspaper was not the only means by which the public mind was reached out to.
The new motion picture industry, though still silent at this time, made its opinion known,
showing blatantly propagandist films. Any evidence of German war crimes was put in the
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worst light possible. The captions reinforced the messages of the flickering black-and-white
films.
Conclusions
Despite being given near-complete legislative carte blanche during the conflict, the
President was not yet able to enjoy the near-absolute supremacy in foreign policy matters
claimed by modern holders of the title. Wilson, one of the main architects of the peace, could
not get Congress to ratify the Treaty of Versailles. He found Congress, even members of his
own party, stonewalling the treaty into which he had sunk much of his own energy and
political capital. Even with major popularity in Europe and the political capital he had gained
at home, he could not get the Allies to agree to any of his points except the League of
Nations. When it came time for the United States to join the League, he could not achieve
even that. The Senate, without any representation on the peace delegation, felt snubbed by
Wilson and this bitter feeling may have led some senators to vote against the treaty
negotiated without them, re-emphasizing the role that the Senate claimed in foreign policy
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.
All the ingredients of the rally around the flag effect were in place by the second
decade of the twentieth century. The press had been divorced from its role as a mouthpiece of
the parties in the political system, maturing into a political force in and of itself. The yellowjournalism years of the late 1890s and the early 1900s had fallen behind them, leaving
something in its wake that “had become a forceful and undeniable participant in the body
politic.”264 The papers were the source of reform throughout their history. The editorials and
the investigative journalists of their time gave “birth to civic reform and to the progressive
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era,” rather than the government. As they developed into independent and reliable sources of
information and opinion, divorced from partisanship, the citizens looked more and more to
the papers “as guides to the drift of public affairs.”265 The papers became a main source of
not only information, but also analysis, and this gave them a certain amount of power in
regards to shaping public opinion. If anything, the media may have become more liable to the
rally effect, as they were not yet recognizing its own tendency towards subjectivity as a fault
as it would do in the next decade.266
Just as the press had come into its own right by this point in American history, so too
had the symbolic presidency. Rossiter points out that both Wilson and TR had come to the
office directly “from a successful tenure as a governor of a progressive state… measured in
terms of his leadership of the legislature” and that neither of them had been “strangled by
wearing the ‘old school tie’ of either house of Congress.”267 Wilson wrote at the end of TR’s
presidency that the nation “can never hide our President again as a mere domestic officer…
he must stand at the front of our affairs,” being the actual and the symbolic leader of the
country, especially when dealing with other countries. By this point, the president has
become a symbol of the nation; an outlet for affect – a way of feeling good about one’s
country; a cognitive aid, allowing a single individual to symbolize… government; and a
means of vicarious participation through which people can feel more a part of events
occurring around them.268
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Because of this concurrent development, I expected a robust rally of popular approval
to the president in the papers and was not disappointed. Even the papers that were generally
anti-Wilson acknowledged his role as the symbol of the nation. The President had become
the focus of action when it came to US foreign policy. The President was now recognized as
the central actor in a military and foreign policy sense. This is well demonstrated by a
marked increase in the mentions of the executive in the papers as soon as the crisis is
published. Unlike the Spanish-American War experience, however, the surge in public
approval that was withheld early from McKinley personally was not kept from Wilson. Both
the increase in positive coverage and the discussion of Wilson as the symbol of the country
and the spokesman for the nation show that the twentieth century presidency, even as early as
Wilson, had become symbolic of the country itself. Here was, in the modern sense, the first
rally around the flag.
Table 5:
Examining Press Accounts, Pre- and Post-Resumption Announcement
N (Pre-Event)
Mentions of:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

N (Post-Event)
98
119
92

Mean (Pre-Event)
Attitude on:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

768 (128/month)
720 (120/month)
627 (104.5/month)
Mean (Post-Event)

-0.0707
0.1092
0.1075

0.2632
0.1528
0.2488
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T-Value
2.4639
0.0885
1.2281
T-Value
5.4874
0.9167
2.2361

P-Value
0.0146
0.9296
0.2208
P-Value
>0.0001
0.3596
0.0257

Table 6:
Examining Press Accounts, Pre- and Post-Resumption Announcement, Before the
Zimmermann Telegram
N (Pre-Event)
Mentions of:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

N (Post-Event)
98
119
92

Mean (Pre-Event)
Attitude on:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

T-Value
97
136
95

Mean (Post-Event)

-0.0707
0.1092
0.1075

0.0619
0.1029
0.1895

P-Value

0.0719
1.1987
0.0804
T-Value

0.9430
0.2355
0.9362
P-Value

1.9028
0.1030
0.9189

0.0586
0.9181
0.3593

Table 7:
Examining Press Accounts, Pre- and Post-Publication of the Zimmermann Telegram
N (Pre-Event)
Mentions of:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

N (Post-Event)
97
136
95

Mean (Pre-Event)
Attitude on:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

T-Value
799
717
658

Mean (Post-Event)

0.0619
0.1029
0.1809

0.2866
0.1534
0.2716
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3.0035
1.4762
1.6915
T-Value
3.6145
0.0978
1.2996

P-Value
0.0030
0.1414
0.0922
P-Value
0.0003
0.2726
0.1941

Table 8:
Examining Press Accounts, Pre-and Post-Declaration of War
N (Pre-Event)
Mentions of:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

N (Post-Event)
273
256
225

Mean (Pre-Event)
Attitude on:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

T-Value
623
597
528

Mean (Post-Event)

0.1648
0.1250
0.1778

0.3050
0.1541
0.2955

0.9181
1.2636
1.5379
T-Value
2.7845
0.7921
2.6103

P-Value
0.3596
0.2078
0.1256
P-Value
0.0055
0.4285
0.0092

Table 9:
Examining Press Accounts after the ZimmermannTelegram, Pre- and Post-Declaration of War
N (Pre-Event)
Mentions of:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

N (Post-Event)
176
120
130

Mean (Pre-Event)
Attitude on:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

T-Value
623
597
528

Mean (Post-Event)

0.2216
0.1500
0.1692

0.3050
0.1541
0.2955
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1.0365
2.6859
0.6672
T-Value
1.6468
0.0848
2.3222

P-Value
0.3014
0.0079
0.5055
P-Value
0.1000
0.9324
0.0205

Table 10:
Examining Press Accounts during the Rally Period, Pre- and Post-Passage of the Espionage Act
N (Pre-Event)
Mentions of:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

N (Post-Event)
482
422
245

Mean (Pre-Event)
Attitude on:
President
Congress
Public Opinion

T-Value
317
295
283

Mean (Post-Event)

0.2656
0.1588
0.2293

0.3186
0.1458
0.3251
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0.5094
0.3338
1.5454
T-Value
1.2359
0.3545
2.1895

P-Value
0.6111
0.7389
0.1245
P-Value
0.2169
0.7231
0.0289

War is… the true nurse of executive aggrandizement. In war… it is the executive will
which is to direct [the forces]… it is the executive hand which is to dispense [the
public treasures]… it is the executive patronage under which [the honors and
emoluments of office] are to be enjoyed… and it is the executive brow [the laurels]
are to encircle.
-- Helvidius (James Madison)
Chapter 6:
Conclusions – A Story of the Rally Around the Flag
This project is a story of rallies, but not the story. It is not exhaustive, nor can or
should it be considered the definitive work on the subject. It is an effort to show the truth of
Madison’s statement on executive aggrandizement: that crises, and war in particular, lead to
expanded executive power. Primarily it is an effort to foster a better understanding of the
rally effect by analyzing the development of that phenomenon.
The rally-around-the-flag is the descriptive term for the fact that presidents see a
noticeable increase in their job approval scores when the nation is faced with an international
crisis. In the era of the modern presidency, this jump in popular approval occurs with little
regard to the success or failure of the president’s substantive actions in reaction to the crisis.
Kennedy received a surge for the Cuban Missile Crisis in the same way that Carter received
one for the unsuccessful rescue attempt of the Iranian-held hostages. The political capital
gained from a rally event tends to be fleeting. Kennedy, had he lived, would likely have
faced a tough reelection battle considering the shifting partisan patterns in the South over the
issue of civil rights. Carter lost his reelection bid in an electoral college landslide against
Ronald Reagan based largely on economic conditions.

145

The Project
The puzzle around which this project revolves began with a deceptively
straightforward, simple question from an Introduction to American government student: why
does the rally around the flag effect happen? In answer, the academic literature points to two
main causes. The first of these is the idea of patriotism. This school of thought holds that
presidents, with dual roles as Head of Nation and Head of Government, hold a position in the
national psyche as a symbol of unity. People rally to them because they see them as symbolic
for the nation as a whole and, because of the singular leadership position, they are accepted
as the locus for action on the international stage. Politics stop at the water’s edge and people
tend to support whatever the President does, regardless of the corresponding success or
failure of the actual actions undertaken.
The second idea revolves around the idea of opinion leadership, especially that of the
media and the coverage of opposition opinions therein. The fact that the president is a unitary
actor and in charge of foreign policy makes coverage easy and appropriate, especially when
compared to more than five hundred members of Congress. This gives the executive branch
an unparalleled stage and, because of this, people give the president the benefit of the doubt
when it comes to foreign policy. This is reinforced by two supporting trends. Opposition
viewpoints tend to be silenced, with a lack of media coverage, or to silence themselves, not
wanting to seem out of step with a popular president or policy choice. This silence causes
feedback into the rally, in that people interpret the lack of coverage of opposition views as a
lack of opposition, further increasing the popularity of the president. This in turn furthers
silencing and so on.
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The Goal
The purpose of the project was to better explain how these two accepted determinants
interact. The current literature generally seems to position the two as mutually exclusive,
with little effort to integrate the two into a single unified theory. I disagree with this
tendency. Without the opinion leadership of the independent media, the presidency would
never have reached its prominence as a symbolic leadership role, independent of the political
parties. If the presidency hadn’t changed, becoming instead of, as McKinley said, “the
President of a party… the President of the whole people,”269 the media would not have had
this singular actor on which to focus.
I selected cases from a wide range of time periods, based on the development of the
presidency as a symbol of the nation and the independence of the media. Beyond this, the
case selection was strategic. The first of my cases was designed as a least-likely case study,
one in which the academically accepted determinants were not present. If a rally had been
found in this case, it would have caused serious problems for the academic literature in that it
would call into question the foundations of the rally effect. My second case needed to be
after the Civil War, as the outcome of this conflict redefined the identity of the nation into a
singular, rather than plural. However, it needed to occur before the understanding of the
president’s role in government with regards to his relationship to Congress and the people
began to change, the rough date for this being 1901, the first year of Theodore Roosevelt’s
presidency. This would allowed me analyze the effect of the media, independent by this time,
without having the symbolic nature of the executive branch interfering in the data. Finally,
my last case, a most-likely case, had to fit into the period between the first Roosevelt and his
269
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younger cousin, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, when the modern presidency is accepted to have
begun. This case would serve as one in which, if the rally were not found, would cast doubt
on the determinants as well.
The first challenge for this framework was to quantify public approval during a time
when scientific polling was non-existent. To this end, I developed a proxy measure with
which to measure public opinion and the attention given to the two main governing
institutions of the Republic. This measure was built from content analysis of a set of
newspapers in the New York market, carefully selected to cover the full range of partisanship
during the specific time period. By counting and evaluating the articles mentioning the
President, the Congress and public opinion, I was able to approximate a two-point approval
score for the administration. Armed with this score, I could start looking at the changes that
specific events made in the approval of the presidency.
The statistical data was supplemented with a qualitative narrative. This served to tell
the story around the data. While useful for generalizations, the proxy measure is admittedly
blunt. It does not tell specifically how things were affecting public opinion, only that the
patterns of opinion were changing generally. The narrative, however, is much better and able
to tell in richer detail the story of shifting opinions and how the event in particular changed
the discourse of politics in its own time.
The Findings
This project represents the first attempt to set the rally around the flag effect in a
historical context and beyond a single case. By using the traditional presidency to study an
effect discussed exclusively in the literature on the modern presidency, it gives us a sense of
where the modern office has come from. It also helps us to understand better why the
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presidency gains these sudden and short-lived increases in popular support. It also
contributes to the explanation of why, when given much the same institutional
characteristics, the traditional presidency operates in a much different and more constrained
way than its modern counterpart. Crisis begets executive power in our system. Why, and
how? This project has tried to answer those questions, and the answer is because of the
patriotic rush to the symbol of the nation and the mass media shaping of public opinion in
support of that rush.
Summing up the findings of this work can be done in a single sentence. The rally
around the flag effect is an artifact of the modern symbolic nature of the presidency. It does
not seem to occur in the absence of the symbolic presidency and the independent media. It
does occur when both are present. However, when the symbolic position of the White House
in the public psyche is removed from the equation but the media remains that the most
interesting finding for this work occurs; during the Spanish-American War, the rally effect
lags behind the rally event until the President takes action. The action is what garners the
support.
In my first case, centered on the Mexican-American War, I found little evidence of a
rally around the flag effect. The Thornton Affair represented what would be a perfect
impetus for the rally effect in the modern era. A unit of the U.S. Army was ambushed and all
of members were either killed or captured; one was later returned on humanitarian grounds
for medical treatment that the Mexicans did not have the ability to give. President Polk
reacted quickly once word reached Washington about the attack, asking Congress for
military authority and appropriations. He and his Congressional allies out-maneuvered the
opposition party, forcing them into choosing between support for the troops in the field and
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expressing their opposition to the war; they chose the former, being very cognizant of the
political dangers of that choice. Polk, however, does not seem to receive any sort of political
support from the event or the war. Mentions of and support for him does not vary
significantly between the time before the battle on the Rio Grande and the time after. Even
rerunning the data excluding the moderate paper from the sample because it had such a huge
number of articles and moved in a sudden and extremely anti-administration direction
showed no significant change in mentions or in attitude of the papers. Whatever change there
might have been was cancelled out by an accompanying move in the opposite direction by
the other papers.
In my third case, dealing with the U.S. entry into the First World War, the rally effect
was fully developed. The rally event that was selected for this case was the publication of the
Zimmerman Telegram. Germany’s announcement that they planned to resume unrestricted
submarine warfare was tested separately from the publication to account for a possible
endogeneity problem, but was not found to have a significant effect independent of my
selected event. The telegram, on the other hand, seems to have caused an immediate and
significant effect on President Wilson’s approval. Mentions of Wilson personally and the
administration increase dramatically, as does the supportive tone of the articles published.
Wilson seems to receive another boost after the declaration of war in the supportiveness of
the articles, though not in the amount of coverage; the best explanation for this disconnect is
that the press is already covering him extensively and can not increase that coverage, rather
than any sort of unwillingness to do so on their part. I also found that, while having a good
amount of face validity, the Espionage Act did not seem to affect the way that the papers
covered the administration. When the qualitative story is consulted on this fact, however, it
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can be seen that the Act was enforced in a somewhat less than even-handed manner. The
Hearst papers, for instance, were left almost completely alone, despite being anti-Allied
enough in tone for England and France to ban the publications from their mails. At the same
time, Socialist and German-language newspapers were being shut down for infractions that,
if committed by the larger papers, would have been more likely to have received a warning
or completely ignored. The concern that the Act would affect the data with regards to the
rally effect turned out to be unfounded.
It was in my second case that a very different and the most interesting story of the
three was to be told. The explosion and sinking of the battleship Maine in harbor of Havana,
Cuba, just like the Thornton Affair fifty years earlier, would have created a rally effect if it
had occurred even a few decades later. The Mexican-American War had neither of the two
determinants, while World War I had both. It is in this case that one of the academically
accepted factors, the symbolic position of the presidency, lags behind the other, the
independent media, in its development.
This case was different than the Thornton Affair in two other significant ways. First,
word of the incident came almost instantly. Telegraph technology made instantaneous
communication possible in the 1890s while during the 1840s word took more than two weeks
to get to the capital from the frontier, by which time General Taylor had fought two pitched
battles with the Mexican Army. The newspapers of the late nineteenth century could play up
the drama of the events, working the public into a frenzy. Second, the nature of the events
was different. There was no question that the Mexican Army had attacked the dragoons on
the Rio Grande in 1843. There was significant debate, some of which is still not settled to
this day, over who or what caused the Maine disaster. Was it a mine? Was it a coal fire? We
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may never know, but the development of the report from the Navy’s Court of Inquiry, which
settled on the external explosion theory as the cause, took time. Immediately after the
explosion, President McKinley received a surge of attention in the press; this attention was
focused solely on the President rather than on Congress or on public opinion. The press
became suddenly very interested in what the executive branch was doing. However, unlike
modern rallies, it was not until after the declaration of war that support began to accrue to the
President. Because of this lagged rally effect, tied to the policy change rather than to the
event, this case strongly suggests that it is the symbolic presidency that primarily supports
the emergence of the rally around the flag.
Future Research
As I said at the beginning of this chapter, this is a story of rallies; it is not the story of
rallies. There are a couple of significant ways that this research can be expanded. The first of
these would be to include a wider range of newspapers into my proxy measure for public
approval. Throughout the history of the United States, different regions have had
significantly different approaches to questions. During the Mexican-American War, the
South saw the expansion of the country as a protection for their ‘peculiar institution’ and way
of life, while the New England states, opposed to slavery, argued that it was an immoral
land-grab, designed to further expand the power of the Slave States, and weakly justified by
forcing Mexican honor into firing the first shot. As the country found itself moving closer
and closer to entering the First World War, the Midwest especially pushed long and hard for
peace, arguing that the points made against Germany for violations of international law
regulating the rights of neutrals could be justly made against the Allies as well, especially
England and its blockade of the continent. I believe that expanding the Mexican-American
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War sample to include a Southern paper, perhaps from Atlanta, and a New England paper,
maybe from Boston, would make that analysis stronger. My other two cases would benefit
similarly from the inclusion of Midwest and Western papers; the Chicago, St. Louis, San
Francisco and Los Angeles markets could provide good candidates for inclusion.
The second potential expansion is one of methodology. This project employed a mix
of qualitative and quantitative methods. While the statistical methods used were enough to
show a trend and contributed well enough for this project, future collection of data could be
expanded such that more explanatory statistics could be drawn upon. My measure of
mentions is blunt. Making finer distinctions about who exactly is being mentioned would
improve the explanatory ability of the measure as well. For example, is it the president
himself that is being spoken of, or is a more general mention of the administration? With
regards to the tone of the coverage itself, an ordinal scale of how positive or negative the
article was might be added, rather than a simple dummy variable with positive, negative, and
neutral distinctions.
A potential contributing factor hinted at itself early in the project but did not emerge
full-blown until it was too late for it to be included. I focused on the relative importance of
the institutions, the president and Congress, and of public opinion and how those three
interacted. I examined the media and the acceptance of the president as the prime mover in
the area of foreign affairs. However, I left out one other institution that has emerged in every
democracy in the modern international era: the political party. The effect of the party in the
American system should not be discounted. While it arguably did not come into full effect
until the election of 1800 and the battle between Adams and Jefferson, the Federalists and the
Democratic-Republicans, it became increasingly more powerful over the following years.
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Arthur Schlesinger pointed out that “as the parties wasted away, the Presidency stood out in
solitary majesty as the central focus of political emotion, the ever potent symbol of national
community.”270 The parties essentially controlled the government until after the turn of the
twentieth century. After this point, the executive started pulling away from party control with
the introduction of the primary and the rhetorical presidency and its acceptance of public
appeals as appropriate. The President became the leader of the people first and the leader of
the party second rather than the other way around. However, Schlesinger’s quote leaves the
possibility of party strength, or the lack thereof, having a direct influence on the acceptance
of the president as the “symbol of national community.” The faltering power of the parties
over politics in the nation may also be a contributing influence on the independence of the
media. A deeper examination of this contributing factor would be a logical and likely fruitful
extension of this work as well.
While examining the effect of the rally around the flag phenomenon on the executive
branch is the more apparent application of this sort of study, the rally does affect others in the
system. Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence theory states that the other key decision makers
are essentially frightened into silence in the face of a popular president in the midst of a
crisis. Congress is a key player in politics in this country. Understanding how it reacts to a
President in the midst of a rally is key to understanding its behavior. Do members of the
House and Senate behave differently, considering the differences in their institutional
positions? Does the rally effect manifest itself differently if we are operating under a unified
or divided government?

270
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These last two considerations also give this research the potential to cross over the
lines between the subfields of political science, especially into comparative politics. How
does the rally effect work, if it does at all, in democracies where the chief executive is a
member of the legislature and beholden to his or her party for power? Do Chancellor Angela
Merkel or Prime Minister Gordon Brown receive a similar increase during times of crisis? A
brief look at history might hint that they do not, even in cases of situations dealing directly
with foreign relations. Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain’s government dissolved quickly
as Germany’s war machine rolled over the Low Countries in the spring of 1940; Prime
Minister Yukio Hatoyama of Japan was recently forced to resign over a campaign promise on
foreign relations on which he attempted to go back. A comparative examination of the rally
effect over democracies with different governmental and electoral systems would bring
additional light to the subject of our own peculiar system.
Concluding Thoughts
James Madison observed during a written exchange with his erstwhile Federalist
Papers co-author Alexander Hamilton “war is… the true nurse of executive
aggrandizement.”271 It is the executive that directs the military, that fights the war, and that
collects the laurels at the end of the struggle. Thus, it is during times of crisis, and war is the
epitome of crisis, that the president is most able to step up and take a hold of the reins of
power. Keeping this fact in mind, it is not surprising that the rally effect occurs. While one
might expect it to occur throughout the history of the country, it is not until the modern era of
the presidency that the chief executive begins to really benefit in a substantive way from the
public opinion surge that accompanies the rally around the flag effect.
271

Hamilton and Madison, 1845, pg 89.
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Much has been made in recent years of the apparently increasing polarization of the
political parties. Overt partisanship has been coming back into style on both sides of the
political spectrum, Fox on the right and MSNBC on the left being the best examples. This
may signal a reemergence of the parties as a significant player in the political drama of the
nation. Before the decline of the parties in the early twentieth century, they essentially ran
government in the United States: caucuses selected candidates with little to no input from the
public, patronage filled the majority of government jobs, and the success of an administration
was predicated on how well it worked with Congressional party leadership. It wasn’t until
after the parties faded that the president came to prominence. Schlesinger’s quote about the
decline of the parties being accompanied by the rise of the executive in very telling on this
point. This work hints at the possibility that, if the parties regain control of the workings of
government, we may see a fading or even an altogether disappearance of the rally around the
flag phenomenon.
This project began with the September 11 terrorist attacks; I think that a comment on
those attacks and their effect on the presidency are appropriate, to close the loop in a manner
of speaking. George W. Bush began his first term as a weak president without any electoral
mandate outside of the Electoral College. He ended that term with some of the greatest
claims to executive discretion and power articulated since the founding of the Republic.
While the 9/11 attacks were extraordinary in their effect and the length of the rally that they
created, the fact that President Bush benefited from them and was able to use the political
capital from them to produce such significant results is a testament to the potential of the
rally effect.
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Notes to Appendices
The term ‘articles,’ used below and throughout the work, should not be confused with
the term 'issues.’ By articles I mean individual stories written within each daily issue of the
paper in question. Dates to code were randomly selected using the random number sequence
generator available online at http://www.random.org.
Articles coded pre-event mean those articles read and coded from the issues that
occurred prior to the first possible mention of the rally event in the papers in question. As an
example, the sinking of the battleship USS Maine in Havana Harbor, Cuba, occurred on
February 15, 1898. ‘Pre-event,’ therefore, covers the period from January 15, 1898 through
February 14, 1898. Post-event covers the six-month period after the rally event, in this
example February 15 through August 15. In the monthly breakdown, I termed the months
with reference to the event (i.e. "1 month post," "2 months post," etc). These reference the
month following the event. Therefore, "1 month post" refers to a date range in this example
from February 15 to March 14, while "2 months post" refers to March 15 through April 14,
and so on.
In the number that I termed "President mentioned," this tracks the number of articles
for the period in question in which the President was mentioned. Rather than coding each
mention of the President, each article is coded as a single mention. Some articles were coded
as mentioned without actually mentioning President McKinley by name. These articles all
made specific reference to the administration's policies or to the policies of the executive
branch or the government's foreign policy in general. The same rule holds true for Congress.
Public opinion mentions were only coded for specific events, such as demonstrations, public
meetings and advertisements in the papers for such, as well as reactions by the papers to
those events, such as an editorial discussing a peace protest.
Please note as well that, while only 10 issues per paper per month were coded, the
dates in the table below are arraigned by calendar month rather than in correspondence to the
event. Therefore some months appear to have more or fewer than the ten described in the
coding scheme; this is simply an effect of that distribution.
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Appendix A: Coding
The following terms were used to code articles mentioning the President, Congress or
public opinion with regards to attitude. Occasionally, especially in the editorials that were
coded, an article would be written in such a way that the tone was clearly the opposite of
what the coding cues would suggest, such as satire or sarcasm. These, when detected, were
coded in the proper way as opposed to how the cues might have otherwise dictated.
Furthermore, there were times when the general tone of the article was positive or negative
while no one specific word could be pointed to as positive or negative. These were coded on
a case-by-case basis.
Positive statement queues: acclaim, admire, advocate, aggrandize, applaud, appreciate,
appreciate, approve, celebrate, cheer, cite, clap, commend, compliment, decisive, endorse,
extol, give thanks, hope, laud, hail, proclaim, rave over, recommend, resound, sanction,
standing by, support, tout.
Negative statement queues: accuse, bash, blame, blast, challenge, chastise, chide, condemn,
counter, denounce, disbelieve, disparage, disgrace, dishonor, dispute, distrust, find fault,
imbecility, imprudent, incoherence, inconsistency, jump on, knock, lambaste, mistrust,
oppose, outraged, pan, question, reproach, reprove, scathe, slam, take down, unjust,
unjustifiable
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Appendix B: Mexican-American War Data
This is the data from April 10 through November 10, 1846, representing the time
period specified for the Mexican-American War.
None of the papers in this case published on Sundays during this time period. If one
of the random selections fell on a Sunday, the previous Saturday was coded. If it was already
selected, the following Monday was coded. If both were already coded, the extra issue was
randomly redistributed. On the table below, the number listed inside of parentheses is the
date selected, while the date outside is the date that was coded.
Mexican-American War: Coded Issue Dates
Herald
13, 17, 22, 25, 30

April
May
June
July
August
September
October
November

Sun
14, 18, 20, 22,
27,
1, 2, 9, 11, 22,
25, 26,
2, 5, 8, 9, 12, 14,
17, 20, 22, 27,
2, 3, 11, 15, 16,
21, 22, 25, 27,
1, 15, 16, 19, 23,

2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 16, 17, 18
19, 21, 25, 27, 31
6, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22
23, 29
1, 6, 8, 11, 13, 14
16, 18 30
4, 6, 7, 10, 12, 15
16, 24, 25, 26
1, 2, 8, 9, 14, 16
1, 4, 6, 8, 11,
18, 20, 22, 29
20,
4, 5, 6, 10, 13, 16
1, 5, 6, 8,
22, 25, 26, 28, 31 20, 24, 27, 28,
2, 5, 10

17,
26,
13,
29,
6,

26
28
23
27
15
28
19
28
24
28
19
28
14
31
10

Tribune
12, 17, 19, 20,
24,
4, 6, 10, 11, 17,
19, 21, 25, 27,
2, 3, 12,
20, 21, 23,
1, 3, 4, 5, 11,
19, 22, 23, 29,
2, 9, 10, 12, 16,
19, 23, 24, 30,
6, 7, 15, 16, 29,

22
28
18
29
13
28
13
31
17
31
30

1, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11
21, 23, 26
3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10

Mexican-American War: Coded Data
Herald
Articles Pre-Event

Sun

Tribune

768

579

1106

13/12/17

11/13/12

15/17/19

-- Positive

1/1/6

10/9/1

3/5/7

-- Neutral

2/5/10

1/3/11

6/8/6

-- Negative

10/6/1

0/1/1

6/4/6

730

579

1095

9/12/10

11/12/10

16/22/19

-- Positive

3/0/5

9/8/8

1/3/1

-- Neutral

2/1/5

2/4/2

5/7/5

4/11/0

0/0/2

10/12/13

President/Congress/Public Mentioned

Articles 1 Month Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned

-- Negative

160

Articles 2 Months Post

806

550

1150

14/19/13

11/12/9

12/20/16

-- Positive

1/0/5

9/10/7

2/6/0

-- Neutral

4/4/7

2/2/1

2/6/7

9/15/1

0/0/1

8/8/9

President/Congress/Public Mentioned

-- Negative
Articles 3 Months Post

745

585

1139

13/12/15

8/10/14

15/25/17

-- Positive

0/1/4

8/8/10

1/3/0

-- Neutral

2/2/9

0/2/1

7/5/5

11/9/2

0/0/3

7/17/12

730

597

1139

9/16/10

8/14/12

21/19/21

-- Positive

0/1/2

8/7/11

2/2/1

-- Neutral

3/5/7

0/6/1

7/5/6

6/10/1

0/1/0

12/12/14

707

521

1161

7/14/17

6/12/12

22/29/25

-- Positive

1/2/6

5/9/9

0/6/2

-- Neutral

1/5/8

1/3/2

7/12/4

-- Negative

5/7/3

0/0/1

15/11/19

707

538

1139

9/13/14

7/9/11

22/18/27

-- Positive

1/2/4

5/8/11

0/2/4

-- Neutral

0/2/9

2/1/0

5/7/5

-- Negative

8/9/1

0/0/0

17/9/18

President/Congress/Public Mentioned

-- Negative
Articles 4 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned

-- Negative
Articles 5 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned

Articles 6 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
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Appendix C: Spanish-American War Data
This is the data from January 15 through August 15, 1898, representing the time
period specified for the Spanish-American War.
The Evening Post did not publish on Sundays during this time period, so if one of the
random selections fell on a Sunday, the previous Saturday was coded. If it was already
selected, the following Monday was coded. If both were already coded, the extra issue was
randomly selected. On the table below, the number listed inside of parentheses is the date
selected, while the date outside is the date that was coded.
Spanish-American War: Coded Issues Dates
Evening Post
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August

Journal

Tribune

15, 20, 22, 29 (30), 31
2, 4, 11, 12, 14 (13)
18, 24, 25, 26, 28
5, 10, 11, 16, 17
18, 19, 21 (20), 22, 26
1, 5, 8 (24), 13, 14
15, 23, 25, 26, 27
1 (2), 3, 7, 12, 16
19, 20, 25, 26, 29 (28)
2, 3, 8, 12, 15
17, 21, 26, 29, 30
6 (31), 8, 9 (10), 12, 15
16, 18 (17), 19, 22, 30

21, 24, 25, 26, 28
1, 2, 6, 8, 9
10, 16, 18, 23, 28
3, 7, 14, 18, 19
22, 23, 28, 30, 31
11, 13, 14, 18, 21
24, 25, 27, 28, 30
4, 9, 16, 18, 19
21, 22, 23, 27, 29
7, 8, 12, 13, 14
16, 21, 22, 24, 25
9, 10, 17, 18, 19
20, 21, 22, 23, 30

6, 8, 9, 11, 13

3, 6, 9, 11, 13

15, 17, 22, 23,
5, 6, 7, 8,
12, 16, 23, 24,
1, 4, 5, 8,
19, 22, 24, 25,
1, 3, 4, 7,
13, 16, 23, 27,
1, 7, 8, 10,
14, 17, 18, 21,
2, 7, 8, 10,
13, 18, 23, 27,
2, 5, 10, 11,
14, 18, 21, 22,

24
10
28
18
31
10
30
12
23
11
28
13
26

1, 3, 6, 12, 15

Spanish American War: Coded Data
Journal
Post
Articles Pre-Event
561
1205
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
9/44/31
12/36/11
-- Positive
0/9/0
3/2/2
-- Neutral
1/34/12
9/31/9
-- Negative
8/1/19
0/3/0

Tribune
1157
14/48/18
12/7/12
2/36/6
0/5/0

Articles 1 Month Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
-- Positive
-- Neutral
-- Negative

754
19/32/22
0/5/1
2/24/10
17/3/11

1365
16/28/17
9/6/3
7/21/12
0/1/2

1496
26/29/4
20/6/4
1/20/0
5/3/0

Articles 2 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned

778
15/34/28

1376
17/47/23

1552
13/47/7
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-- Positive
-- Neutral
-- Negative

6/12/0
2/19/12
7/3/16

6/4/8
9/40/10
2/3/5

8/8/5
4/36/2
1/5/0

Articles 3 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
-- Positive
-- Neutral
-- Negative

841
17/27/21
3/9/7
12/16/7
2/2/7

1320
17/38/10
1/8/8
6/28/1
10/2/1

1509
27/39/11
23/25/7
4/11/4
0/3/0

Articles 4 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
-- Positive
-- Neutral
-- Negative

749
10/48/44
2/17/36
6/29/7
2/2/1

1333
13/37/17
3/9/11
7/25/6
3/3/0

1496
16/40/10
12/18/8
4/16/2
0/6/0

Articles 5 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
-- Positive
-- Neutral
-- Negative

715
8/30/16
1/13/13
4/15/3
3/2/0

1272
12/38/17
1/7/15
11/31/2
0/0/0

1448
18/34/14
13/16/14
5/12/0
0/6/0

163

Appendix D: World War I Data
This is the data from February 1 through September 15 1898, representing the time
period specified for World War I. This data further included January 1-31 to deal with an
endogeneity concern, discussed in Chapter 5.
World War I: Coded Issue Dates
January
February
March
April
May
June
July
August

American
5, 10, 11, 12, 13,
25, 26, 27,
2, 7, 8, 11, 17,
22, 26, 27,
3, 4, 6, 7, 11,
14, 17, 24,
3, 5, 11, 19, 20,
26, 27, 28,
1, 6, 9, 10, 14,
19, 20, 22,
4, 7, 8, 12, 13,
21, 22, 23,
1, 8, 10, 11, 12,
18, 22, 23,
2, 3, 4, 6, 8,
15, 27, 29,

16
31
20
28
13
28
24
30
15
28
18
30
13
24
10
30

Times
2, 8, 14, 15, 18,
20, 23, 28,
2, 3, 10, 12, 13,
22, 26, 27,
2, 4, 6, 8, 11,
16, 20, 21,
1, 4, 5, 6, 14,
21, 25, 27,
1, 2, 4, 9, 11,
16, 20, 25,
1, 2, 4, 7, 9,
14, 20, 28,
5, 10, 12, 15, 19,
28, 29, 30,
1, 2, 5, 8, 10,
14, 15, 27,

World War 1: Coded Data
American
Articles Coded Pre-Event
527
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
20/38/21
-- Positive
1/7/3
-- Negative
3/4/4
-- Neutral
16/27/14

19
29
16
28
15
26
17
30
15
31
11
30
24
31
12
31

Tribune
4, 6, 12, 13,
21, 23,
1, 2, 7, 15,
19, 20,
1, 2, 11, 14,
18, 19,
1, 5, 11, 14,
21, 25,
2, 3, 6, 8,
15, 18,
1, 4, 5, 11,
23, 25,
4, 5, 6, 9,
19, 21,
1, 2, 4, 8,
17, 26,

Times

16,
25,
17,
22,
15,
22,
17,
27,
11,
25,
12,
27,
10,
25,
13,
28,

17
30
18
26
17
25
18
29
14
27
17
30
16
31
15
30

479
27/38/40
8/7/16
0/4/3
19/27/21

Tribune
554
50/60/34
3/13/11
3/5/5
44/42/18

Articles 1 Month Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
-- Positive
-- Negative
-- Neutral

580
26/23/33
6/4/6
5/3/1
15/18/24

461
58/20/30
31/6/10
0/2/3
27/12/17

593
58/41/43
11/11/8
11/2/0
36/28/25

Articles 2 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
-- Positive
-- Negative
-- Neutral

610
23/53/36
7/9/6
6/1/7
10/43/24

457
56/34/36
28/5/14
0/5/2
28/24/20

513
50/51/38
12/16/14
6/4/0
32/31/24
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Articles 3 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
-- Positive
-- Negative
-- Neutral

445
20/51/30
4/13/9
5/2/5
11/36/16

529
56/35/31
24/6/17
0/1/0
32/28/14

578
55/43/32
16/7/14
1/2/0
38/34/18

Articles 4 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
-- Positive
-- Negative
-- Neutral

595
27/34/26
5/6/2
10/2/7
12/26/17

536
53/39/47
23/8/19
0/0/0
30/31/28

553
56/35/37
24/10/13
0/0/0
32/45/24

Articles 5 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
-- Positive
-- Negative
-- Neutral

531
21/23/25
3/5/3
9/0/3
9/18/19

572
54/25/41
20/3/12
0/1/0
34/21/19

543
58/47/46
35/13/21
0/3/0
33/41/25

Articles 6 Months Post
President/Congress/Public Mentioned
-- Positive
-- Negative
-- Neutral

563
22/52/37
7/7/9
6/1/7
4/44/21

412
52/30/46
23/6/17
0/4/0
29/20/29

435
54/51/43
19/12/21
0/6/0
35/33/22
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